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Abstract  
 
The research has a double objective. Firstly, to investigate the degree of rules 
harmonization between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea, one of the 
main objective pursued by the EU external action in the field of energy. 
Secondly, to analyze current developments of the regulatory framework and 
the role of regulatory agencies of Mediterranean countries with regards to 
electricity and renewables. In doing so, the thesis has been organized into an 
introductory chapter and three specific chapters focusing on EU rules 
promotion methods and the perception of EU action by Mediterranean 
regulators (chapter 2); the institutional endowment of southern Mediterranean 
countries (chapter 3); role and independence of regulatory agencies for the 
energy sector in Northern Africa and Middle East countries (chapter 4).  
 
Chapter 2 (co-authored with Prof. Carlo Cambini) 
 
Rules harmonization is one of the features characterizing regional integration 
processes. This paper analyse such dynamics with regards to the Euro-
Mediterranean area and the energy sector. The study pays attention to three 
main criteria that have characterized the EU domestic process of energy sector 
liberalization, which are promoted in the Southern Mediterranean 
neighbourhood through EU cooperation programmes and networking 
initiatives. These criteria are the sector’s unbundling, the definition of TPA 
regime, and the establishment of National Independent Regulatory Authorities. 
In doing so, three pressures for rules promotion and change are assessed in a 
comparative way through a perception survey directed at regulatory 
authorities from four Southern Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Jordan, 
Egypt, and Turkey. These cases have been selected because of their relevance in 
terms of energy sector restructuring and energy exchanges, being relevant 
producers and transit countries. Moreover, with the exception of Turkey, 
candidate to EU membership, the countries selected are involved in EU 
cooperation programmes and policies since mid 1990s. All of them, thus, are 
under both EU top-down and EU indirect, mainly network based, pressures for 
rules change. The case of network governance here considered is the MedReg. 
Among the modes of governance considered, the indirect pressure seems, 
considering our results, the weakest one.  
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Chapter 3 
 
The aim of the paper is the identification of existing restraints on regulators’ 
discretion, and limits to changing the regulatory system, as may be derived by 
the analysis of Constitutions, fundamental laws, and anecdotic evidences on 
the political life of southern Mediterranean countries. In the Annex to the 
paper, a description of the methodology adopted and variables defined is 
given. The institutional background that emerge from the analysis has been 
considered in the analysis on the role and independence of energy regulatory 
agencies in the southern Mediterranean countries.   
 
Chapter 4 (co-authored with Prof. Carlo Cambini) 
 
The paper analyses the existing regulatory framework for the electricity and 
renewables sectors, and the role of regulatory agencies in Northern Africa and 
Middle East countries, under the promotion by the European Union. Using 
data collected through an original survey directed at regulators, ministry 
departments and energy companies of the southern Mediterranean, the study is 
aimed at assessing the extent of agencies’ independence looking at three main 
dimensions of independence: regulatory instruments available to regulators 
and decision making autonomy; regulators’ organizational autonomy; 
regulators accountability. Results show that those countries having established 
an independent regulator have a more credible regulatory framework than 
those countries in which such body does not exist. In particular, the analysis 
shows that Turkey, Croatia and Jordan have defined a regulatory framework 
that limits administrative expropriation and, consequently, creates an 
environment more suitable for attracting investments in the electricity and 
renewables sector. On the institutional ground, this is probably related with the 
harmonization of regulatory standards promoted by the European Union 
through the neighbouring policy, for the Jordan case, and the membership 
perspective, in the Turkish and Croatian case. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Rules harmonization in the Euro-Mediterranean area.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this research is twofold: to investigate the degree of 
energy rules harmonization between the two shores of the 
Mediterranean Sea, and to analyze current developments of the 
regulatory framework of southern and eastern Mediterranean countries 
with regards to the electricity and renewables sector. In doing so, the 
first aspect considered in the study is the pressure of the European 
Union (EU) for rules harmonization in the Mediterranean region. 
Although the missing exclusive competences on energy, and external 
relations, the role of the Union as “regulatory power” (Majone, 1997) 
abroad emerges by those initiatives and programmes directed at 
promoting a model of “functional” integration based on energy market 
integration and shared regulatory standards.  
The first dimension of the study is the effectiveness of the EU as 
rules promoter in the neighbourhood. Starting from 1995, the year of 
the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, rules harmonization is at the base 
of the promoted process of regional integration as it develops till 2011. 
The study, thus, assesses the EU rules promotion looking mainly at the 
degree of adoption and implementation, by Middle East and Northern 
Africa (MENA) countries, of EU regulatory standards for the electricity 
sector. Specifically, being independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) one 
of the features that characterizes the EU domestic regulation for 
utilities, the research assesses the extent of adoption of IRAs model by 
southern Mediterranean countries. Firstly, the effectiveness of the EU 
pressures for rules change is investigated (paper 2). By virtue of an 
external rules promotion largely based on the domestic experience, the 
development of the European acquis communautaire on energy have 
been considered. Three core aspects of energy sector restructuring, and 
market integration, have been taken as the main dimensions on which 
the EU pressure for rules change is measured: the mentioned 
establishment of IRAs; the unbundling of utilities’ industry; the 
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definition of third party access (TPA) regime and incentive tariff 
system. Two modes of external pressure for rules change have been 
considered: hierarchy and network. The former referring to EU directly 
managed initiatives of cooperation, the latter being the case of 
networks of governance supported by the EU. A third competitive 
pressure played by domestic actor (bottom-up pressure) is also taken 
into account. The methodology of analysis chosen is a perception 
survey measuring regulatory performance (OECD 2012), directed at 
officers of existing IRAs in four MENA countries: Algeria, Egypt, 
Jordan and Turkey. 
Secondly, the degree of adoption and implementation of promoted 
standards of regulation by MENA countries is assessed. Thus, the 
second dimension of the study is the institutional endowment (North 
1990) of MENA countries taken as necessary, but exogenous, factor 
allowing rules change. With this regard, the research follows the 
methodology by Levy and Spiller (1994) and analyses how judiciary 
independence, counterbalancing executive-legislative powers, and veto 
players external to the political arena affect regulatory restraints (paper 
3). Constitutions and fundamental laws, as well as anecdotic evidences 
on the political life of ten MENA countries, have been taken as the main 
sources of information for this part of the analysis. After having 
detected the main variables of interest, we grouped them in six 
categories: state regime; restraints on regulators’ discretion written in 
the regulatory system; restraints on changing regulatory systems, 
formal or substantial; judiciary independence; countries’ stability; and 
countries’ investment profile. Then, a first description of the energy, 
electricity mainly, sector is provided including existing regulatory 
restraints.  
The third, and last, dimension considered in this research is the 
current development of the electricity and renewable framework of 
regulation in the region, and the independence of regulatory agencies. 
A literature review on the rationale behind agencies’ establishment and 
independence from the political power is provided. Subsequently, the 
extent of agencies’ independence, as well as  the existing electricity and 
renewable regulatory framework, is analysed through a survey 
directed at regulatory agencies and energy companies of the 
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Mediterranean region (paper 4). Agencies’ independence has been 
defined in terms of decision making powers; organizational autonomy; 
and accountability measures.  
To conclude this introductory chapter, the following paragraphs 
clarifies the rational behind the study: the degree of  inter-dependence 
within the Mediterranean region in terms of increasing energy needs of 
both shores of the Mediterranean Sea  (1.1) and Euro-Mediterranean 
policies and programmes of cooperation on energy (1.2).  
In the end, a description of the organization of the thesis, is provided. 
 
1.1 Euro-Mediterranean energy inter-dependence  
 
The main assumption at the base of this study is that the Mediterranean 
region is characterized by energy inter-dependence, which involves 
both the northern and the southern and eastern shores of the 
Mediterranean Sea. Such inter-dependence is in this section described 
in terms of energy needs - energy demand and exchange - as well as 
needs for a shared regulatory framework directed at improving 
resources potentials of the south, including renewables1.  
Energy consumption by southern Mediterranean countries will 
increase in the next 20 years by 70%, relying at 87% on fossil fuels 
(European Commission, 2007). The energy demand in the southern 
Mediterranean is expected to rise of 2% per year to reach 1.405 million 
tonnes oil equivalent (Mtoe) (OME 2011). In OME scenario, the 
southern Mediterranean countries account for “33% of the region’s 
energy demand today” (OME 2011, p.31), which may expands to 47% in 
2030. In order to satisfy such increase, reforms of the sector are 
required.  
On the northern shore of Mediterranean, energy dependency from 
abroad increases. The EU is depending for energy provisions mainly 
from outside supplies. The International Energy Agency (IEA), 
                                                 
1 Developing the study, the author is aware that inter-dependence should be considered 
in terms of security and stability at both regional, the Mediterranean widely understood, 
and sub-regional, Mashreq and Maghreb, level. With this regard, security aspects have 
been conceived as exogenous to our study and reference to them are given only when 
necessary for the study on regulatory harmonization processes. 
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comparing the level of energy imports from IEA members of 1973 with 
the values registered in 2008, identifies Italy, France and Spain, among 
EU countries, as those suffering the highest level of dependency from 
gas, natural gas and coal imports. The same report qualifies Denmark 
as the sole net exporters (IEA 2009). Analysing the EU energy 
dependency since 1998, the Eurostat Pocketbook (2010), stresses the 
constantly increasing level of dependency2, shown in the Table 1. For 
the electricity sector, the Netherlands, with Italy, registered the highest 
imported values. On the contrary, France was the largest net exporter 
of electricity among EU Member States. The level of dependency 
reached in 2008 the 84.3 % for oil, and the 62.3 % for gas, two of the 
main energy sources imported by the EU. Southern EU members’ 
dependency from gas import increased in the period 1998 - 2008. 
Portugal and Greece recorded a six fold and fivefold increase in their 
net imports of gas, mainly due to low penetration of natural gas back in 
1998, and Spain and Italy, two of the top importers in the EU members, 
presented a threefold and twofold increase and their share of total EU 
natural gas imports reached 36% in 2008 (Eurostat 2010). The Table 2 
refers to the import of natural gas in the EU by main country of origin. 
Despite the most sensitive growth was registered for Russia, both for 
oil and gas, Algeria and Libya confirmed to be the main exporters 
among Mediterranean countries, with increasing values for Libya (26 % 
in the 2000 – 2008 period); while Egypt emerged as a new and strong 
exporter in the last few years.  
The data provided for the EU and MENA countries confirm the 
two shores of the Mediterranean being reciprocally dependent: the EU 
depending for energy supplies, while MENA countries are depending 
from the EU in terms of market, for their energy products, technology 
and financial resources for new infrastructures. The Table 3 stresses the 
gas import from the MENA region ordering, for each main country of 
origin, those of destination; it reveals the existing strong dependency of 
the EU by exporters in the Mediterranean region. Coming to the oil 
sector, Libya confirmed as the main source of import from the southern 
                                                 
2 The energy dependency indicator assesses “the extent to which an economy relies upon 
imports in order to meet its energy needs. The indicator is calculated as net imports divided by the 
sum of gross inland energy consumption” (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat , March 2011) 
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neighbourhood (Table 4). These data are also confirmed when looking 
in detail at southern neighbouring countries (Table 5).   
With regard to the MENA region, Algeria Libya and Egypt are, since 
1990s, the main country of origin for energy imports for the EU 
Mediterranean members mainly.  
The last tables provide a short summary of the energy production 
by MENA countries, import and export values. These data are 
interesting considering the analysis of the current organization of the 
sector, with special attention to electricity and renewable. Considering 
the energy primary production, it rapidly increased in the last few 
years, in coincidence with the need for the European importing 
countries to find alternative sources to imports from Russia. Moreover, 
the increased values registered should be regarded as the result of 
growing interests of Asiatic emerging powers for Mediterranean and 
Middle East energy resources.  Data show the growing relevance of 
energy exports (Table 7) compared to the imports for countries like 
Syria and Egypt, the latter confirming as the country with the third largest 
oil and gas reserves in the Mediterranean” (OME 2011). The role of 
Algerian resources is also confirmed. Data between growing exporters 
and persistence of net importer countries is also evident when looking 
at the energy import by country (Table 8). Morocco and Israel are those 
countries registering higher level of imports compared to the other 
countries; while, the situation of Palestinian Territory requires, in our 
opinion, more detailed data.  
Summarising, the EU energy dependency will rest for a long and 
should be considered under the light of a changing world in which, 
new powers, like China and India, and development countries, are 
increasing their demand and changing the relevance that old and 
“new” energy producers may have (IEA 2009). Furthermore, the 
increasing level of energy demand by MENA countries, concentrated in 
the industrial and residential sectors, is part of a development process 
that cannot be ignored. As recent people uprisings in the region show, 
the need to assure equal access to economic resources is pivotal to the 
stability of the region, and to the northern energy security too, more 
than long lasting authoritarian leaders. Thus, considering the potentials 
of the renewables sector too, the Mediterranean area is intended 
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becoming ever more relevant. The Euro-Mediterranean relations and 
cooperation on rules for the establishment of a common energy area 
and “a free energy trade zone” thus, require new efforts in favour of a 
more coordinated response to energy challenges.  
The following section delineates the development of the Euro-
Mediterranean policy since 1990s. It provides the framework for the 
analysis of the evolution of the EU action as rules promoter, progresses 
done, and perspectives for future change.    
 
1.2 The Euro-Mediterranean energy policy and the process of 
regional integration3  
 
One of the core elements of the EU action in the neighbourhood is the 
establishment of strong partnerships with the neighbouring countries 
on the base of shared and harmonized rules for sectoral cooperation. 
With regards to energy, this approach clearly emerges when looking at 
the way the EU–MENA cooperation addresses issues regarding the 
electricity sector regulation, markets integration, cross-border 
infrastructure investments and electricity trade. Since the 1990s, when 
the EU foreign policy was defined for the first time and partnership 
initiatives towards the Mediterranean countries have been adopted, the 
action pursued has been directed at creating conditions for energy 
market integration, by mirroring the process of domestic market 
harmonization on the EU external action. Association of regulators at 
EU and neighbouring countries level, EU Member States, stakeholders 
such as the energy industry and the civil society organizations, all of 
them have unanimously agreed on the relevance of creating a shared 
regulatory framework, viewed as the milestone for implementing 
common projects in the field of energy efficiency, renewables and 
security of supply. The objective is the establishment of an effective 
integration, based on shared interests of the actors involved, allowing 
the EU to overcome domestic limits in energy sector (not yet under its 
exclusive competences), and permitting the MENA to be considered as 
                                                 
3 “Institutional context: energy policies, regional institutions, financial organizations and 
schemes”, in: OME Report, The Institutional Framework of the Electricity Industry in SEMCs 
and the Euro-Med energy policies, , chapter 2, paragraph 1 (publication forthcoming). 
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active interlocutors of the projects to be implemented. In order to 
describe how the energy policies towards the Mediterranean have been 
defined during the time, this chapter highlights the evolution of the EU 
energy policy towards the southern neighbouring countries; initiatives 
and programmes adopted are examined together with results achieved 
starting from 1995 till to the present moment.  
 
1.2.1 The European energy policy and the Mediterranean region: evolutionary 
process and future perspectives  
The EU energy policy with regards to the neighbouring countries 
has been described as non-unique policy, showing “continuous tension 
between the EU’s lack of competence over energy imports (27 separate policies 
with external energy suppliers) versus its supranational competence on 
commercial relations with third countries (single trade actor)”  (Hadfiled 
2009, p.3). Being a young international actor, with growing 
competences in international affairs, the EU reacted to the missing 
exclusive competences in the energy field by promoting international 
initiatives mainly based on market integration and common standard 
regulation, considered two essential aspects for enhancing cooperation. 
The 1990s are considered as crucial years for the consolidation of the 
EU role on energy both, at domestic and international level. If the latter 
refers to first projects for partnership building, the former refers to the 
approval of first directives for energy market (electricity and gas). In 
this period, EU competences on energy market integration are affirmed 
and the Internal Energy Market (IEM) structure progressively defined, 
providing elements characterizing the Euro-Mediterranean energy 
cooperation.     
Having regards to the southern neighbouring countries, in the 
1990s the EU extended the principles of the IEM through a policy 
promoting the definition of an Energy Charter Treaty for the South. 
Directed at encouraging free trade and economic integration, and 
favouring the necessary political cooperation for the security of energy 
supplies, the Treaty was never signed. In 1994, the European Council in 
Essen confirmed the role that the Euro-Mediterranean coordination 
should have in order to assure effectiveness to investment projects, and 
in 1995 the Barcelona declaration (1995) launched the Euro-
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Mediterranean Partnership.  
 
1.2.2 From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) to the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) has constituted the 
central framework for relations between the EU and its Southern 
Mediterranean partners for over ten years. In the 1990s, the EU started 
to draft a new Mediterranean policy, which was finalized at the 
Barcelona Conference, on November 1995. As result, the “Barcelona 
Process”, or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, was launched with 
the main objective of attaining long-term stability in this region, 
including all the EU Member States, as well as Turkey, Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and the 
Palestinian Authority; Albania and Mauritania joined at the beginning 
of November 2007; Libya has had observer status since 1999. 
The EMP initiative lays the foundations of a proposed new regional 
relationship, by establishing three main objectives: 
- Definition of a common area of peace and stability by 
reinforcing political and security dialogue, and by promoting 
political values, good governance and democracy (Political and 
Security Basket). 
- Construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an 
economic and financial partnership and the gradual 
establishment of a free-trade area, including the Association 
Agreements on the bilateral level (Economic and Financial 
Basket). 
- Rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and 
human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding 
between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (Social, 
Cultural and Human Basket). 
The economic basket, which includes the project for a Euro-
Mediterranean Free-Trade Area (EMFTA) to be established in 2010, as 
well as financial cooperation and concerted actions in the field of 
economic development, embraces also the cooperation on energy 
issues, proving the relevance of a progressive convergence on market 
regulation, since the very beginning of the Euro-Mediterranean policy. 
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Consequently, considering market as the main area in which the EU 
had full competences, energy market integration was identified as the 
method chosen for managing the energy integration between European 
and MENA countries.  
In 2004, the European Union enlargement brought two more 
Mediterranean countries (Cyprus and Malta) into the Union, while 
adding a total of 10 to the number of Member States. Today, the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership comprises 44 members (27 European Union 
Member States, and 16 partner countries: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, 
Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian territories, Syria, 
Tunisia and Turkey) promoting an articulated regional dialogue which 
aims, among the other things, at carrying out a number of bilateral 
activities, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, 
that the EU negotiates with the Mediterranean Partners individually, 
reflecting on them general principles governing the new Euro-
Mediterranean relationship. 
Regional dialogue represents one of the most innovative aspects of 
the EMP, covering at the same time political, economic and cultural 
fields within a cooperative logic. This cooperation has a considerable 
strategic impact as it deals with problems that are common to many 
Mediterranean Partners, emphasizing regional complementarities and 
cross-border synergies. The multilateral dimension, which supports 
and complements bilateral actions taking place under the Association 
Agreements, has been strengthened, since 2004, by including 
Mediterranean Partners in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 
supported by the funding instrument MEDA, replaced in 2006 by the 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which 
represents the new financial scheme designed within the framework of 
the ENP. 
1.2.3 The European Neighbourhood Policy and the evolutionary integration 
process. 
The EMP has represented an innovative project “based on the 
principles of joint ownership, dialogue and co-operation”, which had to 
make the Mediterranean a “region of peace, security and shared 
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prosperity” (Barcelona Declaration 1995). In this regard, the novelty of 
the EMP has been to present a well structured policy framework for the 
cooperation with the southern neighbouring countries in which the 
partnership and all funded projects were developed. Although energy 
was not the core element of the EMP project, there is no doubt that 
promoting a model for restructuring the economic sector in a more 
competitive way favoured a certain regulatory culture to spread, and 
common problems as well as visions for future energy cooperation to 
bring out. In the post-Barcelona environment, the role of the EU as 
integrated energy market strengthened, also considering progresses 
within the Union, testified by the adoption of two other packages of 
directives4 in the first decade of 2000, aiming at fostering the IEM, by 
enhancing regulatory competences and consolidating the model of 
regulation the EU promotes outside its borders. Since then, the external 
dimension of the energy policy has been considered in several 
documents of the EU, as the Communication “On the development of 
Energy Policy for the Enlarged EU, its Neighbours and Partner countries” 
(European Commission 2003b), which addresses roles and values of the 
energy partnership when creating a wider market based on common 
rules and principles. In this regard, the EMP value for north-south 
energy market integration as well as energy infrastructure projects, 
have been defined relevant also in terms of security of supply, and in 
2004, the ENP has been launched including Partner Countries 
participating in the Barcelona Process, thus complementing and 
reinforcing the EMP on a bilateral basis, through Action Plans that 
should contribute to cross-border cooperation 5.  
                                                 
4 The Second Energy Package (Directive 2003/54/EC and Directive 2033/55/EC, concerning 
respectively the electricity and gas markets), and the Third Energy Package (Directive 
2009/72/EC and Directive 2009/73/EC, concerning respectively the electricity and gas 
markets, and repealing the former Directives).  
5 Cf. European Commission, 2004, Communication on Proposals for Action Plans under 
the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 09. 12. 2004, COM (2004) 795 final. Besides, As 
stated in the conclusions of the European Council held in Gaer the 14 June 2004, the 
Action Plans “(…) should be based on common principles but be differentiated, as appropriate, 
taking into account the specificities of each neighbor, its national reform processes and its relations 
with the EU. Action plans should be comprehensive but at the same time identify clearly a limited 
number of key priorities and offer real incentives for reform. Action plans should also contribute, 
where possible, to regional cooperation” 
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The ENP, approached by some scholars not only ”as a new EU 
policy, but also as a reflection of some deeper transformations on (...) 
governance in the wider Europe” (Crombois 2007),  has its roots on the 
vision of the European Commission based on the conviction that “over 
the coming decade and beyond, the Union’s capacity to provide security, 
stability and sustainable development to its citizens will no longer be 
distinguishable from its interest in close cooperation with the neighbours”, in 
order to “promote stability, security and sustainable development both within 
and without the EU (…) to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly 
neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ - with whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful 
and co-operative relations” (European Commission 2003a). In this regard, 
on March 2006, the Green Paper “European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy” (European Commission 2006a) 
confirmed the value of the regional approach to energy cooperation, 
revising also the instruments for the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation 
by establishing, among the other things, the ENPI. Furthermore, a 
document addressed to the European Council, and jointly signed in 
2006 by the European Commission, the Secretary General, and the High 
Representative for foreign relations, suggested the adoption of a legal 
framework for the external energy policy in which the problem of 
energy security had to be discussed in a “coherent (backed up by all Union 
policies, the member states and industry), strategic (fully recognising the geo-
political dimensions of energy-related security issues) and focused (geared 
towards initiatives where Union-level action can have a clear impact in 
furthering its interests) way” (European Commission/ Secretary General 
/High Representative 2006, p.3). The need of assuring to the foreign 
energy strategy consistency with the EU’s foreign policy objectives has 
been then confirmed and in this regard, the document suggested the 
constitution of “networks of energy correspondents”, including 
representatives from the European members, the Commission, and the 
Secretary General, in order to “monitor energy security in relevant 
producer countries, and develop analysis and action plans”. Regarding the 
neighbourhood, this text envisaged the need to give particular 
emphasis on the implementation of the energy-related provisions of the 
ENP Action Plans, and strengthen the bilateral energy cooperation with 
important producer and transit partners in North Africa, while at 
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regional level a gradual convergence towards market opening, fair 
competition, as well as environmental protection and safety had to be 
pursued. Nevertheless, the Network of Energy Security 
Correspondents, established in 2007, involved only projects on the EU 
eastern borders, leaving for the moment the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean without such a form of coordination.  
In 2007, the Communication “An Energy Policy for Europe” 
reconfirmed energy as a relevant issue for the European economic 
growth, also considering the potential evolution of its relations with 
foreign partners, adding to energy also climate change and renewables 
started to be promoted, by affirming the need to speak with one single 
voice in pursuing, within 2010, the definition of “network of countries 
around the EU, acting on the basis of shared rules or principles derived from 
the EU energy policy” (European Commission 2007, p.18). Therefore, on 
March 2007, the European Council adopted the view of an energy 
policy, integrated with a climate change strategy, that should “increase 
security of supply, ensure the competitiveness of European economies and the 
availability of affordable energy, and promote environmental sustainability 
and combating climate change” (European Council 2007, p. 12). These 
objectives have been following translated in the EC document on the 
2020 initiative adopted in 2010. Having regards to the neighbouring 
countries, the Council referred to the ENP Action Plans as tools for 
“enhancing energy relationships with Algeria, Egypt and other producing 
countries in the Mashreq/Maghreb region” (European Council 2007, p.12), 
and on December 2007, the 5th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial 
conference agrees on a six-year Action Plan for energy cooperation 
aimed at creating “a common Euro-Mediterranean energy market”. In the 
same year, the project of the Union for Mediterranean (UfM) was 
launched by the French President Nicholas Sarkozy. The UfM, can be 
defined as “an international, inter-governmental organization including 
states linked by weak institutional ties (the non EU states) and a group of 
states brought together by strong supranational institutional ties (the EU)” 
(Aliboni and Ammor 2009). 
Adopted in 2008, the UfM is a multilateral partnership that 
encompasses 43 countries from Europe and the Mediterranean Basin: 
the 27 member states of the European Union and 16 Mediterranean 
  
13
 
partner countries from North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans. 
Created to re-launch the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the UfM is 
considered as the southern regional cooperation branch of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy with the aim of promoting stability 
and prosperity throughout the Mediterranean region6. At the Paris 
Summit, the 43 Heads of State and Government from the Euro-
Mediterranean region presented the Union as a new phase of the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership with new members and an improved 
institutional architecture in order to "enhance multilateral relations, 
increase co-ownership of the process, set governance on the basis of equal 
footing and translate it into concrete projects, more visible to citizens. Now is 
the time to inject a new and continuing momentum into the Barcelona 
Process. More engagement and new catalysts are now needed to translate the 
objectives of the Barcelona Declaration into tangible results" (Paris 
Declaration 2008, p.11). Moreover, the Paris Declaration states that 
contributions for the Union for the Mediterranean will have to develop 
the capacity to attract funding from "the private sector participation; 
contributions from the EU budget and all partners; contributions from other 
countries, international financial institutions and regional entities; the Euro-
Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP); the ENPI”, 
among other possible instruments (Paris Declaration 2008, p.12). In this 
regard, the European Commission contributes to the Union for the 
Mediterranean through the European Neighbourhood Policy 
Instrument (ENPI), by allocating financial resources to several areas of 
action, such as the de-pollution of the Mediterranean basin, the 
establishment of maritime and land highways in order to connect ports 
and improve rail connections so as to facilitate movement of people 
and goods, and a Mediterranean solar energy plan that explores 
opportunities for developing alternative energy sources in the region. 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) contributes through its Facility 
for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), which 
brings together the whole range of services provided by the EIB to 
assist the economic development and the integration of the 
Mediterranean partner countries; and through the InfraMed 
                                                 
6 Nevertheless, its 2009 and 2010 Summits could not be held due to the stalemate of the 
Arab-Israeli peace process after the Gaza war. 
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Infrastructure Fund, established in June 2010 by five financial entities 
(the French Caisse des Dépôts, the Moroccan Caisse de Dépôts et de 
Gestion, the Egyptian EFG Hermes, the Italian Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 
and the European Investment Bank) in order to resources of equity 
financing for infrastructure projects across the region.  
While the EMP and the ENP hardly contributed to the regulatory 
convergence so far promoted, the UfM has been differently perceived, 
having introduced a novel approach to the Euro-Mediterranean 
relations; the focus on technical issues of cooperation and the relevance 
of functional integration approach being directed at ”circumvent through 
a more functional approach the endemic macro-political obstacles that have 
traditionally impeded the advancement of co-operation in the region” 
(Darbouche 2011, p. 195).  
With this regard, the new focus on interests based approach to 
energy relations with European southern neighbouring countries 
appears in several documents of the EU referring to energy in the 
framework of a wider foreign policy. In particular, the Second Strategic 
Energy Review (2008) stresses the relevance of the Euro-Mediterranean 
coordination in new infrastructure projects for reducing the EU energy 
dependency by diversifying sources of energy supply. Infrastructures’ 
improvements are thus required for completing the “Mediterranean 
energy ring, linking Europe with the Southern Mediterranean through 
electricity and gas interconnections to improve energy security and to help 
develop the vast solar and wind energy potential” (European Commission 
2008a, p.  2). Besides, in 2010 Communication on Energy 2020, 
confirmed the need for a common policy directed at strengthening 
energy partnerships with the neighbouring countries, focusing both on 
the role that market integration could have in guaranteeing the EU 
security of supply, on one side, and on the promotion of growth in 
new, increasing energy demanding areas of the southern shore of the 
Mediterranean, on the other side (European Commission 2010). The 
priority actions identified in the 2020 document follow this logic: 
- The integration of energy markets and regulatory frameworks 
with the neighbours mainly through the extension of the 
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Energy Community Treaty7 to other south-eastern countries, 
and extending the internal market acquis to the energy sector. 
- The establishment of privileged partnership with key countries, 
extending principles of the Energy Charter Treaty8 such as the 
freedom of transit, transparency, safety, and investment 
opportunities, as well as compliance with international law. 
As affirmed in the conclusions of the European Council held in Brussels 
the 4 February 2011, the European Union has to pursue the extensions 
of the internal energy market rules, deepening the Energy Community 
Treaty experience and extending it to other neighbouring countries in 
the south. In this regard, the EU-Member States’ coordination is 
required in order to ensuring consistency and coherence in the EU’s 
external relations with key producer, transit, and consumer countries; 
coordination being pivotal to the successful implementation of all 
external initiatives in the field of energy policy. Besides, the Council 
invited the Commission to submit by June 2011 a communication on 
“security of supply and international cooperation aimed at further improving 
the consistency and coherence of the EU's external action in the field of 
energy” (European Council 2011, p. 3). The Communication by 
European Commission on security of supply and international 
                                                 
7 The Energy Community Treaty, signed on October 2005 and entered into force on July 
2006, pursues the aim of creating a single regulatory space among countries taking part 
on it. It links the EU to Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo pursuant to the United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1244. Georgia, Moldova, Norway and Turkey are observers, while Ukraine 
signed the agreements on September 2010. The main tool of the Energy Community 
Treaty is the implementation of key parts of the EU legislation.  
8 The Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and 
Related Environmental Aspects were signed in December 1994 and entered into legal 
force in April 1998. To date, the Treaty has been signed or acceded to by fifty-one states, 
the European Community and Euratom (the total number of its members is therefore 
fifty-three). The Treaty was developed on the basis of the 1991 Energy Charter. Whereas 
the latter document was drawn up as a declaration of political intent to promote energy 
cooperation, the Energy Charter Treaty is a legally-binding multilateral instrument. The 
fundamental aim of the Energy Charter Treaty is to strengthen the rule of law on energy 
issues, by creating a level playing field of rules to be observed by all participating 
governments, thereby mitigating risks associated with energy-related investment and 
trade. 
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cooperation has been published on the 7 September 2011, and 
represents an important cornerstone of the EU external energy policy. 
First of all, what emerge from this document is that past experience 
proved that bilateral energy relations between individual Member 
States and third supplier, or transit countries, can result in a 
fragmentation of the internal market rather than a strengthening of the 
EU's energy supply and competitiveness. In this regard, the regulatory 
framework which has been progressively put in place at the EU level 
entails important consequences towards partner countries such as in 
the field of network access, safety and competition provisions. Since the 
last Communication from the Commission on external energy relations 
adopted in 2006, the political and legal frameworks for EU energy 
policy have been transformed. The Lisbon Treaty set out clear 
objectives for the EU energy policy, further developed in the Europe 
2020 strategy, but it is evident that the EU cannot reach these objectives 
without adequately addressing the external dimension. As the 
European Commission underlines in the 2011 Communication, the EU 
must build on the strength of its market, expanding links between the 
European energy network and neighbouring countries and creating a 
wider regulatory area, beneficial for all. Recent examples have 
demonstrated the merits of such European approach and the Council 
has recognized the need for new initiatives to develop mutually 
beneficial energy partnerships with key players on all subjects of 
common interests, including energy security, investments in 
sustainability and environmental protection, low-carbon technologies, 
energy efficiency and nuclear safety. In this regard, the aforementioned 
Communication proposes concrete ways to extend energy cooperation 
beyond the mere physical security of imports, by proposing an external 
energy policy with the following priorities: 
- Building up the external dimension of the European internal 
energy market both, by establishing a mechanism for increased 
transparency and information exchange on Member States’ 
bilateral energy agreements with third countries, and by 
negotiating EU-level agreements with third countries where 
necessary in order to achieve the EU core objectives, for 
example to facilitate large-scale infrastructure projects. 
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Furthermore, regarding the Mediterranean area, the promotion 
of cooperation on renewable energy projects with the Southern 
Mediterranean countries is highlighted, notably in the 
framework of the Mediterranean Solar Plan, with the launching 
of pilot solar plant projects in 2011-2012, and by proposing to 
partners a regional EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy 
Partnership initially focused on electricity and renewable 
energy market development in these countries by 2020, and 
aiming at encouraging third countries to implement ambitious 
energy efficiency and renewable energy policies. 
- Strengthening partnerships for secure, safe, sustainable and 
competitive energy, by increasing focus in all dialogues on 
good energy governance and investment, sustainable energy 
and energy efficiency. 
- Improving access to sustainable energy for developing 
countries, by mobilizing regional level action, particularly in 
Africa, to reform legal and regulatory frameworks with a view 
for creating market based conditions that attract private sector 
investments and enhance regional power trade; and also by 
mobilizing more resources from EU development assistance to 
catalyze investment projects both, at the small scale for 
increasing access to energy services in rural areas, and at a 
larger scale for improving energy competitiveness and security 
through interconnections and major generation projects. 
Besides, this access improvement requires support schemes 
and financing instruments to the specific needs of the sector, by 
privileging capacity development and technology transfer, 
including through research and innovation, stimulating 
decentralized renewable power production, promoting private 
initiatives and maximizing the local added value. 
- Better promoting EU policies beyond its borders, by ensuring 
an active EU participation and leading role in the global energy 
governance debate, through its regular presence in relevant 
international energy initiatives and frameworks. 
Such as indicated in the Communication, the EU energy policy is based 
on the threefold objectives of security of supply, competitiveness and 
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sustainability, and external dimension plays a crucial role for all of 
them. However, a consistent and well coordinated external energy 
policy is essential not only to the completion of the internal market and 
the delivery of key policy targets, but also for enhancing the regional 
cooperation, especially in the Mediterranean area where energy 
synergies and complementarities represent a significant potential that 
should be better exploited in order to obtain mutual benefits.  
The history of the EU external energy policy definition, with 
regards to the southern neighbouring countries, shows that the 
outcomes achieved, as well as the foreign energy policy, still need to be 
assessed. Firstly, scholars doubt of the effectiveness of the EU action. 
Some of them define as non-existent the external dimension of EU 
energy policy because of Member States’ divergent interests and the 
persistence of national sovereignty on energy supply decisions 
(Andoura and Végh 2009). In this regard, at first the external energy 
policy is defined as a policy that lacks effectiveness considering the 
constitutional limits to the EU foreign actions and competences on 
energy, as well as the consequent missing EU bargaining power at 
international level (Checchi et al. 2009). Secondly, the difficult 
integration of security of supply, market liberalization, and 
environmental issues further limits the external projection of the energy 
policy. Thirdly, the promoted partnerships have been strongly 
criticized with regards to the potential impact that the promotion of the 
sectoral governance may have on the partner countries’ good 
governance and rule of law. However, despite these critical aspects, 
today the EU focuses more on the external dimension of energy, 
especially since a domestic energy market is almost defined. In this 
regard, instead of a pure rules promotion of the EU model, approaches 
directed at the definition of EU–MENA shared regulation of energy 
aspects should be recommended, also considering that common 
interests in managing current and next challenges exist, as the 
renovating interests in renewable energies proves.  
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1.3 Research design and Thesis structure 
 
This study analyse the effectiveness of the EU action as rules promoter 
in the energy sector taking into consideration EU pressures for rules 
change, and the two dimensions of rules adoption and implementation 
by MENA countries. With this regard, the EU methods for the external 
rules diffusion, on one hand, and the MENA countries energy sector 
organization, and their institutional background, one the other hand 
are the main dimensions of the study. 
The study develops on a two-level analysis method, thus. The 
model of two-level analysis was theorized by Putnam (1988) with 
regards a government and its double position, as domestic and 
international actor, in order to explain how domestic and international 
politics are interlinked an reciprocally influence actors’ behaviour. 
When a government is constrained by domestic actors, the action at the 
two levels is limited; on the contrary, a government that is autonomous 
can play at both levels (Matláry, 1997). In this study, the EU action at 
international level is conceived as the case of a government constrained 
by the domestic environment, with regards both the energy sector and 
the policy towards Mediterranean neighbours, considering the limits to 
EU external competences. The neighbouring countries’ position may, 
indeed, be conceptualised as the one of governments characterized by 
strong executives, lacking democratic institutions, and limited 
statehood (Risse and Lehmukuhl 2006).  
The analysis mainly refers to the electricity sector. The countries 
analysed in the period 1990 – 2010 are Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Jordan, Syria, Israel, and Turkey. The last essay 
reported in the thesis also includes data on Croatia, one of the next 
members of the EU; this allows to extend our considerations on EU as 
rules promoter when the leverage of membership perspective is at 
work, such as in the Croatian and Turkish cases. The thesis collects a 
series of works dedicated to the analysis of the newly established 
regulatory agencies for the energy sector in the MENA region, current 
trends in the electricity sector and renewables, and the role of the EU as 
rules promoter. The study takes into consideration processes of rules 
harmonization between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea; rules 
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harmonization being the necessary step for solving energy inter-
dependency problems between northern and southern Mediterranean 
countries.  
The first paper - Hierarchy vs Networks.  Regulators’ perception 
of EU methods for rules promotion - reports the results of a perception 
survey directed at those Mediterranean countries which responds to 
the following criteria: have established an independent regulatory 
agency for the energy sector, have participated to EU cooperation 
initiatives on energy in the period 1990 – 2010, are part of the EU 
funded Association of the Mediterranean regulators for electricity and gas 
(MedReg). The survey was directed at investing the perception, by 
Mediterranean regulators, of the EU and EU-based network of 
cooperation as rules promoter and the effectiveness of pressures for 
rules change as identified by the literature on the EU external 
governance. Findings from the perception survey show the relevance of 
the EU direct pressure compared to the network one.  
Going deep in to the analysis of MENA countries, the second essay 
reports the study of the Institutional Background of Southern 
Mediterranean countries: the exogenous factors affecting both 
current energy regulation and potentials for regulatory changes. On 
the base of the methodology by Levy and Spiller (1994), the aim of the 
paper is the identification of the following dimensions: 
- restraints on regulators’ discretion written in the regulatory 
system;  
- restraints on changing regulatory systems, formal or 
substantial;  
- independent judiciary. 
With this regard, MENA countries’ institutional background is 
examined considering Constitutions and fundamental laws for those 
countries not having a written Constitution; anecdotic evidences 
concerning the political life of concerned countries; judiciary-political 
power relations.  A first description of the electricity sector for the 
examined countries is also provided on the base of the existing 
literature. In the Annex to the paper, a description of the methodology 
adopted and variables defined is given.  
The institutional background that emerge from the analysis has been 
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considered in the analysis on the role and independence of energy 
regulatory agencies in the southern Mediterranean countries.   
The third and last work - Independent Regulatory Agencies and 
Rules Harmonization for the Electricity Sector and Renewables in the 
Mediterranean Region - uses data collected through an original survey 
directed at regulators by agencies, ministry departments and energy 
companies of the southern Mediterranean, the study is aimed at 
assessing the extent of agencies’ independence looking at three main 
dimensions of independence: regulatory instruments available to 
regulators and decision making autonomy; regulators’ organizational 
autonomy; regulators accountability. Results show that those countries 
having established an independent regulator have a more credible 
regulatory framework than those countries in which such body does 
not exist. In particular, the analysis shows that Turkey, Croatia and 
Jordan have defined a regulatory framework that limits administrative 
expropriation and, consequently, creates an environment more suitable 
for attracting investments in the electricity and renewables sector. On 
the institutional ground, this is probably related with the 
harmonization of regulatory standards promoted by the European 
Union through the neighbouring policy, for the Jordan case, and the 
membership perspective, in the Turkish and Croatian case. 
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Table 1 EU 27 Energy dependency by all products (%)  
Years 1998 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Values 46.1 46.8 52.6 53.8 53.1 54.8 
Source: Eurostat pocketbook, Energy, Transport and Environment indicators 2010 
 
 Table 2 Gas Import into the EU-27 (in TJ, terajoules) 
Origin 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Share 
2007(%) 
Russia 4539 709 4421 515 4554 744 4895 252 4951 044 4952 879 4937 711 4685 365 40,8 
Norway 1985 231 2136 379 2601 569 2699 473 2801 723 2671 779 2844 237 3061 751 26,7 
Algeria 2203 075 1957 181 2132 477 2158 803 2042 137 2256 826 2132 236 1943 976 16,9 
Nigeria 172 020 216 120 217 882 335 929 410 260 436 319 563 905 588 317 5,1 
Libya 33 442 33 216 25 536 30 390 47 809 209 499 321 150 383 615 3,3 
Qatar 12 443 27 463 87 952 80 414 160 170 195 713 232 721 275 496 2,4 
Egypt           202 419 327 394 221 305 1,9 
Trinidad 
and 
Tobago 36 334 24 498 19 120 1 365   29 673 163 233 104 917 0,9 
Other 
Origin 112 810 199 256 125 425 100 023 313 245 409 387 227 147 213 995 1,9 
Total 9095 064 9015 628 9764 705 10301 649 10726 388 11364 494 11749 734 11478 737 100,0 
Mio 
Cubic 
meters 240 610 238 509 258 326 272 530 283 767 300 648 310 840 303 670   
NOTE: Gross calorific value of 1 million cubic meter of Natural Gas can vary between 37.5 and 42.5 terajoule 
Source: Eurostat, data updated to May 2011 
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Table 3 Imports (by country of origin) of gas, annual data in Terajoules (Gross calorific value = GCV) 
Origin Destination 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
Turkey 
  
EU (27) 35323 16727 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Greece 35323 16727 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Algeria 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
EU (27) 1867044 2000109 1945792 2132236 2256826 2042137 2158803 2132477 1957182 2203075 
New EU 
MS (10) 11303 12343 13662 13460 17189 16620 16772 15182 15712 15258 
Greece 21519 39885 36319 24098 17788 18601 22528 20367 20210 20294 
Spain 513626 558928 546332 471929 609182 587007 565396 514858 406273 433743 
France 306152 303286 312356 293945 309486 232641 391146 419653 402278 406598 
Italy 863727 990295 936650 1049617 1046378 976579 935774 920420 930135 1071372 
Portugal 80906 82436 59536 85964 112022 97138 100816 109956 93143 82351 
Slovenia 11303 12343 13662 13460 17189 16620 16772 15182 15712 15258 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Libya 
  
  
EU (27) 379882 398006 383615 321150 209499 47809 30390 25536 33216 33442 
Spain 30581 21921 31533 28085 38316 27959 30390 25536 33216 33442 
Italy 349301 376085 352082 293065 171183 19850 0 0 0 0 
Egypt 
  
  
  
  
EU (27) 274465 226955 221305 327394 202419 0 0 0 0 0 
Greece 10033 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 182093 186572 169042 191692 142389 0 0 0 0 0 
France 61445 40383 45959 90828 60030 0 0 0 0 0 
UK 20894 0 6304 44874 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Eurostat, data updated to May 2011 
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Table 4 Crude oil imports into the EU-27 (in Mio tonnes )  
Origin 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Share 
2007(%) 
Russia 112,4 136,8 154,7 170,8 188,9 188,0 189,6 185,3 34,0 
Norway 115,9 108,1 103,1 106,4 108,6 97,5 89,1 84,3 15,5 
Libya 45,5 43,8 39,2 45,9 50,0 50,6 53,2 55,5 10,2 
Saudi Arabia 65,1 57,5 53,1 61,5 64,5 60,7 51,1 39,5 7,2 
Other, Middle East 54,7 48,3 43,2 27,8 28,5 30,0 32,5 34,4 6,3 
Iran 35,5 31,4 25,9 34,7 35,9 35,4 36,4 34,1 6,2 
Kazahkhstan 9,9 9,1 13,4 15,9 22,2 26,4 26,8 18,3 3,4 
Nigeria 22,4 25,7 18,4 23,2 14,9 18,6 20,2 15,5 2,8 
Other Origin 58,3 62,3 64,2 56,6 56,6 66,2 66,0 78,1 14,3 
Total Imports 519,8 523,0 515,3 542,9 570,1 573,4 564,7 545,0 100,0 
in Million barrels 3794 3818 3761 3963 4162 4186 4122 3979   
Source: Eurostat, data updated to May 2011 
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Table 5 Imports (by country of origin) - oil - annual data, Thousands of tonnes 
Origin Destination 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
Turkey EU (27) 779 239 904 29 271 170 0 0 0 213 
Algeria EU (27) 8539 14563 10433 14351 20181 19129 16207 14157 14716 16717 
Tunisia EU (27) 2228 2152 2206 1231 1335 1344 1684 1664 1176 1346 
Libya EU (27) 47047 56400 54388 51698 50373 49988 45949 39081 43755 45517 
Egypt EU (27) 5141 4313 3208 3739 1716 3952 3460 3811 3600 5579 
New EUMS 
(10) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 112 
Syria EU (27) 6842 6954 7944 7481 9027 9081 12945 20587 19396 13259 
Source: Eurostat data updated to May 2011 
 
Table 6 Energy primary production per country. All products.  
Country 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Algeria : : : : : : 170594,54 179740,78 176628,88 176458,76 
Egypt : : : : : : 62440,07 77009,51 79101,82 82655,05 
Morocco : : 134 140 137,6 186,3 781,38 741,73 770,27 759,81 
Tunisia : : : : : 5220,4 5506,66 5593,88 5270,66 6488,88 
Israel 422 523,5 637,2 668,7 703,6 733,8 1992,14 2450,36 3120,44 3120,44 
Jordan 132 218 289,8 283,6 268,5 291,4 290,53 252,39 286,66 272,56 
Lebanon : : : : 98 : 228,77 223,66 194,96 187,49 
Palestinian 
Territory : : : : 194 226 240,8 227,28 193,17 206,62 
Syria : : : : : :      31418,9 26920,73 25683,53 24346,2 
Source: MEDSAT, data extracted on March 2011 
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Table 7 Energy exports per country. All products.  
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Algeria 138815,61 144390,63 139258,13 136970,88 
Egypt 23359,76 21492,57 23427,79 27081,12 
Morocco 1441,36 1378,27 1164,81 1272,63 
Tunisia 4049,97 4129,61 3683,73 4996,65 
Israel 3853,18 4010,65 3860,24 3860,24 
Jordan 0,27 : 1,09 15,14 
Syria 13496,35 12261,41 9334,39 8919,86 
Source: MEDSTAT, data extracted on March 2011 
 
Table 8 Energy Import per country. All products.  
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Algeria 1433,03 1082,38 1264,34 1924,88 
Egypt 7079,99 6290,37 7329,65 12044,55 
Morocco 12734,98 13911,63 13999,45 15027,97 
Tunisia 5961,72 5921,78 5982,07 6323,7 
Israel 22932,88 23778,32 22526,88 22526,88 
Jordan 6288,32 7010,03 6913,99 7344,28 
Lebanon 5129,79 4634 4522,85 3779,29 
Palestinian territory 1079,59 1332,85 1153,59 1190,72 
Syria 4008,41 5745,53 5779,2 7919,4 
Source: MEDSTAT, data extracted on March 2011 
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Chapter 2 
 
Hierarchy vs Networks.  Regulators’ perception of EU 
methods for rules promotion 9 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The paper analyzes the perception of the European Union (EU) rules 
promotion in the energy field by four Middle East and Northern Africa 
(MENA) countries: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. The 
Mediterranean region, currently at the centre of renovating interests on 
electricity and renewables, is involved in EU regional integration 
projects, with rules convergence as one of the main objectives to 
achieve. Our case studies represent a good sample of the MENA 
population: they are related to the EU by partnership building 
programs and, in the Turkish case, by membership perspectives. The 
sample includes relevant countries as energy producers and energy 
corridors for both EU–MENA relations (i.e.: Algeria and Turkey) and at 
intra-MENA level (Egypt). They are representative of all regimes of the 
region (Presidential, Algeria; Semi-Presidential, Egypt; Parliamentary, 
Turkey; Monarchy, Jordan). All of them are at the centre of investment 
projects for renewable energy. Finally, they have consolidated 
relationships with the EU: Turkey, a candidate country to EU 
membership since 1987, is gradually adopting and implementing the 
acquis communautaire on energy. Thus, Turkey is directly subject to the 
EU direct pressure for rules adoption and implementation. With 
regards to Egypt and Jordan, both countries joined the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) since 1995. Currently, the two 
countries are taking part in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 
and in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Association Agreements 
(AAs) between these countries and the EU entered into force in 2002 for 
                                                 
9 This is a revised version of the paper presented at 13th Mediterranean Research Meeting 
21-24 March 2012 Montecatini Terme (FI) – ITALY. Title: Networks as rules promoter. 
The MEDREG case and the Principle of Regulatory Independence. Authors: Prof. Carlo 
Cambini, Politecnico di Torino and EUI-Florence School of Regulation, 
carlo.cambini@polito.it . Donata Franzi, Phd candidate IMT Advanced Studies Lucca, 
donata.franzi@imtlucca.it 
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Jordan, and 2004 for Egypt. On the base of AAs, bilateral Action Plans 
(APs) identify actions to be implemented, as well as financial resources. 
In the Algerian case, although participating in EU initiatives, a bilateral 
AP is missing. 
The paper investigates the perception of the EU action by 
regulatory authorities of MENA countries. The effectiveness of the EU 
as rules promoter is analysed having regards to those elements 
characterizing the EU regulatory framework such as promoted in the 
European neighbourhood, and for which an EU mode of governance 
may be identified. The regulatory elements are: unbundling, TPA 
regime and tariffs system, establishment of an Independent Regulatory 
Authority (IRA). The degree of convergence towards the mentioned 
elements of regulation is evaluated having regards to EU top-down 
pressure for rules adoption, as well as EU indirect, network based, 
rules promotion. The case of network pressure is represented by the 
MedReg, the EU funded Association of the Mediterranean regulators 
for electricity and gas. At the same time, domestic, bottom-up, 
pressures for rules change are taken into account.  
Promoting regulatory standards for energy market integration, and 
a functional integration mainly (Lavenex 2008), is also considered in 
this study the EU’s method for counterbalancing the lacking exclusive 
competences on energy and external relations. Thus, the analysis 
contributes to those studies on the EU capability of inducing non-
member countries to adopt and implement EU pre-determined rules. 
But, contrary to external governance literature, this work takes 
countries’ institutional background as the crucial element impacting on 
the effective rules adoption and implementation. 
The research method adopted consists of a perception survey 
directed at MENA regulators of the four mentioned countries. The 
paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we review the literature on 
rules change, referring to three pressures for rules change as 
explanatory factors for rules diffusion: bottom-up, top-down, and 
networks approaches to rules diffusion and promotion. In Section 3, we 
report a brief description of the three elements of energy sector 
regulation on which our study focuses on, in order to verify the 
coherence between the EU domestic model of regulation and the one 
promoted in the southern neighbourhood. Section 4, presents the 
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methodology of the survey, while Section 5 reports outcomes obtained 
for the four case studies.  
 
2. Explanatory factors for the electricity rules diffusion  
 
Introducing liberalization in monopoly sectors through restructuring 
(unbundling), competition (wholesale market), and regulation (TPA 
regime and IRAs set-up) are common features of the regulatory state 
(Majone 1997). These are the results of the globalization of regulation 
(Levi-Faur 2005): worldwide spreading rules and principles on energy 
sector management.  
The first assumption of this study is that the EU is trying to 
establish a shared regulatory framework for the energy sector 
replicating, in the neighbouring countries, the model of “domestic” 
regulation as it has been defined since mid 1990s; thus, the EU is 
promoting itself as a regulatory power beyond its own borders 
(Schimmelfennig 2009).  
The second main assumption of this study is that, in order to be 
effective, rules spreading needs to be followed by rules adoption and 
implementation in the countries’ domestic system. Thus, in addition to 
the presence of an external pressure for rules adoption, domestic 
pressures for rules change should be taken into consideration. With this 
regard, the institutional background (North, 1990; Levy and Spiller, 
1994) of selected countries reveal the reason why, rules promoted may 
be adopted and implemented with a different degree of efficacy. The 
analysis of those elements of the acquis communautaire on energy, 
promoted in the Mediterranean region, thus, is a good method for 
explaining what Radaelli (2005) defines the phenomena of “diffusion 
without convergence”. Moreover, with regards to regulation, and 
regulatory impact assessment, recent studies confirm the importance of 
domestic political variables (Peci and Sobral 2011) as well as “the role of 
policymakers’ ideological legacies in explaining variation in rules adoption” 
(Gallardo and Murillo 2011, p.351). The institutional environment, 
indeed, is what makes the process of rules converge, that may be due to 
regional frameworks of cooperation, truly effective. Nonetheless, the 
institutional analysis of MENA countries is not developed in this paper, 
being too far from the scope of the paper, the analysis of EU direct and 
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indirect pressures for rules change and its effectiveness. Considerations 
on the institutional background of the four analyzed countries, thus, 
are provided only when necessary to the development of the study. 
The following part of this section reports hypotheses referring to 
three classes of explanation for rules spreading and adoption, which 
develops on both previous studies on the EU external governance 
methods and analysis deriving by the institutional economics literature. 
The first explanation, considers domestic - bottom-up - pressures for 
rules change; it refers to MENA voluntary convergence towards the EU 
model for the organization of the energy sector. It conceives countries’ 
executives as actors central to rules change. Secondly, the EU hierarchy 
- top-down - pressure is analyzed. The hierarchy mode of rules 
promotion, refers to the EU rules promotion within the Euro-
Mediterranean frameworks of cooperation as developed since mid 
1990s. Socialization mechanisms due to the history of cooperation 
between the EU and the specific countries considered, thus, are taken 
as relevant. The third explanatory factor, network pressure for rules 
change, analyse socialization mechanisms within networking 
initiatives. Analysing organizations promoted and financed by the EU 
mainly, the EU indirect pressure for rules change is assessed. 
Specifically, we refer to the experience of the MedReg here conceived as 
a network of governance. 
 
2.1 Bottom-Up pressure  
Bottom-up pressure refers to domestic pressures for rules change. 
When effective, such pressure may produce rules convergence towards 
a system of rules consolidated and recognized as effective at 
international level. The EU system of rules is taken as one of the 
possible final outcomes of the rules change process, together with other 
international norms. Convergence, thus, depends on countries’ 
voluntary approximation towards a defined system of rules (Barbé et al. 
2009). Reasons behind convergence may be the need of assuring that 
the regulatory framework of a country is credible. For this reason, in 
this analysis, countries in which an IRA has been established and 
information are available, are firstly considered. Moreover, the 
existence of regulated TPA regime, sector’s unbundling, and incentive 
tariffs system, have been taken into consideration as indicators of the 
  
36
 
commitments towards energy sector liberalization by MENA 
incumbents. Persisting patronage system and state-owned assets, raise 
doubts on the effectiveness of agencies’ independence. Having 
established an IRA before than implementing  sector’s liberalization 
reforms, such as for Algeria, Egypt and Turkey, may result in a sort of 
mimicking recommended regulatory standards; a behaviour that do not 
correspond to strong regulatory commitments.  
 
2.2 Hierarchy pressure  
The literature on EU external governance focuses on the external 
diffusion of the EU acquis, or part of it, due to the pressure played by 
the EU in its immediate neighbourhood (Lavenex 2008; Lavenex & 
Schimmelfennig 2009). The replication of the EU system in the 
neighbouring countries is the expected outcome of the process of 
regional integration promoted. Moreover, such integration is expected 
to be differentiated (Lavenex, 2004) for the different countries being 
different their relation with the EU and their degree of involvement in 
EU initiatives. Such direct pressure, also described by the literature on 
EU external governance as hierarchy mode of governance, is very close 
to cases of Europeanization. As stressed by Radaelli, Europeanization is 
a pervasive process consisting of “construction (b) diffusion and (c) 
implementation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, "ways of doing things," and shared beliefs and norms” emanating by 
the EU and incorporated in the “domestic discourse, identities, political 
structures and public policies” (Radaelli 2003, p. 30). With regards to 
MENA countries, we have to take into account the EU rules diffusion in 
absence of membership linkage, with the sole exception of Turkey, 
although the membership status is currently in a deadlock. In such a 
context, regional frameworks of cooperation usually may favour the 
spreading of rules by participating countries, especially when 
incentives mechanisms to rules change are provided. With regards the 
EU, current frameworks of cooperation miss such incentive 
mechanisms traditionally given by conditionality measures. Although 
included in signed APs, such measures have never been invoked (Stahn 
and van Hüllen 2007). As previous studies prove, conditionality works 
only if “the EU offers a membership perspective in return for political reform” 
(Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008). Thus, the quest for rules change 
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through hierarchy mode of governance is expected to be not so much 
effective in MENA case.  
 
2.3 Network pressure 
Usually recognized as in between the top-down and bottom-up 
method, the indirect mode of rules diffusion refers to all those new 
modes of governance (Eberlein and Kerwer 2002) generally driven by 
“voluntarism and inclusion mechanisms” (Héritier 2002), such as 
networks. Network forms of cooperation are described as the most 
promising, specifically in those cases in which strong 
interdependencies between actors exist. Contrary to top-down 
explanations, networking cooperation allows MENA countries to act 
not as passive beneficiaries of certain promoted rules, but as actors 
participating in rules definition. Thus, networks may facilitate a shared 
regulatory framework to emerge by virtue of mediation processes 
among actors instead of top-down diffusion or simple imitation. In 
order to make indirect cooperation functioning, it is necessary to put 
networks, shared framework of action and shared regulatory 
framework, into place. With this regard, networks of governance “are 
made up of organizations which need to exchange resources to achieve their 
objectives” (Rhodes 1996, p. 658). Shared processes for decision making 
usually characterize networks, which tend to develop their own 
“internal relational rationality” in order to manage complex situations 
(Ladeur 2004). Moreover, the literature on EU external governance 
takes all actors in the networks as formally equal, although it 
recognizes that power asymmetries may exist. The same literature 
affirms that networks do not produce binding rules, but mutual 
agreements and often prescribe procedural modes of interaction rather than 
final policy solutions (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009, p. 798).  
Having regard to networks, we focus on the case of the Association 
for Mediterranean Regulators for Electricity and Gas, MedReg. Funded 
by the EU in 2006 as a cooperation initiative, the association is today 
registered as not for profit association under the Italian law, and its 
Secretariat is based in Milan. Although still depending from EU 
financial sources, the MedReg is a membership based association. It 
includes Albania, Algeria, the Palestinian Authority, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Cyprus, Croatia, Egypt, France, Jordan, Greece, Israel, 
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Italy, Malta, Morocco, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Tunisia 
and Turkey. 
The association presents those characteristics that Rhodes (1996) 
identifies for networks:  
- voluntary cooperation; 
- membership; 
- interdependent authorities, considering that even authorities of 
EU Member States are taking part.  
- It should be autonomous from the States, even though officers 
in charge of specific committees are named by the national 
regulatory body and governments member of the Association.  
To a first extent, MedReg seems to be characterized by interdependent 
and continuously interacting (Rhodes 1996) members. Although 
depending on the support of states, it is self governing, having a 
network’s secretariat, and is characterized by internal procedures of 
coordination. The attempt to achieve coordination has only recently 
been started, thus it is until now difficult to affirm that self-organizing 
practices and members’ co-definition of rules (Rhodes 1996) exist 
effectively. On the contrary, we expect that problems related to a young 
and very flexible structure of coordination may limit, to certain extent, 
the effectiveness of MedReg’s action and, consequently, the EU indirect 
pressure for rules change.  
To clarify contents of EU energy rules promoted, the next section 
reports the evolution of the EU regulatory experience in the energy, 
electricity and gas, sector. 
 
3. Energy Rules Promotion. The EU model for sector organization and 
the rationale behind it  
 
Table 1, at the end of the chapter, summarizes the main issues 
characterizing the energy market restructuring within the EU, which is 
the expression of worldwide consensus over electricity and gas sector 
liberalization (Jamasb and Pollitt 2005). The EU liberalization process 
was mainly a political decision based on the need of guarantee the 
freedom of enterprise (producers side of the market) and the freedom 
of choice (consumers side), and to make competition within the Union 
effective. The process of liberalization, and further integration of 
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energy market, implied the unbundling of networks and independence 
of regulators both from the State and the energy industry. This process 
of progressive liberalization can be summarized in three waves, which 
refer to the three directives reported in Table 1. The Table shows the 
development, in parallel, of the electricity and gas liberalization. The 
table also shows how progressively the role of regulators emerges and 
the unbundling transmission and distribution operators acquires 
relevance. The current regulatory framework is the final result of such 
gradual changes. When a sector inquiry by the European Directorate on 
Competition (DG COMP) in 2005 shown that dominant positions were 
still at stake and that a further wave of liberalization was required, a 
“third package” of directives started to be defined.  
The current package focuses on: further unbundling of the system; 
independence of system operators; the strengthened role and 
independence of national regulators; the set up of ENTSO –E and G – 
the European association of transmission and system operators for both 
electricity and gas, as well as the establishment of ACER - the Agency 
for the cooperation of energy regulators. 
Principles of transparency and liberalization, such as the system 
unbundling, TPA regime, and IRA set-up, can be identified in 
documents regarding the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation too. With 
regards the southern neighbouring countries, indeed, the EU tried to 
extend the internal energy market (IEM) principles through a policy 
mirroring domestic experience and following the strategy for Central 
Europe (Matláry 1995, p. 55). A first attempt to define an Energy 
Charter on the model of the Energy Charter Treaty was unsuccessful. 
Then, the project of regional framework of cooperation emerged and 
the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Forum was launched in 1996. 
Although very few has been achieved during the second half of the 
1990s in terms of EU rules adoption by Mediterranean countries, it 
should be stressed that energy remains one of the main pillars of EU 
cooperation programs in the region. The Communication “On the 
development of Energy Policy for the Enlarged EU, its Neighbors and Partner 
countries” (European Commission 2003b) conceives energy cooperation 
in terms of establishing a common regulatory framework for an 
integrated Euro-Mediterranean energy market. Thus, directed at 
energy market integration between the two shores of the 
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Mediterranean Sea, the content of the EU action in terms of rules 
promotion may be summarized as follows: promotion of system 
unbundling, regulated TPA regime, establishment of IRAs, and an 
incentive based tariff system.  
With regards to IRAs, they are probably one of the most tangible 
outcomes of market reforms concerning the utilities industry. The 
OECD describes these new entities as “one of the most widespread 
institutions of modern regulatory governance” (OECD 2002). Agencies’ 
autonomy and independence is a sign of the credibility of incumbents’ 
commitments not to undermine the independence of the regulated 
sector (Trillas and Montoya 2011). Thus, to assure credibility of the 
liberalization process, the inception of IRAs is fundamental (Levy and 
Spiller, 1994; Majone 1996) together with a guarantee to avoid political 
capture of such authorities. Regulatory agencies were given the 
mandate to regulate the activity of network industries and to discipline 
the potential conflict of interests between the government and state 
controlled utilities. The IRAs ought to operate with their own 
specialized staff and detailed tasks, independently of ministries or 
government departments. The European Commission especially urged 
member states’ governments to establish formally independent 
regulators in the energy industry, leaving however the decision about 
the definition and the scope of the delegated powers to national 
executives. Typically, delegated regulatory tasks involve price setting 
decisions, both at the retail and wholesale level - whenever access to 
essential facilities is needed to develop market competition - the 
definition of entry conditions, the imposition of quality standards and 
all the technical rules to use or access existing infrastructures. All this 
considered, it is clear that, an assessment of roles and functions of 
MENA IRAs is pivotal to the understanding not just of the agencies’ 
independence as per se, but as a measure of the degree of diffusion of 
the model of liberalization promoted; IRAs’ autonomy and 
independence being fundamental to effective unbundling, non-
discrimination among utility companies, and capable of facilitating the 
entrance of new, private, operators.   
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4. Perception Survey Method adopted 
 
To analyze the perception of rules promotion, data have been collected 
through a survey directed at regulators from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan 
and Turkey. The questionnaire investigates respondents’ perception of 
the role that both the EU and MedReg have in terms of rules adoption. 
The survey is based on the literature on the EU external governance 
and considers eventual socialization mechanisms among countries in 
the same region (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009; Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 2005; Gilardi 2005a, b). The survey has been structured 
following OECD (2012) recommendations on measuring regulatory 
performance through perception surveys. Specifically, we take care to 
avoid question that are suggesting answers and question priming, 
which may happen when a previous question suggests the answer to 
the following one. The survey has been tested by experts in the 
Florence School of Regulation, Oxford Energy Institute, and Italian 
International Affairs Institute. 
The majority of questions asked respondents to express an 
evaluation of the considered elements on a scale from 0 to 5. In order to 
place countries along a continuum between 0 and 1, all questions 
referring to 0 to 5 scale adopt the following coding system: 5=1.00; 
4=0.75; 3=0.50; 2 and 1=0.25; 0 =0. The results reported do not confirm 
the tendency, stressed by OECD (2012) that respondents show 
answering at the median (3) in a scale from 0 to 5. Thus, this is a first 
confirmation that the answers we have obtained are informed one. 
With regards the regulatory agencies involved in the study, 
information are provided in Table 2a. All of the countries involved 
respond to our selection criteria of having established an IRA and have 
adopted, to a certain extent, sector unbundling and TPA regime. The 
Table 2b reports details of the agency organization model, as emerged 
by the analysis of existing literature and agencies’ involvement in 
managing key aspects of the energy sector: unbundling, TPA, tariff 
setting mainly. The country model of unbundling, TPA and tariff 
setting is briefly reported in Table 2c; detailed information are available 
only for the electricity sector. 
The study here reported is of qualitative nature. Answers obtained 
have been provided by respondents that have already taken part in 
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training sessions arranged by the MedReg. Thus, respondents were 
aware of networks role and competences, as well as of the EU 
programs for cooperation. Moreover, data collected have been 
completed by semi-structured interviews designed according to the 
conceptual background on methods and pressures for rules promotion 
described in Section 2. Interviews follow the same structure of the 
survey, although their nature of semi-structured question let 
respondents more free to justify their answers. The Table 2d reports 
number of respondents to the survey and to semi-structured 
interviews. Officers of Egyptian (5 respondents, including the Agency 
Managing Director) and Algerian (5  respondents) regulatory agencies 
have been interviewed in May 2011 during the Florence School of 
Regulator and MedReg training seminar dedicated to Mediterranean 
energy regulators. It should be stressed that interviews, as well as 
survey’s results, do not let different answers to emerge within the same 
organization. The justification for the missing variation is twofold: 
firstly, all respondents were from mainly state controlled organization; 
thus, we assume that respondents can’t freely express their own 
opinion but the opinion of the agency. Secondly, for those countries for 
which interviews are not available, it should be stressed that officers 
involved were from agencies’ communication offices, which are usually 
reporting the position and the view of the agency more than the 
officers’ personal view.  
 
5. Perception of rules promotion: results of the survey  
 
5.1 Hierarchy vs. Network  
In order to measure the role that the EU as energy rules promoter 
has, regulators have been asked to express an evaluation, on a scale 
from 0 to 5, of the EU top-down pressure compared to the EU indirect 
one. The question asked: “On a scale from 0 to 5, how do you perceive 
the EU (i.e: European Commission Directorate for Energy, EU 
Development Cooperation Office mainly) methods for the energy 
rules promotion?”. The options provided were three: Direct pressure 
(top-down); Indirect (horizontal, participatory based method); Non-
existent. Figure 1 shows perception of the EU methods for rules 
promotion.  
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EU pressure for electricity rules change
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Figure 1: EU pressure for electricity rules adoption 
 
The low variation in the first results shows that both the EU direct 
pressure and networking initiatives are appreciated by respondents. 
Considering the need to further clarify the meaning of direct and 
indirect pressure played by the EU, the second question of the survey 
asked if, in the opinion of respondents, “the EU action in the energy 
sector is more effective when: acting directly in bilateral relations, or 
when promoting energy rules indirectly through regulatory 
networks, such as MedReg?”. All respondents express a clear 
preference for the “acting directly in bilateral relations” option. Contrary 
to what expected (Section 2), this result provides a first confirmation of 
the relevance of the EU hierarchy mode in respondents’ perception. At 
the same time, considering that respondents are governmental actors, it 
is not surprisingly that they prefer the direct involvement of the EU 
Directorates.   
The role of EU direct rules promotion has been investigated with 
regard to specific issues of energy regulation. Specifically, “On a scale 
from 0 to 5, how would you say that the cooperation with the EU 
impacts in terms of rules adoption or rules change in the followings 
sectors?”. The question refers to: the setting of tariffs, retail – market 
competition, sector’s unbundling, TPA regime, energy efficiency 
programs, incentives for renewables, IRA political independence, 
attention to vulnerable customers, and IRA stakeholders independence. 
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Figure 2 shows differences in MENA regulators’ perception for each 
issue considered. 
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Figure 2: EU role on rules adoption 
 
The EU influence results relevant on those aspects closely related to 
market (retail, tariff setting), as well as to sector’s unbundling and TPA. 
The EU influence on IRAs independence, both from political power and 
stakeholders, does not result effective.  
To conclude the section on EU rules promotion method, we asked 
respondents to express, on a scale from 0 to 5 their agreement on the 
following:  
- energy rules are based on EU model;  
- energy rules are based on internationally recognized 
standards (IS);  
- EU energy rules are very often mentioned in the public 
discourse,  
- as regards energy, domestic decision makers follow EU 
recommendations in their behaviour to the.  
This question is aimed at assessing the degree of adherence of MENA 
system to the model recommended by the EU, showing if EU 
regulations are potentially relevant for the domestic system. Answers 
to this question provide a measure of potential Europeanization without 
membership. In this regard, we refer to the way Europeanization is 
considered in the seminal work of Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
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(2005). The study considers not just the formal rules adoption but also 
the behavioral and discursive concept of rules adoption. The former is 
referring to rules-conforming behaviour, and the latter to the 
“incorporation of a rule as a positive reference into discourse among domestic 
actors” (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, p.8).  
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Figure 3: Respondents perception of the degree of conformity between 
domestic rules and actors’ behaviour and the EU recommended one 
 
Such as showed in Figure 3, having an established framework of 
cooperation helps in expanding EU system of rules and has a positive 
impact even on domestic actors’ behaviour. Algeria, indeed, being not 
part of APs and not directly involved in EU bilateral initiatives, shows 
the low relevance of the EU in domestic public discourse as well as in 
the domestic actors’ behaviour. Interviews with officers from Algerian 
regulators confirm that rules for the electricity sector have been 
adopted mainly because of the general consensus on their effectiveness, 
more than because of EU recommendations. The EU system, indeed, 
proves to be relevant for Egypt. Interviews with Egyptian regulators 
confirm the intention of policy makers to adopt a system the closest as 
possible to the EU one. Jordan answers to the survey, confirm high 
appreciation for the EU rules and international standards. Turkey 
partially confirms what has been argued with regard the 
Europeanization hypothesis and the relevance of membership 
perspective for domestic actors’ behaviour. Although the EU system is 
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often quoted in public discourse, the domestic system does not entirely 
fits with the EU one and even domestic actors’ behaviour is not 
conforming to the one recommended by the Union. 
Considering network based rules diffusion, we asked respondents 
to compare the indirect rules promotion, through MedReg network 
mainly, with the EU hierarchic pressure. In addition to MedReg 
membership, we consider the perception of the role the network may 
have for the same regulatory aspects for which the EU role has been 
investigated. Specifically, we asked “On a scale from 0 to 5, how 
would you say that the cooperation within MedReg impacts in terms 
of rules adoption or rules change in the followings?” 
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Figure 4: MedReg role on rules adoption 
 
Results do not confirm hypotheses provided in the literature on the 
relevance of the horizontal method of rules promotion and the role of 
MedReg. Respondents, on the contrary, confirm the relevance of direct, 
top-down rules promotion. Maybe due to its recent set-up, in 2006, 
MedReg does not seem to be as effective as networks of governance 
should be, following the literature on the issue. This is proved by 
results provided with Figure 4. With the exception of Jordan, the other 
countries do not give high scores to MedReg’s action in specific 
regulatory sector, as well as on promoting IRAs’ independence. On the 
contrary, these results show those critical aspects associated to 
networks and networking governance.  
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A second question referring to MedReg investigate the presence of 
those elements proper of network of governance as identified by the 
literature. We asked the following: “On a scale from 0 to 5, how would 
you say that the following options characterize members' relations 
within MedReg?”. The options given were: Participatory model of 
decision making; Codified Procedural Rules; Monitoring and Control 
Procedures; Resources sharing. Answers are round, on average, 
between 2 and 3 for all options, with the exception of Egyptian 
regulators that gives a value of 4 to the second and third options. 
These data confirms weaknesses of network based initiatives. As 
recent works on EU domestic cases of network governance mainly 
prove (Casey and Lawless 2011), networks are weakened by lack of 
legitimacy in the network participants’ perception, and high structural 
flexibility which limits an effective coordination within the network. 
Further investigation may reveal if such a limit exists for MedReg too. 
 
5.2 Role and relevance of the bottom-up explanatory factor 
The perception of other international actors, regional networks and 
domestic factors with regards to energy rules adoption has been asked. 
On a scale from 0 to 5, respondents have been asked to compare the 
role of the three types of actors: other international actors, with the 
exception of the EU; networks, MedReg included; and domestic 
actors. Figure 5 shows result with regard to “other international actors”. 
European countries have been included considering different 
perceptions that respondents may have of country specific energy 
foreign policy compared to the EU one; the latter often criticized for not 
being the expression of “one single voice”. In this regard, only Egypt 
answered to all provided options; Algeria replied only to WTO and 
IEA assigning them a score of 1. Turkey gave a 1 to the UN system, 3 to 
WTO, and 4 to IEA. Despite the recent interest shown by emerging 
powers for the MENA region, respondents did not reply on this point 
here synthesized by “China”. 
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Figure 5: Comparison between international actors, EU excluded 
 
 
Role of regional networks
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Figure 6: Regional networks as energy rules promoter 
Note: ECCAWA, Economic Social Committee for Arab Countries in West Asia, UN 
system. 
AUPTDE, Arab Union for Electricity Producers, Transmitters and Distributors, based in 
Amman Jordan. 
MEDELEC, Mediterranean Committee for Electricity, grouping together the entire 
Mediterranean electrical industry. 
OME, Mediterranean Energy Observatory, non-profit research centre grouping together 
energy industries of the Mediterranean. 
ERRA, Energy Regulators Regional Association, a network of regulatory bodies from the 
Central European and Eurasian region, having affiliates from Africa, Asia, the Middle 
East and the USA. 
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The same question, and the same scale of preferences, have been 
used with regards to regional networks of cooperation, focusing on the 
Mediterranean and Middle East. As Figure 6 shows, their weight in 
respondents’ perception is very low. As regards our case of network 
governance, MedReg, low scores have been registered also in this case, 
while other networks seem better performing (see ERRA in “Other” 
options).  
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Figure 7: Relevance of domestic actors  
 
Finally, the role of bottom-up pressure has been analyzed. 
Although few replies, the bottom-up pressure for rules change (Figure 
7) comes out to be the most relevant in the region, with the executive 
power as the actor pushing for effective rules adoption and 
implementation. Turkish respondent accord high importance to Civil 
Society Organizations (CSOs) and Energy Industry too, showing the 
extent of veto players different from the executive. The higher score 
given to Energy Industry by Egypt shows industry stakeholders as 
relevant veto players, more than the executive power. Nonetheless, one 
should be aware of the ownership structure of MENA energy industry, 
mainly state-owned. Thus, the existing continuity between the industry 
board of directors and the executive powers is the institutional factors 
that mainly affect countries’ regulatory framework. This result, jointly 
with findings provided in Figure 2, reveal how the domestic 
institutional environment plays the major role in the sector’s reform 
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projects also with regards to IRAs independence, both from the 
political power and energy stakeholders. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The study shows the findings of a survey addressed at MENA 
regulators, investigating both electricity sector organization and the 
pressures for rules adoption at both domestic and international level. 
Although based only on four countries, the sample provides a clear 
picture of the MENA population. Examined countries have adopted 
rules for electricity sector restructuring in the period considered such as 
sector’s unbundling and the establishment of IRAs. At this stage of the 
analysis, there are no regime for TPA that can be registered, while 
tariffs - a very important regulatory elements on which independence 
and autonomy of decision makers can be measures - are managed by 
the national IRA only in the Jordan and Turkish case.  
With regards to rules promotion, we consider three explanatory 
factors: bottom-up pressure for rules change, in which the domestic 
actors play the most relevant role; top-down EU pressure for rules 
adoption; horizontal pressure, the one played by technical networks 
grouping both states’ representatives and experts. Being financed by 
the EU, MedReg has been conceived as a case of network governance 
and indirect EU rules promotion. When comparing the direct and 
indirect pressures, respondents confirm that the EU is more effective 
when exerting top-down pressure. Contrary to the literature on EU 
external governance, which usually defines networks as one of the 
most promising modes of EU rules diffusion in sectors not responding 
to the EU exclusive competences (Knill and Tosun, 2009), MedReg does 
not confirm to be a relevant case for rules promotion. Although having 
the characteristics that the existing literature associate to networks of 
governance, MedReg is not recognized as effective in terms of rules 
promotion with regard specific issues (i.e., tariffs) and in comparison 
with the EU by our respondents. The same performance is confirmed 
when MedReg is compared to other networks, such as ERRA. Among 
international actors, the EU confirms to be relevant also in terms of 
MENA actors’ conformity with EU provisions. At the same time, when 
the role of international actors, regional organizations, and the 
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domestic actors are compared, the latter are perceived as the most 
effective in terms of pressures for rules adoption. Domestic institutions 
are essential for effective and credible regulatory commitments, as well 
as for the independence of IRAs. This result is not a surprise. In 
contexts like MENA, characterized by long-lasting regimes, one is 
expected to have the executive power as the sole decision maker. 
Findings show that, decisions on adopting and implementing sectoral 
reforms suffers the veto of energy stakeholders industry.  Moreover, 
the external rules promotion, both at top-down and networks level, 
when concrete incentives to rules change are missing, risks to be not 
effective; in the best case the result may be a pure cosmetic change, 
such as in the case of non independent regulatory bodies.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1 EU Legislative sources: gas and  electricity sector 
 
DIRECTIVE 96/92/EC for 
Electricity 
DIRECTIVE 98/30/EC for 
Gas 
DIRECTIVE 2003/54/EC 
for Electricity 
DIRECTIVE 2003/55/EC 
for Gas 
DIRECTIVE 2009/72/EC 
for Electricity 
DIRECTIVE 2009/73/EC 
for Gas 
Generation: principle of 
non-discrimination; 
Authorization procedure 
(art. 4  DIR. 98/30/EC). For 
electricity sector: possibility 
of tendering (art. 4,   DIR. 
96/92/EC) 
Generation: Tendering 
procedure for new capacity 
for the electricity sector 
(art.7  DIR. 2003/54/EC). 
Authorization procedure 
respecting non-
discrimination principle, 
for gas (art. 4  DIR. 
2003/55/EC) 
Generation: Tendering 
procedure  for the 
electricity sector  (art.8  
DIR. 2009/72/EC)  
Authorization procedure 
respecting non-
discrimination principle, 
for gas (art. 4  DIR. 
2009/73/EC) 
TSO: Unbundling: of 
accounts (art.10  DIR. 
96/92/EC) 
TSO: Unbundling -  
independent at least in 
terms of its legal form, 
organization and decision 
making from other 
activities (art.10,  DIR. 
2003/54/EC; art. 9  DIR. 
2003/55/EC) 
 
TSO Unbundling:   
independent at least in 
terms of its legal form, 
organization and decision 
making from other 
activities (art.9  DIR. 
2009/72/EC;  art.9  DIR. 
2009/73/EC) 
DSOs: Unbundling of 
accounts (art.14  DIR. 
96/92/EC) 
DSOs Unbundling: legal, 
organization and decision 
making (art.15  DIR. 
2003/54/EC; art.13  DIR. 
2003/55/EC) 
DSOs Unbundling: legal, 
organization and decision 
making (art.26  DIR. 
2009/72/EC;  art.26  DIR. 
2009/73/EC) 
 
TPA regime: regulated, 
negotiated, single buyer 
(art.15-18  DIR. 96/92/EC; 
art. 14-16 DIR. 98/30/EC)   
TPA regime: regulated, 
based on public tariffs (art. 
20 DIR. 2003/54/EC; art. 18 
DIR. 2003/55/EC)   
TPA regime: regulated  
based on public tariffs  (art. 
32  DIR. 2009/72/EC; art.32  
DIR. 2009/73/EC)   
IRA: non-specified IRA designation (art. 23 
DIR. 2003/54/EC; art.25  
DIR. 2003/55/EC) 
IRA strengthened role and 
powers (chapter IX  DIR. 
2009/72/EC; chapter VIII  
DIR. 2009/73/EC) 
† Note: TSO stands for Transmission System Operator; DSO stands for Distribution 
System Operator 
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Table 2a Agency identification 
Country IRA Name IRA Acronym Year Legislative 
source  
Algeria 
 
Electricity and 
Gas 
Regulatory 
Commission 
CREG 2002 Law No 02-01, 
February 5, 
2002 on 
electricity and 
gas 
distribution  
 
Algeria Autorité de 
Régulation des 
Hydrocarbures 
ARH NP* NP* 
Egypt Electric Utility 
and Consumer 
Protection 
Regulatory 
Agency 
EGYPTERA 2001 Presidential 
Decree no. 339 
for 
reorganizing 
of the 
authority  
Jordan  Electricity 
Regulatory 
Commission 
ERC 2001 Council of 
Ministers 
decision issued 
on 15 January 
2001 
Turkey  Energy Market 
Regulatory 
Authority 
EMRA 2001 Electricity 
Market Law, 
4628, 2001 
Source: Authors’ survey on the Electricity Sector of MENA countries and the role of international cooperation. Agencies statutes and laws.  
*NOTE - NA: information not available 
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Table 2b Agency organization and role managing energy sector 
Country IRA 
Acronym 
IRA 
managerial 
body* (RC; 
SHR) 
IRA Under 
Incumbents’ 
Control 
IRA 
Advisory 
body, 
partially 
independent 
IRA 
COMPETENCES 
**: 
UNBUNDLING 
IRA 
COMPETENCES 
**: 
TPA 
IRA 
COMPETENCES 
**: 
TARIFF 
SETTING 
Algeria CREG RC - Board of 
four 
commissioners 
X     
Algeria ARH RC - Executive 
Committee 
President, and 
5 Directors 
X     
Egypt EGYPTERA RC X     
Jordan  ERC RC X  X  X 
Turkey  EMRA RC  X X  X 
Source: Country Reports from the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Limassol 2007, have been considered for the analysis of IRAs 
competences on energy. Information on their organization have been asked during interviews conducted on May 2011 and, for Jordan and 
Turkey mainly, in the survey text. 
*NOTE: RC model – Regulatory Council, Chairman plus Council members and Regulatory Staff;  
SHR model - Single Head Regulator, one President plus Regulatory staff.  
When available, additional information are provided in the table 
** NOTE: Competences are reported only when indicated as exclusive competences of the agency. Shared competences or issues on which the 
agency has only a consultative role are not provided 
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Table 2c Electricity sector degree of openness 
Country UNBUNDLING TPA TARIFF SETTING 
Algeria FUNCTIONAL 
separation 
between 
generation, 
transport and 
distribution in 
the electricity 
sector 
Introduced in 
2002 
Fixed by the Prime 
Minister 
Egypt FUNCTIONAL 
missing detailed 
information 
NA Defined by the 
Government. 
Jordan  Full ownership 
unbundling 
achieved in 
1999 
Regulated 
regime 
NA 
Turkey  Sector 
unbundled 
Regulated 
regime 
Approved by IRA 
Source: Country Reports from the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Limassol 2007 
*NOTE - NA: information not available 
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2d Respondents 
Country IRA Acronym Survey Respondents Interview Respondents 
Algeria 
 
CREG 1 3 
Algeria ARH 3 2 
Egypt EGYPTERA 1 5 
Jordan ERC 1 NA* 
Turkey EMRA 1 NA* 
*NOTE - NA: information not available. These agencies did not take part in MedReg FSR Training on May 2011, when other interviews have 
been conducted  
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Chapter 3 
 
Institutional Background  of Southern Mediterranean 
countries: the exogenous factors affecting both current 
energy regulation and potentials for regulatory changes  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Projects for electricity production from renewable sources, such as 
Desertec and the Mediterranean Solar Plan, make Southern 
Mediterranean countries increasingly relevant in terms of energy 
generation and transmission. These countries are involved, since mid 
1990s, in EU funded programmes and policies for regional integration. 
In the past ten years, the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation on energy 
was centred on sector’s liberalization through the extension of rules; 
with this regard, spreading rules part of the EU energy acquis was the 
main issue at stake. The current cooperation projects, indeed, mainly 
focus on the need to create a favourable and shared, as much as 
possible, regulatory environment for new investments in energy 
generation and distribution from solar power, and networks’ renewal. 
The study identifies those institutional features of Middle East and 
Northern Africa (MENA) countries, which determine restraints to 
regulatory discretion and may favour and/or limit country’s specific 
commitments to regulate the sector, as well as a shared Euro-
Mediterranean regulatory framework.  
Countries’ institutional background (North 1990) is exogenous to 
the analysis of MENA electricity sector. It attains to executive-
legislative relations and reciprocal vetoing, the independence of 
judicial power by political power, and the role of bureaucracy. 
Moreover, this study conceive religious groups and the army as other 
two potential veto factors that may impact on reforming processes of 
the economic and energy sector. Domestic factors are analysed under 
the lenses of the veto players concept (Tsebelis 2002). Usually referred 
to the reform-making behaviour of veto players in democratic countries 
(König and Debus 2010), the theory builds on the concept of stability of 
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domestic institutions for countries’ growth. With regards to developing 
countries, indeed, previous studies (Ferreira Filho 2007) prove that 
promoting economic growth and economic reforms processes challenge 
the status quo position of veto players. In countries where multiple 
veto players exist, and are poorly polarized, reforming processes may 
generate credible and stable regulatory frameworks, as well as a 
positive environment for investments (Roberts 2011). Thus, the 
establishment of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs), as well as 
the reforming processes of the energy sector, have potentials for 
threatening the maintenance of status quo position by existing veto 
players in MENA countries too. Nonetheless, MENA authoritarian 
regimes mainly, are characterized by strong and polarized veto powers; 
specifically single-party institutional structures are the main aspect of a 
new form of authoritarian rule that can be characterized as a crony capitalist 
and landlord spoils system cloaked in a multiparty democratic façade” (King 
2009, p.87). This study, which develops an institutional analysis of 
MENA countries largely based on the methodology by Levy and Spiller 
(1994, 1996), shows that one of the powerful actors in the 
Mediterranean context are the executive power and bureaucrats, the 
two being in a very close relation. Such relation may generate a 
regulatory framework characterized by rigidity and not easy 
adaptation to new challenges, such as the integration of intermittent 
renewables in the energy system.  
This implies that the main situation we expect to encounter is the one 
with a very limited room for sector liberalization, limited opportunities 
for private, foreigners included, investors, and predominance of state-
owned utility companies. Being MENA energy companies mainly state-
owned, managerial boards of utility industries are thought as part of 
that bureaucracy closely linked to the executives. 
The paper is so articulated: Section 2 reports the model of analysis 
as provided by the literature. This section identifies the main 
mechanisms for restraining regulators’ discretion we analyse with 
regards to the MENA countries. This section focuses on the role that 
regulatory agencies may have in restraining the discretion of political 
power, limiting cases of administrative expropriation. Then, paragraph 
2.1, describes the method of analysis as derived by Levy and Spiller 
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study; while, in paragraph 2.2, we adapt such method to our case 
study. Section 3 reports the results of the institutional endowment 
analysis, enlightening those mechanisms restraining regulators’ 
discretionary power for each considered country. Section 4, describes 
the current organization of the electricity sector, for each analysed 
country, with an indication of existing regulatory restraints. 
Conclusions develop on the main interesting points of the institutional 
analysis. 
 
2. Impact of domestic institutions on independence of national 
regulatory agencies. The framework for the analysis  
 
The definition of a regulatory framework by states’ actors correspond 
to the view of countries as regulatory States (Majone 1994), a feature 
that emerged globally in the aftermath of the liberalization waves of the 
last 30 years. One of the main aspects of a regulatory State is the 
establishment of ad hoc national independent regulatory agencies 
(IRAs) having technical expertises, adequate resources and degree of 
autonomy to regulate the economy, as the US experience in 1970 – 1980 
shows. In order to be effective, and capable of solving “politicians’ time 
inconsistent policy preferences, introduce technocratic Pareto-improving 
regulations” (Hanretty and Koop 2009, p.2), regulators need to be 
guaranteed a certain degree of autonomy from the political power and 
economic interests. Without regulators’ autonomy, flexibility of 
regulations cannot easily emerge. Moreover, administrative actions 
may be limited by countries’ institutions. Thus, regulators’ discretion 
may be limited in a way resulting in a total absence or very limited 
independence from political powers. Levy and Spiller (1994) pivotal 
study, proves the double impact countries’ political and social 
institutions may have on defining the regulatory framework: countries’ 
institutions may affect both the “appropriate balance between commitment 
and flexibility” (Levy and Spiller 1994, p.204) and the administrative 
arbitrariness. Thus, the balance between commitment and flexibility, as 
well as administrative discretion, influences the type of regulation that 
a country may implement, and its effectiveness.  
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With regards to MENA countries, the regulatory problem is not 
simply related to the existence of limits to administrative discretion. A 
part from the rupture represented, in certain cases, by the year 2011, 
MENA long-lasting regimes raise the problem of the continuity 
between élites in power and the administrative power. This continuity 
determines the need for understanding whether the institutions of 
MENA countries may really favour that degree of independence of 
regulatory agencies which is required for translating commitments 
towards regulation, into effective and credible regulatory framework.  
In order to analyse the efficacy of regulatory processes and 
regulatory authorities’ independence, the degree of discretion and 
autonomy in decision making need to be assessed. With this regard, an 
interesting case of study is the prices and tariffs’ definition. Tariffs set-
up by an IRA, indeed, reveals high level of agency’s administrative 
discretion and mild forms of expropriation. At the same time, when 
tariffs are “set down the long-run average costs” (Levy and Spiller 1996, 
p.3), administrative expropriation emerge. Administrative 
expropriation impacts on the long-term performance of a company, 
affecting the expected return from investments, for example. This 
makes in the end difficult, when not impossible, a company to operate. 
An IRA that is effectively autonomous from the political power is 
capable of defining the level of tariffs that may assure the proper level 
of return on companies’ investments. On the contrary, in those cases in 
which tariffs are set up by incumbents, or by IRAs under incumbents’ 
influence, reveal a non autonomous and non independent IRA. The 
missing independence, thus, may favour cases of administrative 
expropriation. In these cases, investors will expect to be limited in 
prices they can charge, suffering an additional loss to sunk costs. 
Moreover, very low prices signal investors of the missing “reassurance 
that future prices will be se a sufficiently remunerative level to justify 
investments” (Joskow 2005, p.8). Such form of expropriation often “ends 
up with public ownership of utilities, because the hazards of direct private 
investments are so great” (Levy and Spiller 1996, p.3). Although data for 
MENA countries show a more positive environment for investments 
since mid-1990s (graph 1), forms of administrative expropriations may 
come out when analysing MENA countries institutional background. 
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The paragraph 2.1 summarizes the method for the institutional analysis 
as by Levy and Spiller (1996). 
 
2.1 Assessing commitments to regulate the utility sector: the method for the 
analysis 
In Levy and Spiller (1994), regulation is defined as a design problem 
having two main components: governance – the mechanisms that 
constrain regulatory discretion – and incentives – the rules on pricing, 
subsidies, networks access and exploitation. The choice between 
specific governance mechanisms and incentive structures are “variables 
in the hand of policy-makers” (Levy and Spiller 1994, p. 205), which 
choose on the base of nation’s institutional endowment (North, 1990). 
Thus, being the outcomes of the regulatory process mainly path-
dependent, working endogenous mechanisms are the most relevant 
aspect to focus on (Glachant 2008). In this regard, the dimensions of a 
country’s institutional endowment that need to be assessed are: 
- executive and legislative institutions ; 
- judicial institutions;  
- informal norms; 
- contending social interests and their balance; 
- administrative capabilities. 
Firstly, as regards the executive and legislative of a country, these 
refer to formal mechanisms for appointing legislators and decision 
makers, laws design and implementation, and the way executive - 
legislative relations are regulated. Secondly, judiciary independence 
from political powers is one of the main dimensions of the rule of law; 
it makes potential investors confident on the seriousness of laws’ 
implementation and respect. Thus, mechanisms for judges’ 
appointment and for assuring their impartiality should be taken into 
consideration. Thirdly, customs, viewed as constraints to the action of 
individuals. Fourthly, the articulation of interests within the society, 
their balance, and the role of ideology should be considered as 
influencing the policies’ definition. Finally, the administrative 
capabilities of a country, which are described as the “ability of the 
nation’s professionals to handle complex regulatory concepts and processes in 
a relatively efficacious manner, without triggering excessive disputes and 
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litigation” (Levy and Spiller 1994, p.208). Strong administrative 
capabilities are positively correlated with the efficacy of regulatory 
system and, eventually, with a country’s capability to favour and 
attract investments. 
Following the Levy and Spiller framework, the way the above 
dimensions should combine, in order to provide a positive 
environment for developing credible regulatory framework, is: 
- explicitly separating executive, legislative and judicial powers, 
usually in constitutional text; thus, 
- having a written constitution, which works as limits to the first 
two powers and is enforced by functioning judiciary;  
- existing two elective chambers, being elected with different 
voting rules;  
- having an electoral system, which allows opposition parties to 
emerge as counterbalance of the majority ones;  
- a federal structure of the state, or strong decentralization of 
powers.  
With this regard, credibility of regulation in the utility sector is 
higher in countries, in which executive and legislative discretions are 
counterbalanced, than in countries where such counterbalance does not 
exist or is weak. Consider, as example, the case of a country having a 
strong executive power over the legislative institutions: in this case 
providing specific legislation for the sector to be regulated is not a 
sufficient guarantee against administrative discretion, because of the 
legislative counterbalance is weak. Moreover, a strong executive may 
prevail on judiciary power in the interpretation of specific rules, 
eliminating de facto any kind of legitimacy control on specific 
provisions. 
Once analysed, the five dimensions of institutional endowment, 
and their desired combination, mechanisms and pre-conditions for an 
effective regulatory framework may be defined as:  
- restraints on regulators’ discretion written in the regulatory system;  
- restraints on changing regulatory systems, formal or substantial;  
- independent judiciary. 
Under the first mechanism, we find “process regulation or specific, 
substantive rules” (Levy and Spiller 1994, p. 211). Countries, indeed, 
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may be distinguished between those requiring specific regulatory rules 
and those that can use more flexible regulatory processes. As regards 
the latter - countries using a flexible form of regulation - informal 
norms, administrative laws, and “an institutionalised process of 
argumentation and consensus formation” (Levy and Spiller 1994, p. 211) 
that restrains regulatory discretion are relevant aspects of the 
regulatory process. As regards the former - countries requiring specific 
rules to ensure credibility of regulation - the existence of strong 
administrative capabilities is considered.  
The second mechanism, restraints on changing regulatory systems, 
refers to potentiality for changing regulatory system and is related to 
the degree of flexibility of the entire regulatory system of a country. In 
this regard, the political system of a country should be analysed 
considering the distinction between situations in which a credible 
regulatory commitment may be achieved through legislation, from 
those in which such credibility may be derived by licensing and 
contractual arrangements. In this regard, electoral, executive and 
legislative institutions are the core aspects to analyse. 
The third, and last, mechanism refers to the existence of a 
functioning judiciary system, characterized by independence from 
political powers; thus, judiciary capability of limiting the administrative 
arbitrary action, is one of the main aspects to consider in the institutional 
analysis. The section that follows, reports the methodology for the 
analysis as adapted to our study, the results of which are included in 
the section 3. The methodological note in the Annex, variables 
generated by the study of MENA institutional endowment are 
described. 
 
2.2 MENA Institutional Endowment: data collection method 
With regards to MENA countries we have adopted, and 
opportunely adapted, Levy and Spiller framework for analysis 
provided in paragraph 2.1. Specifically, our analysis considers the 
following countries in the period 1990 – 2010: Morocco, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey. The 
above analysed five dimensions of a country’s institutional endowment 
have been analysed collecting data on: 
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- countries’ Constitutions or basic laws, in case of absence of a 
written constitution; 
- anecdotic evidences on countries’ political life in the period 
1990 - 2010; 
- indicators of governance and countries’ stability. 
In line with Tsebelis (2002), it is the Constitution and the political 
system of a country, that specify veto players. The first two points here 
considered originate specific variables, built on the framework analysis 
given by Levy and Spiller, and opportunely integrated with data from 
DPI 2010 and POLCON 2010 (see the Methodological Annex).  
Firstly, data collected were directed at describing countries’ 
institutional endowment on the base of:  
- the presence of a written constitution, year of adoption and 
year of relevant changes/amendments impacting on the 
political system; 
- States’ organization, distinguishing between unitary and 
federal forms of the State. The presence of decentralized units 
of government (municipalities, districts) and their eventual role 
in managing natural resources, and natural monopolies, such 
as energy, has been also considered. 
- States’ regime, referring to the political regime as emerge by 
Constitutional provisions; 
- The presence of religion as State religion and as source of law. 
The existence, in Constitutional texts, of norms referring to property 
rights, expropriation and compensation rules have been considered. In 
this regard, all analysed Constitutions include such provisions referring 
to ordinary law for their effective implementation.  
Secondly, we have deeply analysed countries institutional aspects 
looking at the following dimensions:  
a) Executive and legislative institutions - These two institutions are 
fundamental in order to analyse the institutional limits to regulatory 
discretion. The analysis of Constitutions considers the following 
aspects:  
- Organization of powers, distinguishing between: 
o Chief Executive (i.e.: Head of State, Monarch, or Prime 
Minister depending on States’ regime); 
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o Cabinet, the role of the Prime Minister, when different 
by the Chief Executive, and its party.  
o Parliament, considering elections modalities both for 
the low and high chamber, when two chambers exist, 
and their regularity as regards the low chamber; 
characteristic of both majority and opposition parties; 
parliament dismissal procedures and its veto powers.  
- Anecdotic evidences on elections and alternation in power. 
b) Countries judicial institutions - Aspects here considered are: 
- the recognition of magistrates’ independence by politics; 
- mechanisms for judges appointment and eventual dismissal; 
- the presence of ad hoc institutional bodies in charge of judges’ 
career and their chief. 
Such measures may give a first impression of potential for judiciary 
corruption. Moreover, the presence of a Constitutional Court, 
appointment and dismissal procedures, and the presence of other 
judicial bodies such as those related to religious matters, have been 
considered. With regard religion, and religious tribunal, it should be 
stressed that very often such bodies are involved in aspects 
characterizing the citizens’ private life dimensions (family laws, 
mainly) and do not influence mechanisms for solving controversies 
between private companies and the State. 
As regards the third and fourth dimensions identified by Levy and 
Spiller, c) informal norms widely accepted by the society, and d) 
character of contending social interests within a society, we develop 
our analysis referring to anecdotic evidences and specific indicators, as 
below reported.  The third dimension has been analysed having 
regards to index of corruption within the political system, and extent of 
constraints to the Executives’ action. The fourth dimension instead 
focuses on two actors’ influence on the governments’ action – religious 
groups and the army. We have considered the history of relations 
between the head of executive powers and the army, and role of the 
army in politics; religion and ideology of parties’ formation, as allowed 
by Constitutions, and the eventual role of religion in politics. 
Finally, e) administrative capabilities of a country, are considered 
looking at indicators of: 
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- regulatory quality; 
- government effectiveness, and 
- bureaucracy quality.  
Sources of information for the letter e) and c) are the World Bank 
Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the International Country Risk 
Guide, mainly. These indicators, allow the description of how the 
quality of regulation, level of corruption and rule of law within a 
country are perceived. Countries’ investment profile is also provided. 
The variables so determined, described in the Annex, define the 
exogenous dimension of a wider study on regulatory region, of which this 
paper is part. Such variables characterize countries’ evaluation of the 
coherence between domestic system of energy rules and rules and 
principles promoted by international actors. In particular, being this 
study part of a wider research programme aimed at assessing the 
effectiveness of the EU as rules promoter in the field of energy in the 
southern neighbourhood, we take such considerations as pivotal for the 
definition of a potentially shared Euro-Mediterranean regulatory 
framework. 
The following section describes Southern Mediterranean 
institutional background, useful for having a measure of the current 
processes of regulation with regards electricity and renewables mainly. 
 
3. Mechanisms restraining regulators’ discretionary power: the pre-
conditions for a functioning regulatory environment 
 
In this section we provide a description of how the three mechanisms 
for restraining regulatory power identified in Section 2 may, or may 
not, work in the MENA regimes so identified: 
- Presidential and Semi-Presidential Republics: Algeria, Tunisia, 
Syria, Egypt; 
- Parliamentary Republics: Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey; 
- Monarchies and quasi-monarchical regime: Jordan and Morocco, 
Libya10. 
                                                 
10 We consider the absence of elections in the Libyan Parliament, which is formed by 
representatives of local councils, as well as the absence of Chief executive elections, as 
determinants of the quasi-monarchical status (Emerson and Youngs, 2009).  
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With regards to the first dimension of the MENA institutional 
endowment quoted in paragraph 2.2, all examined constitutions 
formally recognise the separation of powers between political and 
judiciary powers, and between executive and legislative. With the sole 
exception of Israel, all countries have a written constitution. Moreover, 
two legislative chambers with different voting system exist in the two 
monarchies, Morocco and Jordan, and in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt. 
The second chambers of the presidential and semi-presidential regimes 
have been strengthened by constitutional reforms of the second half of 
2000s. Such reforms, initially described as the result of political 
liberalization, reveal their nature of façade change (Ottaway 2008): 
Aimed at guaranteeing Presidents permanence in power, the 2000s 
environment is characterized by constitutional retrogression (Marx 2010, 
p.485). In those cases in which a second chamber exists, indeed, it is 
partially elected by voters and partially by Chief executive (Egypt) or 
formed by people having certain characteristics such as members of 
local councils, members of professional chambers (Algeria and 
Tunisia). Modalities of second chamber elections have been directed at 
consolidating the King and its entourage in monarchical regimes: it is 
entirely named by the King, for Jordan, or formed only by people 
having certain characteristics as above in Moroccan case.  Finally, no 
MENA state has a federal structure of power. Although the existence of 
decentralised level of administration, local authorities’ powers over tax 
and spending legislation exist only in the Egyptian and Moroccan case.  
The part of the study that follows, focuses on the study of the 
formal system of power; thus, restraints written in the regulatory 
framework of a country are considered in the form of executive and 
legislative powers organization, and their relations and reciprocal veto 
powers. Then, the role of the judicial power and administrative 
capabilities, for each country, as well as the level of corruption, are 
considered. In the end, the role of the religion and the army are 
considered as a case of contending social interests and potential veto 
powers external to the formal system of power. Graphs and tables 
quoted in this section are reported at the end of the paper. 
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3.1 Executive and legislative powers 
Having regards to the executive and legislative powers, we have 
analysed: 
- the existence of rules allowing for parties dynamic to emerge 
and, as a consequence, restraints to regulators’ discretion in the 
electoral framework to be identified;  
- the power of vetoing such rules by executive towards the 
legislative powers and vice versa; 
- how such formal vetoes can be defined and which are the most 
interesting cases for the analysis.  
Graph 2 shows the number of years Chief Executives and their parties 
have been in office in the considered regimes, except for the two 
monarchies being the Chief executive a non-elected body. Straight lines 
show continuity in the majority of cases. Such linear relations, have 
been further confirmed considering that the executive party, in the 
same period, controlled the entire Parliament even when two chambers 
exist, as in the Egyptian, Algerian and Tunisian case. Moreover, as 
regards the mandate termination and number of mandates of Chief 
executive, constitutions allowing for a second mandate are only the 
Algerian and Israeli one; Tunisian, Lebanese and Turkish constitutions, 
are the sole cases that do not explicitly allow such possibility. In the 
Egyptian case the possibility of a second mandate has been introduced 
in the constitutional text adopted in March 2011, in the aftermath of 
people uprising. Despite such provisions, Presidential regimes have 
been characterized by long lasting leaders. On the contrary, the 
Parliamentary Republics, Israel, Lebanon and Turkey, have been 
characterized by high governments’ instability. The higher degree of 
stability registered by Presidential regimes compared to the one of 
Parliamentary regimes is evident also in terms of regularity in the 
Parliamentary elections (graph 3): it is higher in the former than in the 
latter case. The flat line of Libya is due to the absence of elections. 
Considering the relevance of elections for functioning check and 
balance between political forces, and emergent majority-opposition 
parties’ dynamics, we have considered the presence of absolute 
majority in the houses, and  legislative and executive veto powers. 
With the exception of Parliamentarian regimes, other regimes are 
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characterized by absolute majority of the executive party. Regarding 
veto power, the Chief executive emerges as the strongest one. 
Specifically, in presidential and monarchical regimes he acts as the 
unique veto power towards the Legislative, the Cabinet behaving like 
agency acting on behalf of the head of executive powers instead of a 
body having the agenda setting power. Moreover, the Chief executive 
appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister, with the exception of 
Lebanon; he can veto legislation and may dismiss the Parliament even 
without motivation, as in the Egyptian and Algerian case. Thus, MENA 
countries show an articulation of powers in which the Government and 
the Parliament are squeezed by strong Chief executives, in monarchical 
and presidential regimes mainly. Although limited available 
observations, the graph on the extent of executive constraints and veto 
points confirm our analysis.  
With regards to Parliamentary republics, the extent of such vetoes 
is highly influenced by fragmented political scenario; such limits are 
more evident in the Lebanese case than in the Israeli one. Indeed, 
during the period 1992 – 2001 Israel adopted a presidential regime 
system that let its executive veto powers increase (graphs 4a – 4b). 
Presidential and Monarchical regimes favour a higher degree of 
incumbents’ discretion than Parliamentary regimes, especially when 
majority-opposition parties’ dynamics does not work. Incumbents’ 
freedom of action result of policies defined on the base of Chief 
executives’ wills more than on well assessed needs of a country. The 
Parliamentary regimes of MENA region, although strong executive 
veto powers, are characterized by a more genuine check and balance 
and alternation of parties in power. In these cases, the analysis reveals a 
high level of system instability and often weak ruling majorities, as for 
Lebanon and last years in Israel. In these last cases, we should be in 
presence of commitments to regulate that are expression of a more 
shared views than in the monarchical or presidential cases. 
Nonetheless, high political instability may make the translation of such 
views into effective regulation difficult. For Parliamentarian regimes, 
thus, such as for the other regimes in the region, the evaluation of other 
veto players is necessary. 
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3.2  Administrative capabilities and the judiciary power 
Formal restraints on executives’ discretion can be defined weak in 
all those countries not having democratic features such as an electoral 
system that, despite elections regularity, favour alternation in power of 
different parties and guarantee a functioning legislative power in terms 
of rules definition. In this regard, if “veto players are those whose 
agreement is necessary to change the status quo” (Gilardi, 2005a p.91), not 
many veto players emerge from the analysis of executive and 
legislative powers in MENA area. The POLCON V index reported, 
measuring the extent of veto powers within a political system, close 
enough to Tsebelis (2002) concept of veto players, is in line with the 
outcomes derived by anecdotic evidences. Even in case of MENA 
parliamentarian regimes, characterised by high political instability, 
veto players should not be so effective if it is true that  “policy stability 
increases as the number of veto players increases” (Gilardi, 2005a p.91). 
Thus, the analysis takes into consideration the extent of other two 
formal limits to incumbents’ discretion that may eventually behave as 
veto powers affecting the rules implementation: a country’s 
administrative capabilities and the judicial power. As regards 
administrative capabilities, we have considered as a measure of MENA 
administrative capabilities the quality of bureaucracy, the perceptions 
of the quality of public services, and executive capacities in formulating 
and implementing sound policies  as reported by International Country 
Risk Guide and Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World Bank 
indicators. In addition to that, considering Levy and Spiller’s definition 
of administrative capabilities as the capacities expressed by the 
professionals within a society to confront with complex ruling systems, 
we have analysed the level of enrolment in tertiary level education (i.e. 
secondary school and university), controlling for the percentage of 
GDP expenditure dedicated to tertiary education (graphs 5a – 5e). 
Values of regulatory quality and government effectiveness almost 
coincide, showing the relation between the two powers as they are 
perceived. Moreover, bureaucracy quality confirms to be high only in 
the Israeli case.  
These data confirm what has been assumed on the role of 
bureaucrats as pivotal for the regulatory effective implementation. In 
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the end, it performs better than the regulatory capabilities of 
implementing policies, as people perceive it. Such data seem to be 
confirmed by average GDP expenditure dedicated to education at the 
highest level, while people enrolled in tertiary education is high for 
almost all examined countries, except Algeria.  
With regards to the judiciary independence and powers, we firstly 
refer to Constitutional provisions, grading 0 those Constitutions not 
mentioning judges independence from both political and religious 
power. Moreover, based on the analysis of Constitutional texts, the 
variable referring to magistrates’ independence refers to methods for 
magistrates’ appointment and dismissal too. It looks at magistrates’ 
appointment and careers decision. The dummy variable obtained, thus, 
register 1 for those cases of formal independence and appointment-
dismissal decisions taken by judiciary bodies, and 0 for cases of missing 
mention of independence in Constitutional texts and appointment-
dismissal decision taken by the political power mainly (graph 6). Then, 
a measure of rule of law is reported for each country (Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, the World Bank), as it varies in the considered 
period (graph 6): the chosen indicator measures the degree of 
confidence towards the country’s rules and their implementation, the 
courts system, the degree of contracts and property rights enforcement. 
Even in this case, the registered scores, with the exception of Israel, are 
not so high showing a low degree of confidence in the functioning of 
the ruling system. This is extremely important for those cases that are 
currently at the centre of new projects for renewable, thus new 
investments. Morocco, which recognizes formal independence of the 
magistrates, registers very low levels of rule of law. The same 
differences between formal and substantial independence and 
functioning of the judiciary system are given for Algeria and Egypt. 
While, Jordan, in which the King has a central role in appointing 
judges, show higher level of rule of law compared to the other 
countries in the region.  Considering that the indicator reported refers 
to capabilities of contracting enforcement, property rights, and correct 
functioning of the courts, it is a relevant measure of our study aimed at 
describing the investment environment of MENA countries and 
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existing potential threats, such as nationalization and administrative 
expropriations.  
The functioning judicial and administrative powers, their 
weaknesses and strengthens, as well as their involvement in last years 
liberalization and openness of the economy, are further described 
having regards each specific country. Specific sessions on existing 
regulatory restraints for Libya and Syria have not been developed due 
to lacking information.  
 
3.2a - Presidential and Semi-Presidential Regimes 
The Arab Republic of Egypt  
Almost 6 million people work for the Egyptian public sector, 300.000 
having temporary contracts (NIS Report, Egypt, 2009 p.88). Since the 
1950s, the State is highly committed towards hiring in the public 
administration the most qualified people. Viewed as a tool for 
absorbing qualified un-employers and unemployment in general, the 
public sector became huge in terms of dimension although lacking 
resources. Its dimension makes monitoring function almost impossible. 
Moreover, low wages increase potential for corruption. The public 
sector suffers of the political influence, in particular in the personnel 
selection phase and in the career process, both at the central and local 
administration level. Considered the difficulties in controlling such 
huge apparatus, bureaucrats gained a degree of autonomy of action 
that very often consists in a non neutral management of public 
resources and strong interactions with the business sector (NIS Report, 
Egypt, 2009 p. 89). It emerge a bureaucracy having power of control on 
the country economic life. In this regard, the process of economic 
liberalization has not reduced such power although creating a sort of 
regulatory culture. In the aftermath of the 1990s worldwide promoted 
liberalizations, in 1991 the Economic Reform and Structural 
Adjustment Program (ERSAP) were adopted in order to favour the 
economic liberalization of the country. Although state owned 
enterprises still play a relevant role, Public-Private Partnerships 
widespread specifically in the utilities sector. The Partnership’s strategy 
started effectively in 2006 and since then almost 22 projects and total 
investments of 15.35 million of US dollars has been achieved.  From late 
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1980 to mid 2000s the participation of private sector in the economy has 
been increased from 40% to 55% (OME, 2011 p.19). Improvements 
should be registered also in the field of administrative law concerning 
public procurement and contracts; the Tenders Law n. 89 approved in 
1998 stopped bids negotiation after bid opening, confirmed the need for 
providing duly justified reasons for cancelling the bid, address conflict 
of interests. Still it provides for a preferential regime for Egyptian 
companies, reserving them 15% of preferences. One of the controversial 
aspects is the missing length of procedures, which reduces 
transparency. With regards to the judicial power, Egyptian constitution 
recognizes magistrates’ independence, although such independence is 
not effectively implemented. In a country in which salaries are low for 
key sector such as magistracy and bureaucracy, corruption is very high. 
The Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), should be in charge of judges’ 
career and improvements, although there is a strong continuity 
between the executive powers and the SJC leading persons. In 
coincidence with the 2005 political liberalization phase and parliament 
elections, former President Mubarak mentioned the possibility to adopt 
a new law aimed at improving judiciary political independence and 
provide for the implementation of article 88 of 1980 Constitutional text 
in which judges are defined as observers of electoral fairness. Although 
the numerous electoral infractions registered in 2005 elections by 
judges, no concrete actions were adopted by the ruling party (NIS 
Country Report on Judicial Corruption, 2009 p.202). Thus, 
independence has been not effectively implemented. As for the political 
liberalization phase even the fight for judges independence went lost, 
as well as the one for effective fight against corruption of both judges 
and bureaucrats. 
 
The People's Democratic Republic of Algeria 
Conceived as an instrument in the hands of the ruling class, Algerian 
bureaucracy is mainly an executive agency directed at implementing 
public-driven economic development. Bureaucracy, thus, developed in 
parallel with an economy mainly centred on oil and gas resources, 
disregarding socio-economic conditions. In 1980s the economic crisis 
associated to oil made evident the social discontent, bureaucracy and 
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the political power stability were threatened and a period of high 
domestic instability started. Contrary to Egypt, Algerian bureaucracy 
was not a low skilled one; the current economic reform in favour of 
private sector and new companies creation being mainly managed by 
bureaucracy. “These reforms are aimed at making it easier to create 
companies and to improve the regulatory and judicial framework, investor 
protection” (African Economic Outlook, 2011). Nonetheless, being 
bureaucracy dimension huge, “delays and transaction costs linked to the 
administrative formalities” still negatively impact on the economic life 
(African Economic Outlook, 2011). The direct relationship between 
bureaucrats and the political power, established at the time of 
independence from the colonial power, never broke up; it affects even 
the new regulatory environment in terms of lacking transparency and 
corruption. Algeria is ranked 105 out of 178 countries in the 2010 
Corruption Perceptions Index. Such as the Egyptian case, the new 
regulatory framework for investments establishes a preferential system 
for Algerian companies and obligatory participation of foreigners in 
association with local enterprises. A certain degree of independence to 
magistracy has been guaranteed after 1989 Constitutional reform. In 
1989 a Law on the Status of Judges and Law Officers established the 
judiciary as an autonomous power; independence was then sanctioned in 
1996 constitutional amendments. Although such formal independence, 
the President is the head of judicial power. It is the head of Supreme 
Judicial Council (CSM), a disciplinary body with limited autonomy, 
which is co-chaired by the Ministry of Justice. As in the article 72 of the 
Constitution, the President has the power to transfer or promote 
judges. Effectively, such decisions are taken by the Ministry of Justice 
which decides also on officers’ career (Executive decree 05/92 of 24 
October 1992 quoted in NIS Country Report on Judicial Corruption, 
2009 p. 173). Criteria for judges and officers’ career are not clear or 
transparent; the CSM meets at closed door when taking such decisions. 
Moreover, corruption is also very frequent and there is no monitoring 
on that; the CSM having no monitoring power. Finally, the CSM is not 
autonomous since the financial point of view and the number of its 
members is limited to 17 of whom only six are judges and law officers 
elected by their peers. Only after 2006, the number has been increased 
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and the law approved an increase in judges’ salary, in order to avoid 
the corruption temptation. Nonetheless, a judge’s monthly salary is the 
equivalent of only US $720 in dinars, lower than the average for judges 
in Morocco and Tunisia (African Economic Outlook, 2011). 
 
The Republic of  Tunisia 
Lacking information on the administrative system, and the interaction 
between the public sector and the country’s economic life, characterizes 
Tunisia. The 2011 people uprisings and political change originated by 
high level unemployment and corruption in the public sector, reveals 
the strong relation between the Ben Ali regime, which lasted almost 23 
years, and the bureaucracy. The most important event in terms of 
renovating public administration was the adoption, in 1996, of the Plan 
de Mise a Niveau de l’Administration; sponsored by the EU, the Plan had 
to favour public administration changes in line with necessities of a 
market economies, which the state started to promote at the end of 
1980s. improving competencies, efficiency and establish a trust-based 
relationship with the citizenry were the pillars of the Plan. An 
assessment of the plan’s implementation degree is missing; the EU 
documents on advancing cooperation with Tunisia remaining vague. It 
should be recognised that, although the state-centric administration of 
economic life, public sector corruption, and concentration of wealth in 
the hands of the Ben Ali family and its entourage, Tunisian economy 
performed better than other MENA countries (Freedom House, 
Tunisia, 2011 p.12). Tunisia, like Egypt and Algeria, guarantees judicial 
independence formally in the Constitutional text, but the President 
chairs the Superior Council of the Judiciary (SCJ), which appoints 
judges. Despite a relatively efficient judicial administration, 
impartiality of verdicts is highly questioned specifically when referring 
to eventual regime opponents. Appointment and dismissal procedures 
are arbitrary, and do not follow meritocratic criteria (Freedom House, 
Tunisia, 2011 p.11).  
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3.2b - Monarchies 
The Kingdom of Morocco  
Morocco defines public employee as “agents nommès dans des employs 
permanents et titularisès” (NIS Country Report, Morocco, 2009 p.66); it 
does not define them as officers or functionaries. In 2006 almost 500.000 
people were employed in the public sector, an amount reduced after 
Intilaka, the plan for voluntary retirement, approval. Officers are chosen 
on the base of public selection process, with the exception of high 
officers appointed by the king and its entourage. A certain degree of 
continuity exists between the high level of public administration and 
the political powers, while at the low administrative level officers may 
be easily influenced by the cadeaux system. Formally speaking, 
“cadeaux” are not considered as a symptom of corruption within the 
Moroccan system, with the exception of those presents given in 
coincidence with the conclusion of certain procedures. Even the 
management of the economy and the efforts of privatize it lack 
transparency. Privatization has been approved by decree and not by 
law, which implies that such provision is weak when compared with 
previous and future laws. The process of managing the passage from 
public to private sector missing clarity too.  Morocco, sanctions 
formally independent judiciary by political powers, and judges’ 
professional life is ruled and monitored by the Superior Council of 
Magistrates (CSM) which has more power than similar bodies by 
presidential systems of the region; it is more independent and has even 
more resources. Almost all judges in CSM are elected by their peers, 
“but it is the King of Morocco, who presides over the CSM and who has the 
last word in making decisions” (NIS Country Report on Judicial 
Corruption, 2009 p.233). The judiciary administration is concretely 
conducted by the Ministry of Justice “minister has primary responsibility 
for the general administration of justice, judicial budgeting and the 
management of human resources, including the careers of judges with 
administrative functions at ministry and in the wider bureaucracy” (NIS 
Country Report on Judicial Corruption, 2009 p.233). The limits of the 
judicial powers in front to the executive discretion emerge often with 
regards investments in strategic sectors, and the potential involvement 
of executive entourage.  
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The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
As for other MENA countries, the public administration has been 
considered for many years as unemployment and social shocks 
absorber in Jordan too. The civil sector is the one absorbing the largest 
part of budget expenditure for public administration (70%, as reported 
by UNDP data in 2004). In 2002 a new law adopting public sector code 
of conduct establish meritocracy as the main criterion for public officers 
career development. Jordan monarchy has a tradition in training public 
employees in the Institute of Public Administration; the Civil Service 
Bureau responsible for training courses has a special programme also 
for abroad training11. In this regard, Jordan realizes one of the 
commitments of many other MENA countries: having a trained and 
well formed bureaucracy capable of implementing also economic 
reforms. The government is implementing a huge programme for 
investments in which foreign companies will be included too: it 
concerns infrastructures and utilities, electricity and renewables 
mainly. The projects have to be implemented through public-private 
partnerships.  As reported by Freedom House, “few if any steps have been 
taken to tackle the primary sources of corruption, weaken extensive patronage 
networks, or consistently punish high-ranking officials” (Freedom House, 
Jordan, 2010 p.14), being patronage one of the methods used by the 
king for “building support among key social groups” (Freedom House, 
Jordan, 2010 p.14). Transparency International ranks Jordan 47 out of 
180 countries in its 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index. An Anti-
Corruption Commission exists since 2006 and its members have 
formally speaking a free mandate, although entirely appointed by the 
King. Considering judiciary independence, Jordan is one of the two 
cases within the MENA area in which religion impact also on the 
organization of judiciary system with religious courts mainly in charge 
of familiar and private life aspects. Both Muslim and Christian have 
their own tribunals. As regards civil courts, instead, judges are 
appointed directly by the King or by the High Judicial Council (HJC), 
whose own members are appointed by royal decree. The king and the 
                                                 
11 UNDP - The UNDP Role in Public Administration Reforms in the Arab Region (6/2003). 
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HJC jointly decide on judicial dismissals and career, while the Ministry 
of Justice has the power over the judiciary organization system and 
other, administrative mainly, staff. In 2003, the government adopted 
the Judicial Upgrading Strategy “but it did not reach  higher level of 
transparency nor judicial independence” (Freedom House, Jordan, 2010).  
 
3.2c - Parliamentary Regimes 
The Lebanese Republic 
Lebanon is the case of weakest public administration, on which the 
human resource factor impact not just in terms of expertise but in terms 
of religious and ethnical composition of bureaucrats. Public officials are 
selected on the base of sectarian, instead of meritocratic, criteria. 
Available posts are equally divided between Christians and Muslims, 
disregarding the existing other ethnics and religious minorities. A civil 
service board should monitor impartiality of the sector and the possible 
political interference but it is weakened by lacking resources and 
expertise. Religious and sectarian criteria are followed in the selection 
of high officials too. Having regards to the management of economy 
and public contracts, the Public Contracting System is defined non 
transparent: it “suffers from clientelism, whereby political leaders take 
advantage of their position to promote the interests of their own communities” 
(NIS Report, Lebanon, 2009 p.87).  The tenders’ administration has been 
established by decree in 1959; its enforcement value is very weak and 
Lebanon registers the worst situation in terms of transparency among 
other Middle East like Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan (NIS Report, 
Lebanon, 2009 p.87). In addition to Jordan, Lebanon is the second 
country on which religion directly impact on judiciary organization. 
Although recognized as a well functioning system, Lebanese judicial 
branch also suffers limits on its independence. Specifically, as for the 
public administration sector, the sectarian division of powers within 
the country makes independence and transparent judicial sector at risk.  
It is the Judicial Council that appointees judges. Independence from the 
political power is highly questioned, as the 2006 Hariri assassination, 
and the subsequent release of involved intelligence officers, show. Such 
influence is also evident with regards to external influence, mainly 
Syrian one, on both political power and the judicial system. Judges and 
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other judiciary officials are appointed on ethno-religious lines; 
efficiency is not guaranteed by selection procedures based on merits. In 
line with all other examined countries, dedicate to the sector poor 
economic resources is the way the judicial power is weakened 
(Freedom House, Lebanon, 2010). 
 
The State of Israel 
Israel is the most developed country in the area, although obtaining 
information on its domestic structures and organization of powers is 
not an easy task. As regards the quality of human resources, Israeli 
profits of a high level of tertiary education; human resources in public 
administration are further trained by the Civil Service Commission. 
Moreover, a specific unit in charge of quality improvements exists 
within the Commission and is dedicated to organisational 
improvements. Israeli bureaucracy apparatus is also defined a political 
bureaucracy; a large apparatus very well present in the economic 
system of a country due to a well established system of patronage. 
Israel, as the second parliamentary system considered, does not suffer 
of endemic corruption; being   more the case of isolated cases of 
“judicial impropriety, coupled with the perception that political forces have 
attempted to influence important decisions” (NIS Country Report on 
Judicial Corruption, 2009 p.218). Nonetheless, limitations to judicial 
independence are also present: four of the nine members of the judges’ 
selection committee are political representatives. Moreover, in the last 
years very often politicians have attacked judges, the Supreme Court 
specifically, due to pronunciations in some controversial cases (NIS 
Country Report on Judicial Corruption, 2009). What seem really 
affecting the judicial power is nepotisms and strong familiar 
relationship in between judges and attorneys.    
 
The Republic of  Turkey 
Turkey is the sole country within the MENA area candidate to EU 
membership and, consequently, it has to harmonize its own ruling 
system to the one recommended by the Union. In this regard, reforms 
of the public sector as those concerning the economic life follow the 
need to implement the EU body of laws and regulation, the aquis 
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communautaire. In order to make such changes effective, corruption 
should be dismantled and the public administration still need to 
improve efficiency. In this regard, a reform adopted in 2003 by the AKP 
premier Erdogan had as main pillar to “promote a more transparent 
management of human resources in the public service and to strengthen the 
fight against corruption” (UNDP Report, Turkey, 2004 p.11). It should be 
considered that selection criteria for public offices are not mentioned in 
the ordinary laws. Thus, Turkey too confirms the general MENA 
tendency in using public sector as unemployment and economic shock 
absorber, generating an inefficient and expensive sector largely affected 
by corruption. Although premier Erdogan initial commitments, even 
AKP party enjoyed the system of patronage relations (Freedom House, 
Turkey, 2011 p.12). Transparency International 2010 ranks Turkey 56 
out of 178 countries, with a score of 4.4 on a 10 point scale. In Turkey, 
as MENA countries already proved, the direct relationship between 
ruling class and bureaucracy weakened any efforts for improving 
economic situation and transparency within the country. Despite 
pervasive corruption, Turkey has a functioning market economy 
favoured by deregulation and privatization of state companies, in the 
energy sector too (Freedom House, Turkey, 2011). Finally, Turkey in 
which the Constitutional Court has always defined itself as “as the 
guardian of the integrity of the state and a bastion of the secular 
political establishment” in contrast with AKP recent positions and the 
2010 reforms of the Constitution. The number of the judges of the 
Constitutional Court, although increased from 11 to 17, is so composed: 
4 members directly appointed by the President, 10 chosen by the 
President from a list of nominees, and 3 are elected by Parliament by a 
simple majority vote. The list of nominees is composed by people 
selected by a different judicial bodies and the Higher Education 
Council. Nonetheless impartiality is at risk considering the AKP 
majority in both legislative and executive powers (Freedom House, 
Turkey, 2011 p.10).  
 
3.3 The religion and the army power 
The last part of the analysis considers other two veto points, usually 
external to the formal interaction of executive-legislative powers, which 
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in MENA case may have a peculiar relevance: the religion and the 
army. MENA Constitutions allow political parties mainly; religious 
parties are permitted only in Lebanon and Jordan. The possibility of 
religious parties has been recognised in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco 
after the 2011 people uprisings, while before religious candidates 
always compete in elections as independent candidates. Thus, although 
recognising mainly Islamic (or Jewish) religion as the State religion, the 
majority of countries in the considered period, do not authorize 
religious parties to take part in elections. These results are further 
confirmed when considering ideology of the Chief Executive party 
(graph 7). Thus, religion does not characterise the regulatory 
framework and utilities’ liberalization, at least for those years 
considered in this analysis. The exception could be given by Lebanon 
and Jordan, due to religion as criteria for selection and career 
advancements in the public administration.  
How the role of religious groups may change and affect economic 
reforming processes after 2011 events rests to be analysed. The victory 
of Islamist parties in Tunisian, Moroccan and, lately, Egyptian’ 
elections question the maintenance of current patronage system of 
relations and potentials for changes; it may allow multiplying veto 
positions, or their further reducing with the consequent increasing 
uncertainties on the regulatory commitments and the processes of 
liberalization of these countries.    
A second veto power here considered is the army. MENA countries 
Chief executives of the period 1990-2010, have strong relation with the 
army. Very often politicians never break a relation started at the time of 
post-colonial period, as showed by the fact that almost in all considered 
cases the head of executive powers is a former member of the army 
(graph 8). Moreover, analysed constitutions state the obligatory 
military service for those who are or aspire to be Chief executives. In 
this regard, we consider Chief executive party ideology, anecdotic 
evidence concerning army involvement in politics, and an indicator of 
military involvement in politics (ICRG) viewed as takeover or risk of 
takeover (graphs 9a-9b). The data reported confirmed the role of the 
army as relevant and important actor, more than the existent religious 
groups and eventual parties religious orientation. In this regard, we 
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argue that the army represents one of the groups of interest capable of 
influencing the definition of specific policies, like those related to 
natural resources, being strongly related to Chief executives. Currently, 
in the aftermath of 2011 people uprisings, the army has a specific role in 
managing the political life as well as the transition phases as for Egypt 
and Tunisia even though with sensitive differences. As already stressed 
by Rustow (1967), army involvement in politics is symptomatic of non 
correctly functioning of civil and political institutions. It is the 
weakness of countries’ political institutions that makes the army’s 
intervention in politics stronger and transforms threats of takeover in 
concrete events. Thus, in MENA countries where the most effective 
political institution is the Chief executive, the army has more room for 
manoeuvre than in situation in which institutional powers are 
counterbalanced. 
 
4. Electricity sector in Southern Mediterranean countries 
 
In this last part of the paper, we report the results of a dataset that 
includes information on the electricity sector mainly, the existing 
regulatory framework and competences of IRAs of MENA countries, 
when existing, as provided by the existing literature. The reference 
period for the analysis is still 1990 - 2010. Our analysis considers the 
potential for existing commitments towards electricity sector 
liberalization. Thus, liberalization has been registered as a binary 
variable (yes or no) when the followings events have been recorded: 
sector’s unbundling, regulated TPA regime, and IRA set-up. Tables at 
the end of chapter report the mentioned elements of sector 
liberalization, when present. At the same time, tables provide a 
description of regulatory restraints for the countries under analysis 
having regards the energy sector. Information provided consider 
incentive mechanisms (rate-of return vs. price-cap) when existent, 
license discipline and eventual relevance of contracts on administrative 
law, the role of judiciary vis a vis the government and regulatory 
companies. In this regard, the institutional analysis above reported has 
been also taken into consideration as determinants of MENA 
regulatory restraints.  
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Considering the first aspect analyzed, liberalization commitments, 
countries having established an IRA have, with the sole exception of 
Algeria, introduced a functional unbundling of the sector and adopted 
a regulated TPA regime. These countries, Turkey, Israel, Algeria, 
Egypt, and Jordan,  have established an IRA during 2000s. At the same 
time all of them, as also for countries in which an IRA has not been 
established, maintain strong state-owned companies, vertically 
integrated; thus, generation, transmission and distribution are still in 
the hand of one sole actor. Moreover, having specific attention to the 
role of IRA and to what we reported in previous sections in terms of  
administrative discretion and IRA’s decision making autonomy, tariff 
setting is the aspect mainly considered. Indeed, tariff setting is still 
managed by incumbents in the majority of cases, with the exception of 
Israel and Turkey. In the latter case, the IRA may review and approve 
tariffs, while in the former case it may set them. With regards to other 
competences, all IRAs may take decision regarding license issues and 
dispute settlement. 
To a first extent, thus, we may confirm that commitments towards 
liberalization, and a more clear regulatory framework, emerge in those 
cases in which an IRA has been already established. Nonetheless, 
existing IRAs suffer of limits to agencies’ autonomy and independence. 
The situation described in the tables confirms that restructuring the 
electricity sector is proceeding in all those countries which have already 
established an IRA, although at different speeds and with different 
characteristics which depend on the domestic institutional 
environment. In this regard, Jordan and Turkey seem fast moving 
towards liberalization of the sector, having unbundled the sector 
between the end of 1990s and the first years of 2000s; both have 
adopted a regulated TPA regime under IRA supervision. As regards 
IRA functions, licenses and dispute settlement are the main operational 
aspects while tariffs’ setting is under IRA competences only in the 
Turkish case. Algeria and Egypt share the characteristics of unbundling 
with the two other countries examined; unbundling mainly consist of 
functional separation between generation, transmission, and 
distribution. The model of TPA regime adopted is not clear and IRA 
does not have high degree of independence. Being not competent on 
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tariffs setting and TPA regime, Egyptian and Algerian IRAs correspond 
to an advisory body of the government. The Egyptian regulator, for 
example, is competent on licensing issues, but it has mainly a 
consultative role concerning the TPA regime, dispute settlement, 
system quality and consumers’ protection. Tariffs, both in the Egyptian 
and Algerian case, are defined by the executive power. The agency role, 
thus, substantiates in monitoring powers related to the mentioned 
competences, which are directly managed by the government and by 
holding companies. Regulatory restraints analysis confirms weaknesses 
of judiciary and legislative power in counterbalancing incumbents’ 
discretion. Only in the Turkish case, courts are asked to resolve 
controversies between the government and stakeholders, and are 
involved in case of appeal against IRA decisions. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The paper analyse and adopts, with opportune changes, the 
methodological framework of institutional analysis by Levy and 
Spiller. This paper enlightens characteristics of the three main restraints 
to regulators’ discretion that MENA countries experience. Considering 
the executive-legislative relations, defining regulatory commitments 
which reflects the wider social interests is difficult for presidential and 
monarchical regimes, by virtue of lacking majority-opposition parties 
dynamic relation and missing legislative veto powers. Thus, we expect 
that the regulatory framework when formulated is characterized by 
rigidity and inefficiencies. The same rigidity may emerge in cases 
characterized by two party systems with frequent alternation in power, 
such as for Israel and Lebanon.  
The closeness between the public administration heads and the 
executive leaders is evident in all considered cases: the civil service 
grown up in continuity with growing power of ruling élites in 
countries in which the economic sector is still almost entirely in the 
hands of the executive power. In such a context there is no information 
asymmetry between the ruling class, with its officers within the 
administration, and the market operators considering companies being 
mainly state-owned and ruled by boards very close to the executive 
  
90
 
power. Thus, the framework here defined is the one of few veto 
players, and vetoing positions at institutional level, which may be 
detrimental for potential new market entrants.  
At the same time, it is the bulk of administration that has 
developed regulatory expertise during the years and that can 
effectively implement regulatory reform. Mainly due to the process of 
privatization that started in the 1990s, public administration as in the 
Algerian, Jordan, Moroccan and Turkish case reveal such capabilities, 
contrary to other countries, such as Lebanon. Toa  first extent, Jordan 
seems to be the most promising case in terms of electricity regulation 
and restructuring of the industry considering the role of bureaucracy 
and its capabilities in implementing reforms, although missing 
democratic features and poor judiciary independence. Staying in the 
Mashreq area, Lebanon seem to be the less promising case: it is a 
parliamentary republic sharing democratic features, but characterized 
by high level of political instability due to ethno-religious parties 
division and the role of external actors (Syria mainly) on the political 
life of the country. Israel is a case of more stable country, with stable 
democratic institutions in which both the army and religion have been 
included in a well consolidated institutional system. Israel registers a 
high level of administrative capabilities and a more independent 
judicial power too.  Having regards to the area that goes from Egypt to 
the entire Maghreb, presidential and semi-presidential regimes can be 
defined as rent-seeking regimes having a rent-seeking bureaucracy, 
and poor resources dedicated to a judiciary power not always truly 
independent. Algeria and Egypt have very similar features in terms of 
regulatory restraints mechanisms and share the same political 
trajectory of promoted political liberalization between 2005 and 2007, 
its suppression, and people uprising in 2011; the outcomes of people 
uprising in terms of democratic changes is highly questionable in both 
cases. Moreover, both register cases of judges pronouncing against the 
ruling party or President. Tunisia is characterized, in the years 
considered in the study, by strong authoritarian power and lacking 
independence of judiciary power; contrary to Algeria and Egypt, it 
better off performs in economic terms. Moreover, considering the 
peaceful transition to the new government, we would argue that even 
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military power is included in institutionalised system of rules contrary 
to the Egyptian situation where such power is more pervasive and less 
submitted to the rule of law. Morocco, is the most controversial case of 
monarchical regime in the region. At the centre of current interests on 
renewables, it seems characterized by a reforming spirit which risk to 
be limited by monarchical structure of the state and continuity between 
royal entourage and the incumbents.  
The data on the institutional endowment of MENA countries have 
been useful to the analysis of the electricity sector organization and 
effectiveness of the regulatory framework as it is reported by the main 
literature on the argument. First findings of the study show that, those 
countries having established an IRA are more advanced in the 
electricity sector restructuring, although it does not imply  
liberalization of the sector and reduction of the incumbents’ discretion; 
the latter being stronger where closer relation between bureaucrats and 
executives exists, undermining agencies’ independence.  
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Graph 1: Investment profile 
Source: International Country Risk Guide - ICRG 
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Graph 2: Chief executive and Chief executive party years in office 
Source: Anecdotic evidences; Database of Political Institutions - DPI, World Bank 
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Graph 3: Regularity of Low chamber elections 
Source: Anecdotic evidences  
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Graph 4a: Veto system, non-democratic countries 
Source: Constitutional analysis; POLCON 2010 
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Graph 4b: Veto system, democratic countries 
Source: Constitutional analysis; POLCON 2010 
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Graph 5a: Regulatory Quality and Government Effectiveness, authoritarian regimes 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators- WGI, The World Bank. 
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Graph 5b: Regulatory Quality and Government Effectiveness, democratic regimes 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators- WGI, The World Bank 
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Graph 5c: Bureaucracy Quality  
Source: International Country Risk Guide - ICRG  
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Graph 5d: tertiary education enrolment level 
Source: The World Bank 
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NOTE: Data for year 2009 are available only for Algeria, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia 
Graph 5e: Public expenditure on education as percentage (%) of GDP 
Source: The World Bank 
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Graph 6: Magistrates independency 
Source: Constitutional analysis; Worldwide Governance Indicators- WGI, The World Bank 
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Graph 7: Chief executive party ideology 
Source: Anecdotic evidences 
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Graph 8: Chief executive relation with the Army 
Source: Anecdotic evidences 
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Graph 9a: Threat of military takeover, or military takeover, non democratic regimes 
Source: International Country Risk Guide - ICRG  
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Graph 9b: Threat of military takeover, or military takeover, non democratic regimes 
Source: International Country Risk Guide - ICRG  
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Table 1 Electricity sector organization and regulatory restraints mechanisms, Algeria 
Country-
Period 
Ownership Regulatory History: Plans and 
Laws adopted 
Regulatory History - 
IRAs established 
Private 
performance 
Substantive 
restraints 
Restraints on 
system changes 
Enforcement of 
restraints 
Algeria † 
1990-2000 
Private monopoly, 
SONELGAZ. It because 
SpA in 2002, the State is 
the principal actions' 
owner.  
Formal recognition of 
independence 
Law 99-09 28 July1999 on energy 
management, implemented by 
"décret exécutif n° 04-149 du 19 Mai 
2004".  
    Tariffs fixed by 
the Prime 
Minister in 
agreement with 
the Ministry of 
Energy and Mines 
Licenses 
defined by 
regulatory 
authority. No 
information on 
changes and 
amendments 
procedures. 
 
Legislative very 
weak; no 
alternation of 
parties in 
power  
Very weak 
judicial power 
and rule of law 
ranks being less 
than 0 (WB - WGI 
index) 
Algeria 
2000 - 
2010 
In the period 2002-2007 the 
company has been 
restructured: 26 branches 
have been created 
The Monopoly has been 
substituted by 
FUNCTIONAL 
separation between 
generation, transport and 
distribution. 
The regulatory framework 
include opening 
production and 
investments to private 
actors. 
First share of IPPs has 
been allowed; (25%) by 
independent producer 
Shariket Kahraba Hadjeret 
En Nouss (SKH) (CREG 
Law n. 03 2000, Conseil de la 
Concurrence set-up: consultative 
role. The legislation on 
competition, as well as the law on 
renewables and energy efficiency 
is not yet defined. 
 
Law n. 01 2002 Launch of 
electricity sector reform: 
electricity and gas distribution 
through canalization; TPA 
regime introduced; License 
procedure for generation and a 
concession procedure for 
distribution allowing new 
operators adopted. 
2005 set up of regulatory bodies 
for electricity and gas - CREG - 
and hydrocarbons ARH. 
In 2005 CREG became 
operative. 
Comité de Direction, 4 
members. They do not 
have a fixed mandate 
term. 
CREG is financed by 
contribution on tariffs.  
The budget is 
approved by the 
Ministry of Energy 
and Mines 
In 2002, 
Introduction of a 
competitive market  
Network 
Regulation under 
"cost of service"  
Universality of 
public service 
guaranteed by the 
State.  
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Report 2010). 
Transmission and 
distribution sectors stay 
regulated monopolies 
Algeria 
2000 - 
2010 
 2006-2010, Plan National de 
Maîtrise de l'Énergie (PNME) for 
energy efficiency and renewables 
adopted. 
 
February 2011 Plan for Energy 
Efficiency for 2011-2013 adopted  
  In 2007 definition of 
bilateral contracts 
involving a new, 
non-discriminatory, 
TPA discipline. 
      
† The table has been realized analysing the Algerian Constitution and anecdotic evidence concerning the political situation of the country. The Country Report from the Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial Conference, Limassol 2007, have been considered for detailed analysis of the electricity sector regulation. The information have been compared with recent reports on MENA 
institutional framework (Paving the way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan 2012). 
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Table 2 Electricity sector organization and regulatory restraints mechanisms, Egypt 
Country- 
Period 
Ownership Regulatory History, 
Plans - Laws adopted 
Regulatory History - 
IRAs established 
Private 
performance 
Substantive 
restraints 
Restraints on system 
changes 
Enforcement of 
restraints 
Egypt † 
1990s 
Power Law No. 
18, 1998, 
integrated the 
regional 
distribution 
companies 
with the 
Egyptian 
Electricity 
Authority’s 
(EEA) 
generating 
capacity.  
      The regulator has 
limited power on 
Tariffs, which are 
defined by the 
Government. 
Licenses defined by 
regulatory authority. No 
information on revision 
and procedures' changes 
 
Although separation of 
powers, the legislative is 
very weak 
Weak judiciary 
power and Rule of 
Law perception 
ranking around zero 
(WB - WGI index) 
Egypt 
2000s 
Egyptian 
Electricity 
Holding 
Company 
(EEHC), former 
EEA, has not 
full financial 
autonomy. 
Generation, 
distribution 
and 
transmission 
companies 
created 
through 
unbundling are 
all state-
owned.  
FUNCTIONAL 
Unbundling 
In 2000 the Law N. 164: 
EEA established in 1970s 
became a joint stock 
holding company, the  
EEHC.  
In 2005 Competition 
authority established 
 
In 2010 New electricity 
law has been prepared 
by the Regulatory 
agency: competitive 
electricity market based 
on bilateral contracts; 
TPA regime; TSO 
establishment; tariffs  
ratified by the regulator.  
In 2000 EGYPTERA set-
up. 
Board of 10 directors 
chosen among suppliers 
(EEHC), customers, and 
experienced persons. 
Headed by the Minister 
of Electricity.  
Self financed. 50 staff 
working in 4 committees: 
subsidies, tariffs, market 
rules, market design. 
Market structure 
is not yet 
defined.  
TSO responsible 
for fulfilling 
contracts for a 
unified 
transmission 
access charge 
proposed by the 
TSO and 
approved by “the 
Agency”. 
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† The table has been realized analysing the Egyptian Constitution and anecdotic evidence concerning the political situation of the country. The Country Report from the Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial Conference, Limassol 2007, have been considered for detailed analysis of the electricity sector regulation. The information have been compared with recent reports on MENA 
institutional framework (Paving the way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan 2012). 
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Table 3 Electricity sector organization and regulatory restraints mechanisms, Jordan 
Country - 
Period 
Ownership Regulatory History, 
Plans - Laws adopted 
Regulatory History - 
IRAs established 
Private 
performance 
Substantive restraints Restraints on system 
changes 
Enforcement of 
restraints 
Jordan † 
1990s 
1994 Jordan 
Electricity 
Authority (JEA) 
established as a 
Public share 
holding company 
1996 JEA renamed 
National Electric 
Power Company 
(NEPCO) 
1999 Separation of 
NEPCO into joint 
stock companies 
 
The restructuring of 
the sector was 
initiated in 1994 
and led to full 
ownership 
unbundling in 1999 
General Electricity 
Laws in 1996, 1999, 
and 2002 
    At the moment there are 
no information on tariffs 
mechanisms and the 
effective role of ERC. 
 
The ERC is competent 
for license issues and 
dispute settlement. No 
information on the role 
of judiciary in managing 
companies – 
government disputes 
are available 
In addition to the ERC and 
the Minister of Energy and 
Mineral Resources, the 
Royal Committee on 
Reviewing Energy 
Strategy also define energy 
strategy as the one adopted 
in 2007. 
 
Although separation of 
powers, the legislative is 
weak and not able of 
counterbalancing the 
power of the Executive and 
the Monarch. Parliament's 
election have not been 
regular in the period 1990 - 
2010 
Judiciary 
Independence from 
political power is not 
clearly affirmed in 
Constitution.  
Nonetheless, the Rule 
of Law is perceived 
better than in other 
countries of the region, 
on average on 0.5 (WB 
- WGI index) 
Jordan 
2000s 
  The ERC determines 
connection charges to 
the network 
implementing a 
regulated TPA 
regime. 
On-going definition of 
Market Operator and 
System Operator  
ERC established in 
2001  
5 Commissioners 
headed by a Chair and 
assisted by a Vice-
Chairman; Self 
financed. 50 staff. 
ERC is in charge of: 
License generation, 
transmission, 
distribution, system 
operation and bulk 
supply. Electricity 
tariffs and connection 
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charges. Promote 
competition and 
secure proper 
functioning of market, 
make 
recommendations (to 
the Ministry). 
Customer protection: 
dispute resolution, 
claims from regular 
customers; guarantee 
public service, quality 
of service. 
 
Energy sector 
regulation and laws 
are defined by the 
Minister of Energy 
and Mineral 
Resources. 
† The table has been realized analysing the Jordan Constitution and anecdotic evidence concerning the political situation of the country. The Country Report from the Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial Conference, Limassol 2007, have been considered for detailed analysis of the electricity sector regulation. The information have been compared with recent reports on MENA 
institutional framework (Paving the way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan 2012). 
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Table 4 Electricity sector organization and regulatory restraints mechanisms, Turkey 
Country - 
Period 
Ownership Regulatory History, Plans - 
Laws adopted 
Regulatory History - IRAs 
established 
Private 
performance 
Substantive 
restraints 
Restraints on 
system changes 
Enforcement of 
restraints 
Turkey† 
1990s  
1993: TEK (1984) 
divided into TEAS 
and TEDAS 
1985 Law on Organization 
and Duties of the Ministry of 
Energy and Natural 
Resources 
1994, Law on Protection of 
Competition;   
2001 Electricity Market Law, 
establishment of regulatory 
agency EMRA 
2001, Natural Gas Market 
Law  
2003, Petroleum Market Law  
2005, Liquefied Petroleum 
Market Law  
EMRA 310 staff and 9 
board members 
EMRA is clearly 
separated from 
government and energy 
sector influences. 
 
A regulated TPA regime 
in place 
Bilateral contracts, 
market completed 
with a residual 
pool.  
EMRA high 
degree of 
autonomy: 
secondary 
legislation 
definition; 
licenses issue; 
reviewing and 
approving 
electricity tariffs 
and transport 
tariffs; define 
performance 
standards; settle 
disputes, 
auditing market 
activities; 
supervise TPA 
regime. 
 
. 
The Ministry of 
Energy and Natural 
Resources defines 
the Energy Policy, 
and prepare 
primary legislation 
for sector regulation  
A recent democracy 
characterized by 
instability and 
frequent elections till 
the beginning of 2000s. 
It is a parliamentary 
regime where the 
executive power is the 
main decisional body. 
 
Judiciary 
independence is 
formally established in 
the Constitution. Very 
frequent contrast with 
the political power.  
Rule of Law 
perception in line with 
the average of MENA 
area (WB - WGI 
index). 
Turkey 
2000s 
TEAS unbundled in 
three companies: 
EÜAS¸ (generation), 
TEIAS (transmission 
and market operator), 
and TETAS 
(wholesale).  
TETAS is state-owned 
TEDAS regional 
distribution have been 
rearranged: 
distribution network 
divided into 21 
2006: Five-Year Development 
Plan for 2007-2013 on 
ensuring reliable energy 
supplies; reinforce energy 
security; favor investments 
National Energy 
Conservation Centre 
(NECC) in charge of 
energy efficiency and 
renewables 
Legislative basis: 
Law on Utilization of 
Renewable Energy 
Resources for Electricity 
Generation (2005) 
Energy Efficiency Law 
(2007) 
Law on Geothermal 
  Cross subsidies 
between 
customer groups 
till 2010 
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regions. 20 companies 
are corporatized. 
Privatization of 
distribution and 
generation assets to be 
launched in 2008 (no 
confirmation). 
Unbundling is 
completed 
Resources and Natural 
Mineral Waters (2007) 
† The table has been realized analysing the Turkish Constitution and anecdotic evidence concerning the political situation of the country. The Country Report from the Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial Conference, Limassol 2007, have been considered for detailed analysis of the electricity sector regulation.  
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 Table 5 Electricity sector organization and regulatory restraints mechanisms, Israel 
Country 
Period 
Ownership Regulatory History, Plans 
- Laws adopted 
Regulatory History - IRAs 
established 
Private 
performance 
Substantive 
restraints 
Restraints on 
system 
changes 
Enforcement 
of restraints 
Israel† 
1990 - 
2007 
The Israel Electric 
Company (IEC) is a 
joint stock company, 
99.8% state-owned, and 
vertically integrated. 
IEC investments are 
funded from revenues 
and loans (not state 
budget) 
2003-2006: IEC 
unbundling (planned, 
supposed to be 
achieved in 2012) 
2008 - 2012: expected 
privatization except 
TSO (state monopoly 
will stay). 
In 2012, electricity 
generation and 
distribution activities 
will be opened to 
private investment (in 
existing units or new 
ones such as IPP and 
concessions). No more 
than 30% of generation 
capacity, and no more 
than 20% of the 
distribution system, will 
be owned by one 
company.  
1996 Electricity law, 
amended in 2003 
PUA - The Public Utility 
Authority (PUA)-Electricity: 30 
staff 
It sets electricity tariffs and 
transport tariffs, licences 
operators, monitors quality of 
services, handles complaints. 
PUA regulates IEC service and 
final electricity tariffs based on 
costs and fixed rate of return 
(generation: 7%, transmission: 
5.5%, distribution: 6.2%) 
Projects of IPPs 
were relatively 
small and could 
not proceed. A 
first bid (1997) 
for an IPP (337 
MW CCGT) was 
unsuccessful. 
IEC only 
generator and 
distributor 
present 
PUA has wide 
room for 
manoeuvre 
and manage 
tariffs system:  
PUA annual 
revision of 
tariffs includes a 
decrease of about 
1.8% (efficiency 
factor) for 
increased 
efficiency and 
improved 
productivity. 
Since 2002, the 
tariff separates 
revenues for 
generation, 
transmission, 
distribution 
(high and low 
voltage) 
Separation of 
powers, but 
instable 
political 
scenario. 
Bureaucracy 
well trained 
Strong judicial 
power, law 
level of 
corruption and 
high degree of 
political 
independence 
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    2007 Master Plan with 5 
main objectives: security 
of supply, competition, 
energy efficiency, 
environment and optimal 
use of land. 
Separation of policy from 
regulation and operation is 
largely achieved 
        
† The table has been realized analysing the Israel fundamental laws and anecdotic evidence concerning the political situation of the country. The Country Report from the Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial Conference, Limassol 2007, have been considered for detailed analysis of the electricity sector regulation. The information have been compared with recent reports on MENA 
institutional framework (Paving the way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan 2012). 
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Table 6 Electricity sector organization and regulatory restraints mechanisms, Lebanon 
Country 
Period 
Ownership Regulatory History, 
Plans - Laws adopted 
Regulatory History - 
IRAs established 
Private 
performance 
Substantive 
restraints 
Restraints on system 
changes 
Enforcement of 
restraints 
Lebanon† 
1990 - 
2010 
Electricité du Liban 
(EDL), 100% state-owned 
and vertically integrated 
company. No open to 
private actors.  
Some concessions for 
energy production were 
given to four small 
companies for 
distribution with about 
7% of the national low 
voltage customers. 
The Ministry of 
Energy and Water 
(MEW) is the Ministry 
responsible for the 
energy sector 
The re was a project for 
an IRA set-up, never 
applied 
Lebanese electric 
power sector suffers 
from lack of 
capacity and very 
old generation units 
that experience 
frequent outages. 
EDL has huge looses 
in the last three 
years 
Unclear 
(undefined) 
regulatory 
framework 
Although the 
Government tried to 
attract IPPs, the 
absence of an 
electricity regulator as 
well as the missing 
laws and regulations 
on licensing, do not 
favour IPPs 
establishment 
The judicial power 
suffers of ethnic and 
religious division 
within the society. 
At the same time, 
the political scenario 
is characterized by 
high level of 
instability 
† The table has been realized analysing the Constitution of Lebanon and anecdotic evidence concerning the political situation of the country. The Country Report from the study Paving the way 
for the Mediterranean Solar Plan 2012, provided information on the electricity sector organization. 
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Table 7 Electricity sector organization and regulatory restraints mechanisms, Morocco 
Country Ownership Regulatory History, Plans - Laws 
adopted 
Regulatory History - 
IRAs established 
Private 
performance 
Substantive restraints Restraints 
on system 
changes 
Enforcement 
of restraints 
Morocco† 
1990 - 
2010 
L'ONE is a 
vertically integrated 
company. 
Sector's unbundling 
was expected to 
start after 2007 law 
approval 
Still under definition phase, the 
law on electricity sector 
liberalization expected in 2007 
has never been approved 
This law should provide for TPA 
non-discriminatory access and 
market based tariffs 
The are no IRA and 
sector's responsibility 
is shared between the 
Ministry of energy and 
other Ministries, such 
as Finance, Economy, 
Interior.  
ONE, funded in 
1963, is the 
company for energy 
production and 
distribution. The 
general director of 
the company is 
appointed by the 
executive.  
It assures 44% of 
distribution 
The IRA does not 
exist.  
Managing the sector 
and implementing the 
energy policy are by 
the Government. The 
Prime Minister 
supervise 
interministerial 
committee, such as the 
one on tarifs 
(commission 
interministérielle des 
prix). The committe is 
formed by Ministry of 
Energy, Finance and 
Interior. 
The committe defines 
also transmission 
tariffs 
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 With decree 
approved in 1994, 
IPPs have been 
approved 
JLEC-Jorf Lasfar, 
assures 50% of 
national production 
Energy produced is 
entirely bought by 
ONE, which then 
distribute it 
The 2007 law project included the 
definition of 2 markets: 
• un marché libre comportant une 
bourse et la possibilité de négocier des 
contrats bilatéraux, accessible aux 
producteurs et clients éligibles, avec 
des mécanismes d'équilibrage, 
d'acquisition des services-système et 
de règlements. 
• et un marché réglementé, géré par 
un acheteur unique. Les acteurs du 
marché libre seront des partenaires 
actifs sur le marché espagnol (bourse 
et contrats bilatéraux). 
Europe, Spain mainly, are relevant 
for Moroccan energy sector:  
Le gouvernement souhaite 
l'intégration du marché marocain au 
marché européen, ainsi qu'à ceux de 
l'Algérie et de la Tunisie. À cet égard, 
les mécanismes impliquent que les 
prix intérieurs soient alignés sur les 
prix du marché 
 
† The table has been realized analysing the Constitution of Morocco and anecdotic evidence concerning the political situation of the country. The Country Report from the Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial Conference, Limassol 2007, have been considered for detailed analysis of the electricity sector regulation (in italic and French language some elements taken from the Report).  
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Table 8 Electricity sector organization and regulatory restraints mechanisms, Tunisia 
Country 
Period 
Ownership Regulatory History, 
Plans - Laws adopted 
Regulatory History - 
IRAs established 
Private performance Substantive 
restraints 
Restraints on 
system changes 
Enforcement 
of restraints 
Tunisia 
1990 - 
2010 
The "Société Tunisienne 
d’Electricité et du Gaz" - STEG, 
is a vertically integrated 
company which has a full 
monopoly on generation, 
transmission and distribution 
Le développement à 
terme d’un marché 
régional de l'électricité 
intégré avec l’UE, 
permettrait de sécuriser 
l'approvisionnement 
national dans un cadre 
de complémentarité des 
ressources et des 
réseaux, et d'optimiser 
les programmes 
d'équipement. 
IRA does not exist.  
On envisage un régulateur 
sous tutelle du Premier 
Ministre 
STEG, born in 1962 is a 
public company 
having financial and 
juridical autonomy 
from the State 
The Head of State 
appoints the 
Head of 
administrations 
involved in sector 
management and 
directors of 
energy 
companies 
(public). 
The Prime 
Minister has the 
direct control of 
certain 
administrations 
and agencies 
Tariffs definition 
process is 
symptomatic of a 
high centralised 
competences: tariffs 
are defined, after 
consultation with 
the executive, by 
MIEP. No role of 
the energy 
companies 
  
 The Ministère de 
l’Industrie, de 
l’Énergie et des 
PME (MIEP), 
defines the 
energy policy 
and energy 
regulation, and 
its 
implementation. 
It is in charge of 
defining tariffs, 
license issues, 
and control on 
the STEG. 
The Ministère des 
Finances, 
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approve prices, 
which are 
regulated 
† The table has been realized analysing the Constitution of Tunisia and anecdotic evidence concerning the political situation of the country. The Country Report from the Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial Conference, Limassol 2007, have been considered for detailed analysis of the electricity sector regulation (in italic and French language some elements taken from the Report).  
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Table  9 Electricity sector organization and regulatory restraints mechanisms, Syria  
Country 
Period 
Ownership Regulatory 
History, 
Plans - 
Laws 
adopted 
Regulatory History 
- IRAs established 
Private performance Substantive restraints Restraints on system 
changes 
Enforcement of 
restraints 
Syria† 
1990 - 
2010 
Vertically 
integrated, 
state-owned 
companies. 
No 
unbundling 
Information 
Not 
Available 
There are no IRAs, 
responsibilities are 
shared between the 
Ministry of 
Electricity and the 
Ministry of 
Petroleum 
State-owned 
companies: PEEGT - 
Public Establishment 
of Electricity 
Generation and 
Transmission - and 
PEDEE  - Public 
Establishment for 
Distribution and 
Exploitation of 
Electrical Energy. 
Limited autonomy in 
decision making and 
budget  
The Ministry of Electricity 
designs, enforces, and 
monitors of the energy 
policy 
It overviews of sub-sector 
investment programmes 
It defines the energy sector 
regulation 
(preparation/enforcement 
rules; licensing 
authorisations)  
It controls public energy 
companies 
It exists a Supreme 
Committee for 
Energy, headed by 
Head of the State, 
which supervises 
inter-ministerial 
committees such as 
the one on tariffs 
Weak judiciary 
power. Strong control 
of the executive 
power 
† The table has been realized analysing the Syrian Constitution and anecdotic evidence concerning the political situation of the country. The Country Report from the Euro-Mediterranean 
Ministerial Conference, Limassol 2007, have been considered for detailed analysis of the electricity sector regulation. The information have been compared with recent reports on MENA 
institutional framework (Paving the way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan 2012). 
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Methodological Annex 
 
MENA INSTITUTIONAL ENDOWMENT  
DATASET  
 
Variables Definition  
Remarks 
1. State identifier 
2. Restraints on regulators’ discretion written in the regulatory system  
3. Restraints on changing regulatory systems, formal or substantial  
4. Independent Judiciary 
5. Countries’ Stability 
6. Countries’ Investment Profile 
Acronyms reported in dataset 
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Variables Definition  
 
Remarks: 
In case of countries with two elected Chambers: 
House refers to the Lower House, or Chamber of Deputies, or Assemblies as 
reported in Constitutional texts. 
Senate refers to the Upper Chamber or Council as reported in Constitutional 
texts 
In case of countries with only one elected Chamber: 
House is the name reported. 
The Chief Executive is the Head of Executive powers in all those case in which 
Presidential or Monarchy is the State’s regime. S/he could be the Monarch, the 
President of the Republic, or the Prime Minister, as reported in Constitutional 
texts.  
Cabinet refers to the Government. 
For variables having a binary value, we refer to 1 as equivalent to yes, and 0 as 
equivalent to no. 
In case of no information the cells have been left blank. 
In case of information not applicable to the case considered, we report 0. 
 
Variables have been grouped into 6 categories each referring to specific 
institutional asset. These categories include variables defined having regards 
different sources mentioned in detail in the references list. We refer mainly to 
the analysis of Constitutional texts and fundamental laws of involved 
countries, as well as anecdotic evidences. 
DPI 2010 and POLCON 2010 has been taken as reference for methodological 
aspects in variable definition and comparison of data collected and generated 
by the analysis. In certain cases DPI values have been used for specific 
indicators in order to integrate our data. All these cases are reported. 
At the end of section 3, quantitative measure of veto points within MENA 
institutional system is given from POLCON 2010, for the years 1990 – 2007. The 
measure has been reported in order to compare results from the analysis of 
constitutions and evidences collected with an already written indicator of veto 
powers. Specifically, the measure allows the description of government’s ability 
to elaborate credible commitments and pursue the related policy with the 
necessary stability. Thus, it measures factors favouring certainty in defining, 
implementation and/or changing a policy.   
Finally, we included in the analysis measures of countries’ governance and  
stability in order to  complete the analysis of those conditions allowing for 
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effective commitments towards energy regulation and reforms. A wider 
description of such indicators is reported under sections 2, 5 and 6. 
 
1) STATE IDENTIFIER 
 
1 - COUNTRY:  
1 COUNTRY NAME the name of the country is reported 
2 Year: 1990 – 2011 period considered for panel data construction 
 
country1 variable generated for panel data analysis, in STATA version 
  
2 - CONSTITUTION 
3 W_CONST: written Constitution. Yes or no value.  
4 Y_ADOPT: year of Constitution adoption. In case of non written 
Constitutions it refers to the year of the first fundamental law adopted (i.e.: 
1958 for Israel) 
5 Y_CHANGE: year of Constitutional change or amendment is reported. 
In case of non written Constitutions it refers to year in which fundamental 
laws concerning the organization of powers within the State have been 
possibly changed (i.e.: Israel case). 
 
3 - STATE ORGANIZATION: organization of the country in unitary or 
federal, and presence of decentralised structures. 
6 UNITARY: has the State a unitary or federal structure? Yes or no value. 
We consider Federal States as no=0. 
7 LOC_ORG: The organization of State has been decentralised in districts, 
provinces and/or municipalities. Yes or no value. Cells are left blank when 
Constitutions say nothing. 
8 LOC_ORG_ENER: Eventual decisional powers of decentralised 
organization on energy and natural resources when mentioned in 
Constitutional texts are here considered. Yes or no value. Cells are left 
blank when Constitutions say nothing. 
9 MUNI (source: DPI 2010) 
Are municipal governments locally elected?  
0 if neither local executive nor local legislature are locally elected.  
1 if the executive is appointed, but the legislature elected.  
2 if they are both locally elected.  
No information are recorded as blank cells.  
10 STATE (source: DPI 2010) 
“Are there state/province governments locally elected?  
0 if neither local executive nor local legislature are locally elected.  
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1 if the executive is appointed, but the legislature elected.  
2 if they are both locally elected.  
No information are recorded as blank cells.  
11 AUTHOR (source: DPI 2010) 
“Do the state/provinces have authority over taxing, spending, or 
legislating? 
Yes or No value. No information are recorded as blank cells. 
 
4- STATE REGIME 
REGIME: the variable refers to the form of political regime as emerge by 
Constitutional rules.  
In this regard, accordingly to the values registered by the variables: 
EXEC_ELE_MODE, in this section, and 
EXEC_VETO, PM_APPO, and PM_DISM, LEG_DISM, and 
LEG_DISM_JUST (category 3), 
We distinguish in between: 
1 “Presidential”; 3"Semi-Presidential" 2"Parliamentary" 0"Monarchy-
quasiMonarchical" Regimes. The last case refer to all cases in which the 
Chief Executive is not an elective body (we include here also Libya). 
 
In STATA version of the database, the variable has been so defined: 
1== (EXEC_ELE_MODE==1 & EXEC_VETO==1), (LEG_DISM==1 & 
LEG_DISM_justify==0)  
 
3== (LEG_DISM==1 & LEG_DISM_justify==1), (EXEC_ELCMODE==2 & 
EXEC_VETO==1), ( EXEC_ELCMODE==2 &  PM_APPO==1) 
 
2== (EXEC_ELCMODE==2 & EXEC_VETO==0) plus (PM_APPO==2 & 
PM_DISM==2)  
 
0== ( EXEC_ELCMODE==0 & EXEC_VETO==1). 
  
12 EXEC_ELE_MODE: refers to the Chief Executive Electoral Mode. 
Following the DPI2010 methodology we give 
Popular=1;  
Parliament =2; 
Non elected Chief Executives (i.e.: Monarchy)=0 
Systems with ad hoc electoral councils, when there is no Prime Minister=0.  
 
5 - RELIGION 
13 RELIGION: Presence of a State Religion. 
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Islam=1;  
Other=2; 
In case of no reference to religion in the Constitutional text=0. 
 
14 REL_lawSource: Religion as legislative source. Yes or no value. 
Yes Islam=1 
Yes Other=2 
No or say nothing = 0 
We consider 1 also those cases in which Islam rule inheritance related 
issues only (i.e.: Jordan) 
 
2)  RESTRAINTS ON REGULATORS’ DISCRETION WRITTEN IN THE 
REGULATORY SYSTEM  
 
1 - Administrative Capabilities Of Countries 
 
1.1 Regulatory Quality (RQ)  - Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance 
Indicator12
                                                 
12
 Perception-based data sources (surveys of firms and households, as well as the subjective 
assessments of a variety of commercial business information providers, non governmental 
organizations, and a number of multilateral organizations and other public sector bodies). 
All the individual variables have been rescaled to run from zero to one, with higher values 
indicating better outcomes. Scores: the aggregate WGI measures are reported in two ways: in the 
standard normal units of the governance indicator, ranging from around -2.5 to +2.5, and in 
percentile rank terms ranging from 0 (lowest) to 100 (highest) among all countries worldwide. We 
have taken the first way.  
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Definition: “it captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development” (Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2010: 4).  
Standard errors are also reported 
Available data: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 
 
1.2 Government Effectiveness (GE) - Source: World Bank, Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
Definition: “it captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2010: 4).  
Standard errors are also reported 
Available data: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 
 
1.3 Bureaucracy Quality (BQ) – Source: International Country Risk Guide 
database 
It qualifies the strength of bureaucracy. The institutional strength and quality of 
the bureaucracy is one of the “shock absorber that tends to minimize revisions of 
policy when governments change”.  
Definition: “high points are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength 
and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in 
government services. In these low risk countries, the bureaucracy tends to be somewhat 
autonomous from political pressure and to have an established mechanism for 
recruitment and training.  
Countries that lack the cushioning effect of a strong bureaucracy receive low points 
because a change in government tends to be traumatic in terms of policy formulation 
and day-to-day administrative functions” .  
(ICRG, http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx#PolRiskRating ). 
 
The highest the score, the better the function of bureaucracy is 
Highest score: 4 Points 
Available data: since 1990 to 2009 
 
2 - Informal Norms And Contending Social Interests 
 
2.1 Rule of Law - Source: World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators 
Definition: it captures “perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence” (Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzi, 2010: 4).  
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Standard errors are also reported 
Available data: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 
 
2.2 Corruption – Source: International Country Risk Guide database 
It assesses the level of corruption within the political system, viewed as a threat to 
foreign investment: “it distorts the economic and financial environment; it reduces 
the efficiency of government and business by enabling people to assume positions of 
power through patronage rather than ability; and, last but not least, introduces an 
inherent instability into the political process”. 
(ICRG, http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx#PolRiskRating) .  
 
The highest the score, the lowest the level of corruption 
Highest score: 6 Points 
Available data: since 1990 to 2009 
 
3) RESTRAINTS ON CHANGING REGULATORY SYSTEMS, FORMAL OR 
SUBSTANTIAL  
 
1 - EXECUTIVE SYSTEM. This group of variables allow the analysis of 
countries’ Executive powers, where the word Executive refer to the Chief of 
Executive powers as emerge from Constitutional text and anecdotic evidences. 
 
1 Executive_Name (source: POLCON 2010). 
It reports the name of Chief Executive. Name is repeated for each year 
2 Executive_Party (source: POLCON 2010). 
It reports the name of Chief Executive’s Party  
Name is repeated for each year.  
3 Executive_voteShare (%) (source: POLCON 2010). 
 
4 PRT_YIN (source DPI 2010): How many years has the Chief Executive 
Party has been in office? Cells left blank when information are not 
available or the army is at power 
5 EXEC_ID: (based on the methodology of DPI 2010 for EXECRLC 
variable). 
It refers to the Chief Executive Party orientation as resulting from analysis 
of factual evidences and is divided between: 
4= Religion – Other (REO): other religion; 
3= Left (L): socialists, communist parties;  
2= Religion – Islam (REI): Islamic religion; 
1= Conservative - Right (C); 
0= Independent, military, or no information available. 
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6 EXEC_MANDATE: The variable refers to the number of years the 
mandate of elected Chief Executive last.  
Real number. Cell left blank when Constitution says nothing on this, and 
in case of Monarchies being the King a non-elected Chief Executive. The 
value is reported for each year, in order to identify eventual changes in 
terms mandate due to Constitutional changes. 
7 EXEC_MANDa: The variable refers to the possibility for the elected 
Chief Executive to have further mandate after the first one as reported in 
Constitutional text. Yes or no value. 
Cells left blank when Constitution says nothing on this, and in case of non 
elected Chief Executives (i.e.: Monarchies). 
8 EXEC_RELECT: how many times the Chief Executive may be re-elected? 
We refer to formal limits to the possibility of being re-elected as reported in 
Constitutional text. 
0=EXEC_MANDATEa is no; 
1=Once;  
2=Twice.  
Cells left blank when Constitution says nothing on this, and in case of non 
elected Chief Executives (i.e.: Monarchies). 
9 EXEC_YIN (source: DPI 2010, variable YRSOFFC) 
How many years has the Chief Executive been in office? 
“Years are counted in which the executive was in power as of January 1 or was 
elected but hadn’t taken office as of January 1” (DPI, 2010: 5). 
Considering the year 2011, although in certain cases provisory 
governments have been established we left the cell blank due to scarce 
information. 
In case of non available information, cells have been left blank. 
 
10 EXEC_VETO: Veto power of the Chief Executive. She/he can veto 
legislation. Yes or no value. This variable refers to Constitutional texts. 
Specifically in system with both a Prime Minister and a President we 
consider EXEC_VETO to further understand if the system has strong 
presidential component or not.  
1= yes 
0=no 
Cells left blank when Constitutions say nothing. 
 
11 EXEC_LIM: Limits to professional, commercial, financial or industrial 
activity of the Executive members when expressed in Constitution are 
registered with 1. When no information are available, cells are left blank. 
Yes or no value 
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12 Military_REL: Is the Chief Executive a former member of the Army? 
Yes or no value 
Data have been derived by anecdotic evidences. In case of yes answer, 1 is 
reported for all years in office of the Chief Executive. 
 
13 RELG_PROOF: The Chief Executive has to profess a specific religion as 
given by Constitution. Yes or no value. 
No=0 
Yes Islam=1 
Yes Other RELIGION=2 
Cells left blank when Constitutions say nothing.  
 
2 - CABINET This section refers to information on the Executive power, 
understood as the Government and the Chief Executive. 
 
1 PM_APPO: Who appoints and dismiss the Prime Minister?  
0=Direct elections 
1=Chief executive (President, Monarch, Prime Minister) 
2=Parliament 
2 PM_DISM: Who dismiss the Prime Minister? 
0=no provisions 
1=Chief executive (President, Monarch, Prime Minister) 
2=Parliament 
PMAPPO and PMDISM are related to group 4, Regime variable, in those 
cases when the Chief Executive may appoint Prime Minister and Dismiss 
prime minister and / or other ministers. 
3 CAB_APPO: Who appoint the Cabinet? 
0=no provisions 
1=Chief executive (President, Monarch) 
2=Parliament   
4 CAB_DISM: Who dismiss the Cabinet? 
0=no provisions 1=Chief executive (President, Monarch) 
2=Parliament   
5 PM_ELEC (source: DPI2010)  
Register the year of Prime Minister election, when she/he is not named by 
other bodies than public vote. The year of election is registered with a 1. 
6 PM_NAME (source: POLCON 2010). Prime Minister name. 
7 PM_PARTY (source: POLCON 2010). Prime Minister party 
 
8 EX_LEG: Executive Legislative Initiative. Yes or no value 
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If such initiative is allowed by Constitutions only in specific, listed, 
circumstances, we give 0.5 value 
 
9 EXEC_NAT (source: DPI2010)  
“Nationalist party”: when  a primary component of the party’s platform is 
the creation or defence of a national or ethnic identity as in case of “parties 
that have fought for independence, either militarily or politically, from a colonial 
power” (DPI 2010: 8). Yes or no value. 
In cases where executive is independent, the executive’s personal 
orientation is recorded.  
When there is no executive cells are left blank. 
 
10 EXEC_AGE (source: DPI2010)  
“Party - Time since formation under the same name”  
0 if executive is not affiliated with a party.  
 
11 ALLHOUSE (based on the methodology of: DPI2010) 
“Does party of executive control all relevant houses?  
Yes or no value. Cells are left blank when there are no information 
 
3 - LEGISLATIVE POWER 
 
1 HOU_TERM: The House term in number of years. Real number 
2 SEN_TERM: The Senate term in number of years. Real number 
3 FRAUD: Record anecdotic evidences on denounced electoral fraud by 
both National and International observers. Yes or no value. Cells are left 
blank when there are no information 
4 HOU_ELEC: This variable register the year of house election. Year 
The year of election is registered with a 1. 
5 HOU_EL_MODE: this variable register the mode of House election:  
0= non elected legislature; 
1= entirely elected by public vote;  
2= partially elected by voters, and partially by the Chief executive. 
This variable is also considered for the definition of variable REGIME, 
section 4. 
6 HOU_EL_MODEa:  
Majoritarian=1, or Proportional=0. 
7 SEN_EL_MODE: this variable register the mode of Senate election.  
1= entirely elected by public vote;  
2= partially elected by voters, and partially by Chief executive;  
3= named by the Chief executive;  
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4= general public is excluded and the Senate is elected by people having 
certain characteristics such as: members of local councils, members of 
professional chambers.  
Cells are left blank when only one chamber exists. 
8 REG_ELEC: Regularity of election in the Parliament. 
Yes or no value. 
It derives analyzing the correspondence between HOU_ELEC and 
HOU_TERM and refers only to the lower chamber. In correspondence of 
the HOU_ELEC, year of election, it is reported a 1 in case of respected 
terms for elections. 
Considering the analysis starting from 1990, a value of 1 is assigned to the 
elections happened in the first 5 years of 1990s. 
 
HOUELEC_REG is the synthetic indicator defined for elections regularity. 
It considers each years election and its respondent to the expected end of 
the parliamentary term. 
Yes or no value 
-1= non-regularity ( HOU_ELEC_Y==1 & REG_ELEC==0) 
1=  regularity ( HOU_ELEC_Y==1 & REG_ELEC==1) 
0= no information ( HOU_ELEC_Y==0 & REG_ELEC==0) 
 
4 - PARTIE AND ELECTIONS 
 
1 FREE: Freedom of expression association meeting formally granted by 
Constitutions.  
Yes or no value. 
2 P_REL: Religious foundation of parties. Yes or no value. 
3 P_IDEOL: ideology of parties as allowed to by Constitutions 
0= political (no religion, linguistic, or regional issue as dominant);  
1= religious; 
2= ethnic; 
3= both religious and political. 
 
4.1 - MAJORITY PARTY  
This part has been built following the DISP 2010 methodology and taking 
some data opportunely quoted.  
 
1 TOTSEATS: Total Seats in the Legislature (DPI2010) Total number. 
Total seats in the legislature, or in the case of bicameral legislatures, the 
total seats in the House.  
This variable includes appointed and elected seats.  
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2 MJ_PARTY: (source:  DPI2010) It refers to the largest government party:  
2.1 MJPNAME;  
2.2 MJPSEAT;  
2.3 MJPVOTE. 
 
4.2 - OPPOSITION PARTY  
This part has been built following the DISP 2010 methodology and taking 
some data opportunely quoted.  
 
1 NUM_OPP: (source: DPI2010).  
Number of Opposition Seats. Real number.  
Records the total number of seats held by all opposition parties. 
Appointees are not included on the assumption that they support the 
government.  
2 OPP_VOTE: (source: DPI2010)  
Vote Share of Opposition Parties. Records the total vote share of all 
opposition parties.  
3 NUM_GOV: (source: DPI2010)  
Number of Government Party Seats. Real Number.  
Total number of seats held by all government parties.  
4 NUM_VOTE: (source DPI2010) 
Vote share of Government Parties. Records the total vote share of all 
government parties.  
 
5 - PARLIAMENT DISMISSAL AND VETO POWER 
 
1 LEG_DISM: Who dismiss the Parliament?  
This variable is related to group 4- Regime, specifically in those cases in 
which the Chief Executive may dismiss the Parliament and call for new 
elections. 
1= Chief executive 
0= Other (i.e.: military) 
2 LEG_DISM_JUST: In cases the Chief Executive may dismiss the 
Parliament, we report yes or no value when a justified reason is required 
by Constitutional provision. 
0= No justification 
1= Justification required 
Cells are left blank when there are no provisions on this point. 
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3 LEGVeto: Parliament' s Control Procedures on Executive's action - i.e.: 
rights of interpellation 
Yes or no value. Cells are left blank when Constitutions say nothing. 
 
6 - POLITY CONSTRAINTS 
 
X_CONST – Source: POLCON 2010 data base and POLITY IV project 
Constraints to the executive power.  
Definition: “This variable refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the 
decision making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such 
limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups”” (Marshall, Gurr and 
Jaggers, POLITY IV, 2010: 24). Such groups may be majority parties in the 
legislatures, or the opposition parties in a highly fragmented political scenario, 
ruling parties, and the monarch entourage; military as well as religious groups 
when strong may be considered as accountable groups. In many cases an 
independent judiciary constitute one of the groups e are referring to. The 
relevance of this value is given by the possibility of measuring the level of 
check and balances in the decision making process. It goes from unlimited 
authority to executive subordination and very limited room for action for the 
executive. 
 
Available data: since 1990 to 2007 
 
POLCON V 2010 – Source: POLCON 2010 data base 
The index assigns to countries without effective veto points the lowest score. 
Identifying veto points, firstly the different institutionalised veto power are 
identified, as we did analysing the role of executive and legislative, as well as 
judiciary in the 4th  section. Specifically, “The preferences of each of these branches 
and the status quo policy are then assumed to be independently and identically drawn 
from a uniform, unidimensional policy space. This assumption allows for the derivation 
of a quantitative measure of institutional constraints using a simple spatial model of 
political interaction” (Heinsz, POLCON 2010). The measure obtained is modified 
in order to consider the extent of alignment across government branches; a further 
modification occurs when capturing the extent of preference heterogeneity within 
each legislative branches (ibidem). 
 
4) FORMAL JUDICIARY INDEPENDENCE FROM POLITICAL POWER 
 
This section summarize data on judiciary independence by political power 
mainly. It is based on the analysis of Constitutional texts, and the presence of 
specific provisions regarding: 
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- formal independence of judiciary, both from political and religious power; 
- methods for magistrates appointment and dismissal. 
Mindep variable gives a measure of independence of judicial from political 
power, as resulting by the analysis of Constitutions. It is one of the three 
dimension of institutional endowment considered by Levy and Spiller (2004) 
together with restraints on regulators’ discretion written in the regulatory system; 
and restraints on changing regulatory systems, formal or substantial (Levy and 
Spiller, 2004: 202), here considered too. 
 
Independency== 1 if ( M_APPO==2 &  POL_INDEP==1), (M_APPO==3 &  
POL_INDEP==1), (M_DISM==2 &  POL_INDEP==1), (M_DISM==0 &  
POL_INDEP==1)  
Dependency==0 if (M_APPO==1 &  POL_INDEP==0), ( M_DISM==1 &  
POL_INDEP==0)  
 
1 POL_INDEP: Formal independence of judiciary power by political power. 
When Constitutions say nothing, cell are left blank. Yes or no value. 
2 REL_INDEP: Formal independence of judiciary power by religion. When 
Constitutions say nothing, cell are left blank. Yes or no value. 
3 M_APPO: Magistrates appointment, and careers decision. 
1= Chief Executive, sometimes she/he is Head of Magistracy;  
2= Judiciary Body, when the Head is different from the Chief Executive;  
3= Other such as the Ministry or those Constitutions referring to law, even 
when rest vague on this point1. 
When Constitutions say nothing, cells are left blank. 
4 M_DISM: Magistrate dismissal decision. 
Magistrate dismissal by political power = 1 
Magistrate dismissal by magistrate body=2 
Magistrates dismissal not possible =0 
When Constitutions say nothing, cells are left blank. 
 
5) COUNTRIES’ STABILITY  
 
Description of stability of a country is derived by four ICRG indicators 
referring to Internal conflicts, External conflicts, Military in politics, Religion in 
politics. These four dimensions give a wider framework for comprehension of 
countries’ political stability.  
 
Available data: since 1990 to 2009 
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1 Internal Conflict – this indicator assesses the level of political violence in the 
country and its potential impact on governance.  
Definition: “The highest rating is given to those countries where there is no armed or 
civil opposition to the government and the government does not indulge in arbitrary 
violence, direct or indirect, against its own people. The lowest rating is given to a 
country embroiled in an on-going civil war. The risk rating assigned is the sum of three 
subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 
points”  
(ICRG, http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx#PolRiskRating) .  
 
The subcomponents are: 
- Civil War/Coup Threat 
- Terrorism/Political Violence 
- Civil Disorder  
 
A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk  
A score of 0 points to Very High Risk. 
Total score: 12 Points 
 
2 External Conflict – It assesses the risk to the incumbent government deriving 
from foreign actions, ranging, both non-violent external pressure (diplomatic 
pressures, withholding of aid, trade restrictions, territorial disputes, sanctions, etc) and 
violent external pressure (cross-border conflicts to all-out war). 
Definition: the risk rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a 
maximum score of four points and a minimum score of 0 points.  
(ICRG, http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx#PolRiskRating) .  
 
The subcomponents are: 
- War 
- Cross-Border Conflict 
- Foreign Pressures  
 
A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk  
A score of 0 points to Very High Risk. 
Total score: 12 Points  
 
3 Military in Politics – considered military involvement in politics, as diminution 
of democratic accountability. Thus, a military takeover or threat of a takeover may 
also represent a high risk if it is an indication that the government is unable to 
function effectively and that the country therefore has an uneasy environment for 
foreign businesses. 
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Definition: The lowest the rank, the greatest the degree of military participation in 
politics. 
(ICRG, http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx#PolRiskRating) .  
 
Highest score: 6 Points 
4 Religion in Politics – It refers to cases in which Religious tensions may derive 
from the domination of a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law by 
religious law and apply exclusivist policy on the base of religious affiliation.  
“The risk involved in these situations range from inexperienced people imposing 
inappropriate policies through civil dissent to civil war”. 
Definition: The lowest the rank, the greatest the degree of religion in politics and 
eventual tensions. 
(ICRG, http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx#PolRiskRating) .  
 
Highest score: 6 Points  
 
6)  COUNTRIES’ INVESTMENT PROFILE   
 
Definition: This is an “assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that are 
not covered by 
other political, economic and financial risk components. The risk rating assigned is the 
sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points and a 
minimum score of 0 points”.  
The subcomponents are: 
- Contract Viability/Expropriation;  
- Profits Repatriation;  
- Payment Delays  
 
A score of 4 points equates to Very Low Risk  
A score of 0 points to Very High Risk. 
Total score: 12 Points 
 
Available data: since 1990 to 2009 
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Acronyms: Parties and movement as reported in dataset 
 
Algeria:  
RND: National Rally For Democracy 
FLN: National Liberation Front 
 
Egypt: 
ASP: Socialist Party 
NPD: National Democratic Party 
 
Lebanon: 
RD: Resistance and Development 
 
Libya 
ASU: Arab Socialist Union 
 
Morocco: 
Socialist: Socialist Union of Popular Forces 
UC: Constitutional union 
Usfp: SOCIALIST 
ISTQLAL: Independency party 
AKP: Justice and Development Party 
 
Syria: 
NPF: National Progressive Front 
 
Turkey  
AKP: Justice and Development Party 
DSP: Democratic left (socialist) party 
DYP: Truth party 
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Chapter 4 
 
Independent Regulatory Agencies and Rules 
Harmonization for the Electricity Sector and Renewables 
in the Mediterranean Region13 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The paper investigates the extent of independence and decision making 
autonomy of energy regulatory agencies in the Mediterranean region. 
Being one of the features characterizing the process of liberalization 
(OECD, 2002) , agencies’ independence from political power and 
stakeholders is widely recognised as a guarantee of regulatory 
commitments of a country (Majone 1996). With regards to the energy 
sector, the establishment of Independent Regulatory Agencies (IRAs) 
may favour investments in networks infrastructure and, considering 
the increasing relevance of renewable energy sources, facilitates system 
adaptation to the integration of intermittent renewable sources such as 
solar and wind.  
Regulatory agencies have been recently set-up in relevant energy 
producers and transit countries of the Mediterranean region, Middle 
East and Northern Africa (MENA) countries mainly. The 
Mediterranean region, currently at the centre of renovating interests on 
electricity and renewables, is highly involved in EU frameworks of 
cooperation, with energy rules convergence as one of the main 
objectives to achieve. In the aftermath of current initiatives and 
investment projects, such as the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the 
Desertec, a harmonized and transparent regulatory framework at wider 
Mediterranean level is required. Thus, the progressive establishment of 
IRAs in the southern Mediterranean region is here analysed jointly 
with the degree of adoption of those regulatory standards qualifying 
the globalization of regulation (Levi-Faur 2005).  
                                                 
13 Carlo Cambini Politecnico di Torino and EUI-Florence School of Regulation, 
carlo.cambini@polito.it . Donata Franzi, IMT Advanced Studies donata.franzi@imtlucca.it 
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Our study, which includes original data from IRAs in the 
Mediterranean region, mainly refers to findings from a survey 
launched on January 2012 among Mediterranean regulators and energy 
companies. Data have been collected from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Turkey, and Croatia. All respondents belongs to regulatory 
agencies with the exception of Morocco and Tunisia, where IRAs have 
not been set-up and answers have been provided respectively by the 
energy company, ONE, and the Ministry of Industry. The analysis is 
completed with information drawn from official documents on Algeria, 
Israel and Lebanon. Libya and Syria have not been considered due to 
the unclear political situation, and civil war, at the moment in which 
the analysis started.  
Our study fills the gap in the literature on independence of 
regulators in developing countries, organizing new and existent data 
with the aim of clarify the extent of southern Mediterranean 
independence of energy regulatory bodies. With this regard, data 
organization follows three dimensions of agencies’ independence: 
decision making autonomy, organizational autonomy, and agencies’ 
accountability.  
Survey’s results show that regulatory agencies in the region are 
mainly advisory bodies of executives, the latter being the sole having 
decision making powers on issues such as tariff setting and Third Party 
Access. Moreover, network unbundling in the region remains 
essentially functional, and state-owned companies own and manage 
networks in the majority of cases here considered. To sum-up, in 
MENA countries IRAs have been established before liberalizing the 
electricity sector and political interference in regulatory decisions still 
affects the existing regulatory framework.   
The paper is structured into five sections: Section 2 critically 
reviews the rationale behind IRAs’ establishment. It analyse the model 
of IRAs as affirmed in European Union (EU), being regulatory 
convergence in the Mediterranean region mainly promoted by EU. 
Section 3 provides detailed description of our research method (section 
3). Methods for data collection and assessment of the index of 
independency are described. The empirical analysis of IRAs in the 
mentioned countries is provided in Section 4. In Section 5 the study of 
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regulatory harmonization in the electricity and renewables sector 
within the Mediterranean region is reported. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Rationale behind regulatory agencies’ independence 
 
2.1 Restructuring utility industries: the role of IRAs   
Introducing elements of competition in traditionally state-managed 
sectors, requires agencies’ independence being substantial in terms of 
agencies’ legitimacy, accountability, and capture risks (Larsen et al. 
2005 and 2006). With this regard, IRAs institutional design have to 
assure: agencies’ independence, since the decision making point of 
view, from the Executive power; agencies’ accountability, in front of the 
elected bodies; and agencies’ autonomy, in terms of financial resources 
to be managed and expertise to be recruited in order to reduce capture 
risks and asymmetric information problems. Thus, the inception of 
truly independent agencies has a positive impact on the investment 
decisions of EU public utilities (Cambini and Rondi 2011). At the level 
of developing countries, Latin America and Caribbean cases have been 
largely analysed (Gutierrez 2003; Andres et al. 2006; Correa et al 2006; 
Andres et al. 2007; Andres et al. 2008). The experience of Chile has been 
widely examined; being crucial both for reforms’ sequencing (Newbery 
2001) and their value, the institutional context of the country has been 
assessed as the main influential factor when reforming the electricity 
sector (Levy and Spiller 1994; Gutierrez 2003; Zhang et al. 2006). Trillas 
and Montoya (2011) present an analysis of the evolution of regulatory 
independent agencies for 23 Latin American and Caribbean countries 
in the telecommunications industry. Defining agencies’ independence 
in terms of regulators’ political vulnerability, the authors show that 
higher degree of authorities’ independence is associated with higher 
network penetration. Cubbin and Stern (2006) show that, in those 
countries where an independent agency has been set-up, generation 
capacity has been improved, confirming the relation between 
performance of the utility sector and the governance of regulatory 
institutions. 
In line with the experience of the US (Geradin 2004; Joskow 2007), 
the EU makes the establishment of IRAs at member countries level one 
of the pivotal element to the competitiveness of utilities.  In Europe, the 
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Great Britain was the first country to adopt IRAs (Saal 2002; Cambini et 
al. 2012). At EU level, the Directive 2003/54/EC carefully defined the 
institutional design of regulatory bodies, and provided a first 
framework for a pan-European coordination among regulators through 
the ERGEG - European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas set-
up. Then, the Directive 2009/72/EC, part of a  third package of 
directives aimed at utilities liberalization and energy market 
integration, further stressed the role of agencies, their duties and the 
need for their effective independence; a strengthened coordination at 
EU level through the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators 
(ACER), was affirmed. IRAs, thus, gradually emerge in the EU 
regulatory experience as the instrument pivotal to the electricity sector 
liberalization. Built on the EU domestic regulatory experience, the 
model of IRAs is the one the EU promotes in the Mediterranean 
neighbouring countries through partnership programmes and 
cooperation initiatives.  
Coherently with the literature mentioned in this section, the EU 
action has been directed at influencing those institutional factors that 
my affect utility reform projects. Thus, EU programmes have been 
directed at the state capacity building through the promotion of good 
governance and rule of law. Firstly the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership (1995) and secondly the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(2004), foster sustainable economic growth and market integration at 
Euro-Mediterranean level to be defined on shared regulatory standards 
mainly. The improvement of MENA rule of law and good governance 
is pursued through technical issues of cooperation, as in the case of the 
Mediterranean Solar Initiative adopted within the Union for the 
Mediterranean initiative (2008). Being mainly based on promotion, and 
adoption, of regulatory standards, EU programmes favour a form of 
functional Euro-Mediterranean integration, which allow both to 
circumvent those “macro-political obstacles that have traditionally impeded 
the advancement of co-operation in the region” (Darbouche 2011, p.195), 
and improve countries’ transparency and rule of law. Thus, IRAs have 
to be viewed in the wider framework of EU rule of law and good 
governance promotion, being a case of transparent regulatory practices 
of a country. With this regard, the 2007 Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial 
Conference provided, for the first time, the assessment of the 
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regulatory framework for the electricity sector at MENA countries 
level, including the role of existing regulatory agencies, and the degree 
of diffusion of EU regulatory standards . Moreover, the EU role as rules 
promoter was, although indirectly, assessed. 
Rules promotion may only partially explains the reasons behind 
spreading regulatory practices. Following the institutional economics 
literature, rules are implemented differently depending on countries’ 
institutional endowment (North 1990 mainly) With this regard, Levy 
and Spiller (1996) highlight how judiciary independence, functioning 
checks and balances system, veto players and contending social 
interests, as well as administrative capabilities of a country, are 
exogenous factors directly impacting on countries’ regulatory restraints 
and independence of regulatory agencies. The relevance of non-
economic barriers and administrative capabilities to the 
implementation of specific policies, such as those for renewables, have 
been stressed with regards to EU Mediterranean countries too in 
comparison to northern ones (Lüthi 2010; Lüthi and Wüstenhagen, 
2011). The second part of this section, thus, contains study’s 
assumption on explanatory factors for IRAs’ set-up at MENA level and 
the potential impact of countries’ institutional endowment on 
independence of regulatory bodies.  
 
2.2 The establishment of IRAs: pitfalls of countries’ institutional endowment       
The rationale behind IRAs establishment are (Levy and Spiller, 
1994): 
- the time inconsistency, and  
- the regulatory commitments/credibility issues. 
Electricity is one of the sectors in which time inconsistency problems 
arise in association with different and very often contending social 
interests. In democratic contexts, it is the legislative-executive dynamic, 
as well as the alternation of parties in power, that reveals such 
contending interests. Delegating the rules’ implementation phase to 
technical agencies, thus, reduces the instability of the regulatory 
framework of a country that may be eventually associated to the 
possibility, for a government, of being replaced by other parties having 
different preferences, and representing different social interests. With 
regards to the majority of MENA countries, long lasting regimes show 
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that such a “risk” of being replaced through democratic alternation of 
parties in power was almost absent for the past 20 years. Nonetheless, 
popular uprising throughout 2011 revealed the high degree of 
vulnerability of consolidated authoritarian regimes. Lack of sufficient 
checks and balances between domestic institutions, strong power of 
incumbents, poor level of rule of law and good governance, and a 
bureaucracy largely dependent by the ruling élites, are those 
institutional factors characterizing MENA endowment. 
In such a context, the rational behind IRAs’ set-up may be viewed 
as strengthening incumbents’ regulatory discretion to the expenses of 
eventual opposition forces, and parties, in case of regime change. With 
this regard, the close relation between bureaucrats and incumbents 
makes government’s self-binding, through effective IRAs’ autonomy in 
decision making, less severe than expected. The close relation between 
bureaucrats and incumbents reinforces the capacity to infiltrate 
bureaucracy by élites in powers (Gilardi 2005a). Similarly, the lingering 
relation between incumbents and bureaucrats strengthen bureaucratic 
élites, making bureaucrats one of most relevant players in the region. 
Being MENA a public-driven economy mainly, bureaucrats are influent 
actors in those reforming processes that involve the utility sector too. 
To certain extent, bureaucrats may infiltrate elite in power, having 
developed that knowledge and technical expertise necessary for 
influencing the implementation of rules and reforming projects; they 
are those actors that may assure continuity in the sector’ management, 
and stability of the regulatory framework also in case of unexpected 
regimes change, such as the ones occurred during 2011-2012. 
The second reason behind IRAs’ set-up and independence is the 
regulatory commitments/credibility. Regulatory credibility is the sole 
insurance against the risk of administrative expropriation; when such 
credibility is lacking, it signals that political commitments towards 
sector liberalization is missing, and the regulatory environment of the 
country is not transparent. The stability of authoritarian and 
monarchical regimes of the last 20 years has not been capable of 
generating new investments in the electricity directed at improving 
both cross-border and MENA – EU power exchanges, the latter being 
limited to the interconnection between Spain and Morocco (Medring 
2010). As Levy and Spiller state (1994), the credibility of regulation in 
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the utility sector is higher in countries in which executive and 
legislative discretions are reciprocally counterbalanced, than in 
countries where such counterbalance does not exist or is weak. Missing 
executive-legislative counterbalance, every form of regulatory 
intervention may be easily knocked over. In this case, administrative 
expropriation is a serious risk for foreign investors interested in 
obtaining a fair return to their investments.  
Considering the scenario of MENA countries, the functioning 
judiciary power remains the sole capable of assuring that degree of 
regulatory credibility for spurring new investments. The judiciary 
power, when independent, works as restraint to incumbents’ 
discretion. Thus, the highest is the degree of judiciary independence, 
the lowest is the regulatory commitment problem. In MENA region, 
such independence is undermined by poor resources available, 
arbitrary decisions on judges’ appointment and dismissal, as well as 
career improvements, and incumbents’ interference in the 
administration of justice when verdicts refer to regime opponents 
mainly (Freedom House 2011).     
 
3. IRAs in the Mediterranean region. The Survey method 
 
This study assumes countries’ institutional background, and political 
cleavages, as relevant for the definition of the country’s regulatory 
governance (Jordana and Levi-Faur 2006; Belloc and Nicita 2011). With 
this regard, in order to understand the extent of independence of 
regulators in the Mediterranean region, and the role played by 
countries’ institutional background, the dimensions of decision making 
autonomy, organizational autonomy, and accountability have been 
translated into a questionnaire. The survey has been directed at 
southern Mediterranean energy regulators and electricity companies. 
The objective of the survey is twofold: tackling the issue of regulators’ 
independence in the Mediterranean region, and provide a measure of 
regulatory convergence in the area.  
The paragraphs that follow clarify data collection and assessment 
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3.1 The data collection  
Questions in the survey refer to standards for electricity sector 
liberalization mentioned in EU documents and plans for cooperation 
adopted since the 1996, when the Euro-Mediterranean energy 
partnership was launched in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean 
policy. The survey  has been launched on January 2012 with the 
support of the Mediterranean Energy Observatory (OME), Paris. The 
text of the survey has been firstly tested by experts of the Florence 
School of Regulation at the European University Institute (EUI, 
Florence) and the Oxford Energy Institute. Then, invitations to take 
part to the study have been sent to energy companies and regulators 
members of the OME and the Association of Mediterranean Regulators 
for electricity and gas (MedReg). 
Moving from MedReg Institutional Group recommendations on 
minimum requirements necessary for assuring agencies’ independence 
(2008), and previous studies on the issue (Gilardi 2002; 2005 a, b; 
Johannsen et al. 2004; Larsen et al. 2006), the survey includes questions 
referring to regulators’ competences, internal organization and budget, 
relation with the political power and stakeholders. It has been 
structured into an introductory section and 5 sections related to the 
electricity sector organization and the role of respondents’ 
organization. The introductory section (question 1 to 6) asks to define 
the organization whose respondents are referring to, distinguishing 
between national regulatory agencies (IRAs) and other bodies, such as 
offices, ministry’s departments, or companies responsible for the sector. 
Question on the year of IRA establishment, number of employees and 
agencies’ normative source (ordinary law, regulation, decree etc.), 
conclude the introductory part. The five sections on the electricity 
sector organization and the role of respondents’ organization,  have 
been organized as follows: 
- Section A Energy Sector Organization: Unbundling, Tariff 
setting mechanisms, the TPA regime and the role of regulators;  
- Section B Regulator’s competences having regards to License 
issue, Dispute settlement, Consumers’ protection;  
- Section C Energy Efficiency and Renewables, policies and 
regulators’ role; 
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- Section D Regulator's Relations with Stakeholders, the political 
power mainly;  
- Section E Regulator's Internal Organization. 
 
3.2 Assessment of independence index 
Such as in Gilardi (2002) and Johannsen et al. (2004) studies, in 
order to measure agencies’ independence we adopt binary variables 
(i.e.: yes or no) varying between 0, absence or very low degree of 
independence, and 1, independent agencies. Then, on the base of 
answers received, the index of regulators’ independence has been 
defined as a simple average of the scores of the three dimensions of 
independence we consider. As in previous studies by Correa et al. 
(2006), Brown et al. (2006), and Andres et al. (2007), our analysis defines 
three sub-indexes for the assessment of both formal and substantial 
aspects of regulatory agencies’ independence. Specifically, as for 
Andres et al. (2007), decision making legitimacy, autonomy, and 
accountability of regulators are dimensions on the base of which 
regulatory performance in each country is measured and is considered 
in the sub-indexes definition. The independence of IRAs is, thus, 
described in relative terms: each single dimension for which IRAs are 
independent relatively contributes to the independence of the agency 
(Hanretty and Koop, 2009). Thus, sub-indexes for each of the three 
dimensions considered are available, together with an overall 
independence index. Answers are reported for each dimension of 
independence considered.  
Data referring to countries that have not established an IRA have 
not been considered in the index assessment. Data referring to 
countries and organizations that did not answer to the survey, but of 
which information are available in the literature have been considered 
for both index assessment and the description of the regulatory 
framework of the  electricity sector in order to provide for the 
organization of all available information for the entire region. The 
literature we refer to consists of Country Reports from the “Paving the 
way to the Mediterranean Solar Plan” initiative (2012) and the Euro-
Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Limassol (2007). The 
Presentation of Algerian authority CREG, taken on May 2011 at 
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European University Institute during the MedReg training seminar, is 
also considered. 
 
4. Dimensions of independence of regulatory agencies in the 
Mediterranean region 
 
With the aim of defining the current regulatory framework in the 
Mediterranean region, and harmonization with the EU system, the data 
here reported includes countries involved by the European 
Neighbourhood Policy – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Tunisia - and countries candidate to the European 
membership – Turkey and Croatia . Table 1 reports data on 
organizations that participate to the survey, while table 2 refers to data 
for those countries that did not reply to the questionnaire. These data 
allow to make comparison and to identify the eventual rules 
convergence processes among some of the most interesting cases for 
the electricity sector organization and renewable energy policies 
throughout the Mediterranean.  
 
4.1 Decision making autonomy 
Data referring to independence of IRAs in the implementation of 
different regulatory tools are summarized in Table 3. The Table reports 
exclusive and/or shared competences having regards to sections A and 
B of the survey.  
Table 3 shows, among MENA countries, only Jordan ERC may be 
defined as fully independent under the first dimension here 
considered. Jordan’s authority is fully competent for those aspects 
identified as pivotal to sector’s liberalization: Unbundling, TPA and 
tariff setting. The other well performing agency is, to this stage of 
analysis, the Turkish one. The Turkish EMRA has, with the sole 
exception of tariffs’ definition, decision making powers on all 
regulatory issues given in the survey. For those Mediterranean 
countries for which an IRA does not exist, the electricity sector’s most 
sensitive aspects are co-managed by public companies and central 
administration apparatus.  
These results confirm the important role of central administration 
and executive power, as described in Section 2. It is the executive, 
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indeed, that has the final decisional power on many features of 
regulatory intervention. Thus, when looking at those issues on which 
credible regulatory commitments and independence of regulators are 
measured in this study – unbundling, TPA and tariffs’ setting - we may 
conclude that IRAs in the Mediterranean area are not truly autonomous 
and independent in the decision process. 
 
4.2 Regulators’ organizational autonomy  
The data available for the regulators’ internal organization and 
autonomy are reported in Table 4. Here we summarized findings from 
section E of the survey. This section has been organized following those 
organizational features “universally recommended” and fundamental 
in order to assure agencies’ independence (Johannsen et al. 2004). It 
represents an opportunity to define the degree of independence of 
energy regulators looking at internal procedures for the organization of 
the work and its management within the organization. 
With regards to decisions on the regulators’ internal organization, 
this competence is shared between the regulator and the legislative 
power in the Egyptian and Jordan case; it is full competence of the 
regulator in the Croatian case. Turkish agency answers to the question 
generically and simply refers to the law as the normative source at the 
base of regulators’ internal organization; thus, it has not been possible 
to attribute any quantitative measures.  With regards to the personnel 
policy, it is a competence that the IRAs shares with the legislative 
power in the Egyptian, Jordan and Turkish case. Such as for decisions 
on the agency’s internal organization, in the Croatian case personnel 
policy is under the sole competence of the regulator. Looking at the 
organizational structure of the IRAs’ board, the model of Regulatory 
Council is the most selected one compared to the Single Head 
Regulator.  
In the study, Regulatory Council model is provided with higher 
scores than Single Head model, being convinced that a collegial board 
is more independent than a single chief, usually directly appointed by 
the executive head. Finally, with regards to IRAs budget, low scores are 
registered. Information on budget autonomy and approval describe 
one of the most important aspects of organizational autonomy of 
regulators: it provides knowledge of regulator’s potential for using 
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resources independently from the political will, including the 
possibility to appoint experts and qualified human resources. The 
executive power is competent for the Regulator's budget definition and 
approval. The IRAs budget is generally defined for 1 year. 
The index we calculate shows the poor degree of autonomy of IRAs 
from southern Mediterranean countries. Croatia is the best performing, 
while Jordan is now ranked a 0.44 as Egypt and Turkey is only 0.31. As 
reported in Section 3 on index assessment, missing data for Israelian 
and Algerian authorities makes the assessment of the dimension 2 of 
agencies’ independence impossible. 
 
4.3 Regulators’ relationship with the political power, and accountability 
measures 
Answers to questions on accountability provisions are summarized 
in Table 4. Section D of the survey is entirely dedicated to this 
dimension of independence. In this part of the study, we look at 
effective regulators’ independence from all those actors interested in 
limiting regulators’ actions. Such as for dimension 2 of independence, 
the assessment of the third dimension of independence for Israelian 
and Algerian agencies is impossible due to missing data. 
The relation between regulators, on one side, and the political 
power and stakeholders, on the other side, is relevant considering the 
risk of a façade independence, such as in those cases when the 
regulator derives instructions from the executive power. Firstly, we 
asked respondents to identify, among the options provided, the model 
that characterizes relations between IRAs, the executive power and the 
stakeholders. The options provided in the survey refer to three kind of 
relations: advisory, ministry, and independent model. 
In the first case no compulsory decision are taken by regulator, 
which is a sort of specialised councillor of the government. It is the 
government that has direct relation with stakeholders. In the ministry 
model, the regulator is an office, or department, within the executive. It 
has no autonomy, and cannot entail direct relations with stakeholders, 
except for those taken on behalf of the government or ministry. In the 
independent model, the regulator does not require approval from the 
executive power for taking decision on regulatory aspects and is 
autonomous in using regulatory tools, as those identified in the first 
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dimension of independence. With the exception of Egypt, that chooses 
the ministry model, the other respondents selected the independent 
model. We controlled these answers with those provided under 
dimension 1 – regulatory competences. Considered the missing 
exclusive competences on unbundling, TPA and tariffs’ setting, we 
scored such a choice with 0.75 in the Turkish and Croatian case. All of 
them affirmed IRAs not having full competences on tariff setting, 
mainly. This adjustment allows controlling the coherence of answers 
provided.  
With regards to the role of the executive power in case of appeal 
against regulator’s decision, it should be stressed that 
Courts/Administrative tribunal is the option chosen by all IRAs 
respondents. The role of judiciary power is relevant in countries in 
which the sole limit to incumbents’ discretion is represented by an 
independent magistracy. With regards to MENA countries, as 
explained in Section 2, the independence of magistracy may be defined 
at risk of being undermined by groups in power, with the sole 
exception of Israel, Turkey and Jordan.  
Finally, the section closes with two questions related to obligations 
of the regulator in front of the executive and legislative powers. The 
answers to these questions directly assess are the accountability 
dimension of independence. Survey’s answers confirm low 
independence from the executive power in the EgyptERA case. The 
Egyptian agency has to submit an annual report to the executive for 
approval; while, there are no accountability provisions related to 
relations between the regulator and the legislative power. Jordan ERC 
is not required to receive approval or to inform both the executive and 
the legislative of its work. Turkish EMRA need to inform both the 
executive and legislative powers; while Croatian HERA need to inform 
the executive power and submit an annual report for approval to the 
legislative power. The sub-index defined, thus, register very low values 
of independence for the Egyptian authority, while highest values are 
registered by Croatia and Jordan. 
 
4.4 Independence index  
As mentioned in the paragraph 3.2, a final index of independence is 
assessed as single average of the three sub-indexes defined. Table 6 
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reports the final data. On a scale from 0 to 1, none of the investigated 
agencies are graded with 1, full independent IRAs. Jordan and Croatia 
are among non-EU countries, those better performing. In the Croatian 
case, being the country candidate to the EU membership, a direct 
influence of the EU can be identified. Such direct influence, we may 
conclude, works better than in the Turkish case. Jordan confirms to be 
an interesting case in terms of regulatory commitments. Although a 
monarchy with strong powers of the executive on the energy sector, 
Jordan is the sole case of IRA, within the southern Mediterranean, 
having decisional power on issues such as tariffs. Moreover, Courts 
may intervene in case of appeal against regulator’s decision, confirming 
the better functioning of the judiciary power as restraints to executive 
and regulators’ administrative discretion, than in other MENA 
countries. Thus, compared to the other southern Mediterranean 
countries having already established an IRA and taking part in the 
survey, Jordan is the most interesting case of regulatory agency 
conceived as insurance against administrative expropriations. 
 
5. Rules harmonization in the Mediterranean region: the electricity 
sector and renewables 
 
The final section of the paper analyse the electricity regulatory 
framework, as well as ad hoc provisions for renewables, resulting from 
the survey. Information have been reported also for those countries 
such as Algeria, Israel and Lebanon, that did not take part in the 
survey. The analysis here developed mainly refers to the section A and 
C of the survey, which investigates those aspects of the acquis 
communautaire on energy promoted through the Euro-Mediterranean 
cooperation, and section E on renewables.  
In the first part of section A, question on managing networks, share 
of Independent Power Producer (IPP), TPA regime and transmission 
tariff system, have been included in order to understand how much it 
has been achieved in terms of sector liberalization and the creation of a 
safe environment for potential private, foreigners included, investors. 
Specifically, questions from 7 to 12, refers to sector’s unbundling; 
answers are summarised in Table 7.  
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The unbundling is one of the main aspects promoted at Euro-
Mediterranean level in close relation with the adoption of incentive 
tariffs and the definition of TPA regime. With this regard, all countries 
in which an IRA exists have unbundled the electricity sector or are 
expected to complete it, such as Israel, in the immediate future. The 
exceptions are by Morocco and Tunisia, among survey’s respondents, 
and Lebanon, among non respondents; all of them have not established 
an IRA. The main characteristic of unbundling in MENA countries is 
the functional separation of generation, transport, and distribution 
activities, with the last two activities being under monopoly regime. 
Moreover, the coincidence between owner and manager of the 
networks, which are the state-owned companies, persists. Typically, 
state-owned, and vertically integrated, companies own and manage the 
distribution network, with the sole exception of Jordan; in this case the 
Government and the IRA manage the network.  
Table 7 reports different percentage of IPP per country with the 
year in which the system has been defined. The most critical situation is 
the Lebanese one, where a law for reforming the sector, launched in 
2002, is in standby and a regulatory agency is missing. Egyptian low 
percentage of IPP is also recorded; however, new IPPs are expected in 
the immediate future when implementing renewables policies with a 
direct involvement of the regulatory agency, being competent for 
license issue. The Moroccan case is the one obtaining highest 
percentage of IPPs. Contracts for energy production, with guarantee of 
purchase by the state-owned company ONE, have been concluded with 
companies Jorf Lasfar Energy Company (JLEC), Compagnie Wind of 
the Strait (CED) and Electric Power of Tahaddart (EET) (Paving the 
way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan - Moroccan Report, 2012). 
Tunisian and Jordan IPPs percentage are the same as for Turkey. IPP 
concessions are provided though a tender, both in the Tunisian case 
(with the state-owned company STEG as Single Buyer) and in Jordan. 
This situation is confirmed for energy generation from renewables too 
(Paving the way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan - Tunisian and 
Jordan Reports, 2012).  
The analysis proceeds with the study of the transmission tariff 
system and TPA regime. With regards to transmission tariffs, the 
survey asks to choose among the following options: cost plus/ rate of 
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return (RoR), price cap, and revenue cap (Vogelsang, 2002; Joskow, 
2008). As Table 8 shows, Egypt, Jordan, and Croatia selected, as current 
transmission tariff, the RoR; Turkey indicated the revenue cap. 
Considering previous studies on the argument, Algeria adopts a cost of 
service mechanism, as well as Israel (European Commission 2007). 
Considering that respondents did not answered to the question on the 
tariff structure (question 14 in the Annex), the emerging scenario refers 
to the main literature on the argument. We may argue that MENA 
regulatory framework is characterized by limited incentives for 
innovation, requiring RoR “revenues to track costs closely” (Armstrong 
and Sappington 2006; Guthrie, 2006), although guaranteeing a fair rate 
of return. The RoR consists of defining a “normal profit or rate of 
return on the firm’s regulatory asset base after allowing for efficient 
capital and operating costs” (Parker 2002, p.501). The RoR includes a 
profit margin the regulator allows to the company, or that the regulator 
and the company agree in between them; it allows investment costs to 
be recovered. The price cap stimulates cost efficiency through the use of 
index of productivity change set for a specific regulatory period; such 
index is adjusted for changes in input prices, quality and efficiency 
targets imposed by the regulator. Letting costs and prices diverge 
during the regulatory lag, provides firms incentives to implement cost 
reducing investment and innovations (Egert, 2009; Cambini and Rondi, 
2010). Both methods have their pro and cons. The RoR is criticised 
because of over-investments due to the fact that profit is set according 
to the size of the asset (Parker 2002). While, the price cap regulation, 
allowing revenues being divergent from costs during a pre-defined 
period of time, “can favour investment on innovation, at least in the short 
term”, but “does not promise specific long-term returns on investment” 
(Armstrong and Sappington 2006, p.341). The third option given in the 
survey is revenue cap. Similar to price cap, the regulator establishes an 
index for a group (basket) of services and operators may change prices 
within this basket so long as the percentage change in revenue does not 
exceed the revenue cap index. Contrary to RoR, in which utilities are 
allowed to set a rate of return on capital, and price cap where prices are 
the regulated variable, revenue cap regulation is designed to 
incentivise companies to increase their efficiency, limiting the amount 
of total revenue received. 
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Clear information are missing on TPA criteria. In this case, the 
authors are aware that having omitted answers’ options in the 
definition of the question results in lacking clarity of information 
provided. Indeed, a specific TPA regime does not emerge and the role 
of regulatory agencies is not clear. With regards to the electricity 
trading, TPA regime when existent permits third parties’ access to the 
transmission network and the subsequent purchasing-selling of 
electricity at regulated or negotiated prices. The opposite is true when 
the Single Buyer model exists, and only one buyer buys electricity, 
usually at the lowest price, by producers and sells it to customers. 
Regulatory Agencies’ role, under a TPA regime, is to set wholesale 
access regulated charges (Medreg 2010). TPA is maybe the most 
common element among MENA countries, and the most divergent one 
between MENA and European countries. While a regulated TPA 
regime is the most diffused form of TPA in EU countries, the MENA 
case is still characterized by the absence of such regime and of an 
effective energy market exchanges.  
We may conclude, thus, that the Single Buyer model is the most 
diffused one at MENA level. Not having yet developed a liberalized 
market for electricity, the answers provided in the survey confirms 
state-owned companies as the sole buyers and sellers of electricity. As 
emerges from the survey, the tools available to regulators for 
guaranteeing TPA non-discrimination and transparency are: template 
contracts to be followed by the utility companies in the Egyptian case; 
dispute resolution between companies and customers are also given. 
Licensing issue and legal provisions exist in the Jordan and Croatian 
cases. Algerian 2002 law provided for the introduction of TPA regime. 
although country studies of 2007 still affirmed that an effective regime 
still need to be defined. Finally, Tunisian’s regulatory framework, 
allows a generic TPA regime if these parties “satisfy  the conditions to 
access the network”; no further explanation are provided. 
In the end, current developments in the field of energy efficiency 
and renewable sources are analysed. Both are pivotal considering the 
increasing energy demands from the southern Mediterranean countries 
and persisting energy dependency from European countries. The 
Mediterranean area has huge potentials for electricity from intermittent 
renewable sources; strong coordination between generators and 
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distributors of the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea is, thus, 
required. Interconnections at south-south and north-south level raise 
the issue of defining a shared institutional framework made up of 
common standards and rules.  
Section E of the survey refers to: regulators’ competences 
concerning energy efficiency and renewables, renewables priorities, 
constraints countries expect to find deploying renewables, their needs, 
and eventual programming instruments already defined or 
forthcoming. Table 9 provides a synthesis of organizations competent 
for energy efficiency and renewables. Energy efficiency and renewables 
are not the either exclusive nor shared competences of IRAs of the 
region with the exception of Jordan and Turkey. Ministries, and specific 
directorates within them, are mainly involved in the definition and 
implementation of energy efficiency and renewables policies. Maybe 
due to the very recent interests in the issue, renewables are widely 
managed by ministries and energy state-owned companies of the 
southern Mediterranean. The situation is different country by country; 
it goes from the missing legal framework in which the Lebanese sector 
develops (the 2002 law for the electricity sector, providing for the 
establishment of national IRA, has never been implemented and the 
organization working mainly as the regulator is the state-owned 
company Electricité Du Liban) to better defined situations, such as the 
one of Turkey and Jordan where national IRAs have specific 
competences in the sector. The lacking involvement of regulatory 
agencies in cases such as Algeria and Egypt, as well as the absence of a 
Moroccan IRA, raise doubts on the capacity to create a positive 
environment for investments in renewables generation and energy 
distribution for three of the countries more directly involved by 
European, public and private, projects. Moreover, the answers 
provided in the survey, as well as existing studies on MENA countries, 
clarifies the existing constraints to energy efficiency and renewables 
deployment countries have to face. The following have been indicated 
by the respondents as the most relevant constraints:  
- lack of financing due to high costs; 
- lack of investments due to low incentives; 
- unavailability of adequate technologies at reasonable prices. 
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The mentioned constraints are typical obstacles when developing 
efficiency in electricity production and distribution. The high 
investment costs, the scarce availability of new technologies at 
accessible prices, may make efforts in promoting energy efficiency and 
renewables not easily to be remunerated.  
Eventually, incentive mechanisms provided have been analyzed. 
Incentive mechanisms indicated in the survey, are feed-in tariffs; 
taxation measures; green certificate; tender mechanisms. To improve 
energy efficiency, competitive tenders are used in the majority of cases, 
while Feed-in tariffs (FIT) is the instrument mainly used for incentivise 
renewables. These mechanisms are still managed by the executive 
power. FIT, as well as Feed-in Premiums (FIP), consists of general 
purchase obligations at regulated prices granted to operators of 
renewable electricity plants for the electricity they feed into the grid. 
FIT, thus, are “preferential, technology specific and government 
regulated” (IEA/OECD 2008). While FIT is a total price per unit of 
electricity paid to the producers, FIP is a bonus additional to the 
electricity market price. Where present, as in the Israelian and Algerian 
cases, premiums introduce competition between producers in the 
electricity market. Usually, such tariffs should be defined for a period 
of 10-20 years in order to guarantee that degree of stability to 
investments decisions. Indeed, if on one hand, the tariff is regulated, 
providing a certain degree of security to investors, on the other hand, 
the FIT may be object of frequent amendments, undermining investors 
return and the credibility of the regulatory framework for the 
renewable policy. Thus, also for deploying renewables, countries 
regulatory culture and regulatory commitments matter.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we report the results from an original survey directed at 
regulators by agencies, ministry departments and energy companies of 
the southern Mediterranean area aiming at assessing the extent of 
regulatory agencies’ independence and the regulators’ tasks in such 
area. Results show that the electricity sector in Middle East and 
Northern Africa (MENA) countries is entirely managed by the 
executive powers and state-owned companies. 
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Regulatory agencies, when existing, are a sort of advisory body of 
the government. Having full decisional autonomy on issues such as 
consumers’ protection, dispute settlement and license issues mainly, 
Mediterranean IRAs miss exclusive competences on unbundling, TPA 
regime and tariff. The latter three aspects are widely recognised as 
pivotal to utilities sector restructuring in a more competitive way. In 
the southern Mediterranean case, the liberalization process mainly 
consists of functional unbundling: the public company separates into 
different branches (i.e. Algeria) or different companies for generation, 
transmission and distribution (i.e. Egypt) but the owner remains the 
state. The tariff system most used is the RoR, while TPA regime is not 
clearly defined in the majority of considered cases. With regards to 
current initiatives for renewables and energy efficiency, the regulatory 
framework that emerges at regional level question the viability of 
investment projects considering the risk of not having a clear discipline 
for new independent producers accessing grid networks and the 
persisting model of Single Buyers (i.e. state-owned companies).  
This study shows that, consistently with the literature on the 
rationale behind the establishment of independent regulatory agencies, 
countries’ regulatory commitments are more clear and the sector better 
performing in those countries registering the highest degree of 
agencies’ independence than in those having poorly independent 
regulatory bodies. With this regard, Jordan, Croatia and Turkey, are the 
most advanced countries in terms of unbundling, which is completed 
in all three cases, and TPA regime, which is regulated such as in the EU 
model especially for Turkey and Croatian. The situation is confirmed 
also having regards to the renewable sector. Analysing the data 
available for IPPs percentage and TPA regime, the study proves that 
while Morocco and Tunisia, two countries at the centre of current 
projects for deploying renewables, tend to preserve the dominant 
position of the state companies and limit potential new entrants, Jordan 
have defined a regulatory framework allowing for the entrance of new 
investors. The three countries confirm as the most interesting case, in 
terms of harmonization with EU standards too; these results, expected 
in the Turkish and Croatian cases, are quite new in the Jordan case.  
Future developments of this study may be directed at assessing the 
influence that countries’ institutional background may have on the 
  168
existing and future model of regulation, usually distinguished between 
market conforming and market controlling model. Finally, an 
assessment of risks of administrative expropriation may be provided in 
particular for those countries that are going to attract new investments 
on electricity generation from renewables but that maintains a 
vertically integrated system with a tariff discipline regulated by 
governments. 
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Table 1 Survey Respondents 
Relation 
with the 
EU* 
Country 
Name 
IRA's Name Acronym Other 
Regulatory 
Body  
Acronym Sector Year  
set-up  
N. 
Employee 
Normative 
source 
PC Egypt Egyptian 
Electric Utility 
and Consumer 
Protection 
Regulatory 
Agency  
EgyptERA     Electricity 2001 70 Presidential 
Degree 
PC Jordan Electricity 
Regulatory 
Commission 
ERC     Electricity 2001 85 General 
Electricity Law 
No. 64, 2002 
CC Turkey Energy 
Market 
Regulatory 
Authority 
EMRA     Electricity 
Gas 
Oil  
LNG  
2001 467 Law no: 4628 
CC Croatia Croatian 
Energy 
Regulatory 
Agency 
HERA     Electricity 
Gas 
Thermal 
energy 
2005 57 Energy 
Activities 
Regulation Act 
  171
PC Morocco     Office 
National 
d'Electricité 
ONE Electricity 1963 8705 Dahir 
PC Tunisia     Ministry of 
Industry - 
Directorate 
general of 
Energy 
MIN Electricity 
Gas 
  20 Function of the 
ministry 
*NOTE: It refers to the relation with the EU. PC: partner countries involved in the cooperation programmes; CC: candidate countries to EU 
membership. 
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Table 2 Missing survey respondents  
Relation 
with the 
EU* 
Missing 
cases 
MENA 
IRAs’ name Acronym Other 
Regulatory 
Body  
Acronym Sector Year 
set-up  
N. 
Employee 
Normative 
source 
PC Algeria Electricity 
and Gas 
Regulatory 
Commission 
CREG     Electricity 
Gas 
2002 50 Law N. 02-01 
February 5, 
2002 on 
electricity and 
the distribution 
of gas 
PC Israel Public 
Utility 
Authority 
PUA     Electricity 2003 30 Electricity law 
2003  
PC Lebanon     Ministry of 
Energy and 
Water 
MEW Electricity 
Gas 
      
*NOTE: It refers to the relation with the EU. PC: partner countries involved in the cooperation programmes; CC: candidate countries to EU 
membership. 
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Table 3 Dimension 1 - tools available to regulatory agencies and decision making legitimacy 
 † Network 
planning  
Year Other 
body* 
Tariff 
setting 
Other  
body 
TPA year Other 
body* 
License 
issue 
Service 
quality 
Disputes 
settle. 
year Consume
rs’ 
protectio
n 
Other 
body* 
year MEAN
** 
Egypt N  PC N CA C NA NA F NA F 2001 F   2001 0.50 
Jordan F 2002   F   F NA   F F F 2002 F   2002 1.00 
Turkey F 2002      F 2002   F F F 2002 F   2002 0.86 
Croatia F 2005     CA F 2006   F N F 2006 S M 2006 0.64 
Tunisia N  PC   CA S 2009 PC N N F  F     
Morocco N  PC   CA N  PC F F N  C     
Algeria†† N  PC    F 2002  F F F 2002 F   2002 0.71 
Israel†† N  PC  F  F 2003  F F F 2003    2003 0.71 
Lebanon†† N  PC       C C   F     
  174
† The table refers to agencies’ competences, F: full competent, scored 1; S: shared competencies, scored 0.5; C: consultative role, scored 0.5; N: 
not competent, scored 0. 
†† Data available in the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Limassol (2007), Country Reports.  
 
*NOTE: it refers to other body having exclusive or shred competencies with the regulator. PC: Public company; CA: Central Administration; 
M: Ministry 
**NOTE: Average of the scores registered for the seven dimensions considered. The value is not calculated for Morocco, Tunisia and Lebanon 
for which IRAs are not existent. 
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Table 4 Dimension 2 -Regulators’ organizational autonomy 
† Internal 
Organisation 
Other*  Personnel 
Policy 
Other* Internal 
Structure*
* 
Other* Budget 
definiti
on  
Other * Budget 
lag 
MEAN*** 
Egypt S R-L S R-L O Board of 
Director
s 
S E 
1 0.44 
Jordan S R-L S R-L 
RC   N E 1 0.44 
Turkey By law   S R-L 
RC   F   1 0.31 
Croatia F   F   RC   N E 1 0.69 
Tunisia F   F           1   
Morocco F   F   SHR   S E 3   
Algeria††       RC   N    0 
Israel              0 
Lebanon               
† The table refers to Regulators’ internal organization and decision making autonomy. F, Full competent=1; S, Shared competence=0.5; N, not 
competent=0. 
†† These data have been taken by CREG presentation (May 2011).  
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*NOTE: O= Other, refers to other body in charge of Regulators’ internal organization and/or with which the regulators shared such 
competencies. R-L= Regulator and Legislative. Score=0.5; E= Executive. Score=0 
** NOTE: RC= Regulatory Council, Chairman plus Council members and Regulatory Staff. Score=0.75.  
SHR= Single Head Regulator, one President plus Regulatory staff. Score=0.5  
***NOTE: Average of the four elements considered  
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Table 5 Dimension 3 - Accountability measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
† The table refers to Regulators’ relations with executive and legislative powers, and stakeholders. 
††Data available in Algerian CREG presentation (May 2011) and Israel Country Report from the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, 
Limassol (2007)  
 
*NOTE: When the authority is not full competent for unbundling, TPA and tariff setting (dimension 1), we give Score=0.75 in case of 
Independent model selection, and Score=0 in case of Ministry model selection. 
  
The Regulator, the 
Government and 
the Stakeholders 
Appeal 
against 
Regulator's 
decisions: 
bodies 
involved 
Regulators' 
formal 
obligations 
towards the 
Executive * 
Regulators' 
formal 
obligations 
towards the 
Legislative** 
Mean*** 
Egypt Ministry Courts A N 0.25 
Jordan Independent Courts N  0.75 
Turkey Independent Courts I  0.56 
Croatia Independent Courts I A 0.81 
Tunisia Ministry Courts      
Morocco Ministry Executive A N  
Algeria†† Advisor      0 
Israel†† Independent    0 
Lebanon      
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**NOTE: A: Annual Reporting for Executive Approval, Score= 0; I: Annual Reporting for Executive Information, Score=0.5; N: No obligations 
towards Executive, Score=1. ***NOTE: A= Annual Reporting for Legislative Approval. Score= 1; I= Annual Reporting for Legislative 
Information. Score=0.5; N=No obligations towards Legislative. Score=0. 
**** NOTE: Average of the four elements considered. 
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Table 6 Independency index 
 † D1 D2 D3 Index 
Egypt 0.50 0.44 0.25 0.40 
Jordan 1.00 0.44 0.75 0.73 
Turkey 0.86 0.31 0.56 0.58 
Croatia 0.64 0.69 0.81 0.71 
Algeria 0.71 - - - 
Israel 0.71 - - - 
† The table reports the index of Independence of those regulatory agencies for the electricity sector that took part in the survey and for which 
data are available in the literature. The index is assessed as simple average of the scores registered for each of the three dimensions of 
independence investigated. 
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Table 7 Electricity sector unbundling 
  Sector 
Unbundled 
IPP% IPP year Distribution 
Network 
Owner 
Network 
manager 
Egypt Y 10 - 19 2002 Public Comp. Public 
Comp. 
Jordan Y 20 - 29 2010 Gov. IRA 
Turkey Y 20 - 29 2003 Public Comp. Comp. 
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Croatia Y 10 - 19 2004 Public Comp. Comp. 
Tunisia  N 20 - 29 1996 Public Comp. Public 
Comp. 
Morocco  N 40 - 49 1996 Local Admin. Public 
Comp. 
Algeria†  Y 25   Public Comp. Public 
Comp. 
Israel† E 0.6-20  1996 Public Comp. Public 
Comp. 
Lebanon††       Public Comp. Public 
Comp. 
† Data have been extracted from Country Reports delivered at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Limassol (2007), and more 
recent reports from the “Paving the way to the Mediterranean Solar Plan” initiative (2012) 
†† Data have been extracted from the Country Report released by the “Paving the way to the Mediterranean Solar Plan”  initiative (2012) 
 
NOTE: Y= Yes; N= No; E= expected; 
Public Companies; Private Companies; Local Administration; Gov.=Government, Executive 
Comp.: Companies; IRA= the Regulatory agency 
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Table 8 Tariff system and TPA regime 
  Transmission 
tariff 
Tariff, 
year 
Regulatory 
lag 
Tariff, 
previous 
system 
TPA criteria 
Egypt Cost plus/Rate 
of Return 
2010 1 Cost 
plus/Rate 
of Return 
Template 
contracts 
Jordan Cost plus/Rate 
of Return 
  1   Licenses 
Turkey Revenue cap 2003 3   non-
discrimination 
Croatia Cost plus/Rate 
of Return 
2006 1 Cost 
plus/Rate 
of Return 
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Tunisia Not applicable         
Morocco Not applicable         
Algeria† Cost of service       non-
discrimination 
Israel† Costs and 
fixed rate of 
return 
        
Lebanon           
† Data taken by Country Reports delivered at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference, Limassol (2007). 
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Table 9 Energy Efficiency and Renewables 
  Energy 
Efficiency 
(EE) 
Authority 
Year Renewables 
(RES) 
Authority 
Year EE Incentive 
system 
RES Incentives* RES Objectives 
(%) 
RES 
Objectives 
(year) 
Egypt ad hoc IRA   New and 
Renewable 
Energy 
Authority 
(NREA) 
1990   FIT;  TE     
Jordan Ministry   ERC   TE; Time 
based 
pricing; 
energy 
audits  
FIT; TE; TAX 11% to 15 % 2016 - 2020 
Turkey Ministry 2007 EMRA   White 
certificates; 
energy 
audits 
FIT 26% to 30% 2021 - 2025 
Croatia ad hoc IRA 2006 Ministry 2007   FIT 11% to 15 % 2016 - 2020 
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Tunisia Ministry   Ministry 2011   TE <10% 2010 - 2015 
Morocco Ministry   Ministry 2009 Time based 
pricing 
FIT 16% to 20% 2016 - 2020 
Algeria† Ministry    Renewable 
Energy 
Commissioner 
- Ministry 
  
  
FIT;FIP;TAX; 
Bank loans 
40% 2020 
Israel†         
  
FIP 10% 2020 
Lebanon†  Ministry - 
Lebanese 
Center for 
Energy 
Conservation 
   Ministry - 
Lebanese 
Center for 
Energy 
Conservation 
  
 
Bank loans 12% 2020 
† Data have been extracted from the Country Reports released by the “Paving the way to the Mediterranean Solar Plan” initiative (2012) 
*NOTE: Feed-in-tariff=FIT; Feed-in-Premiums=FIP; Tax Measures=Tax; Tender=TE; Green Certificates=GC 
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Annex  
Survey text 
 
1. What is the Organization you are referring to?  
Please select one of the two options:  
- National Regulation Authority for Energy IRA;  
- Other regulatory body responsible for Energy sector (i.e.: Ministry 
departments, Offices) OTHER BODY. 
 
2. Please indicate the name of this Organization. 
 
3. The Regulator you are referring to is responsible for: 
- Electricity 
- Gas 
- Electricity and Gas 
- Other, please specify 
 
4. In which year has the Regulator been established? 
 
5. Could you please type the number of employees? 
 
6. Please indicate the normative source that established the Regulator 
 
Section A: Energy Sector Organization  
7. Has the sector been unbundled (separated) into generation, transmission and 
commercialization? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Forthcoming, please specify the year 
 
8. Who is responsible for network planning approval and since when? 
- Public company 
- The Regulator 
- Ministry/Government 
- Other. 
 
9. Please specify the percentage of energy produced by Independent Power 
Producer (IPP) for 2010 
 
10. When the IPP system has been established? 
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11. Who is the distribution network owner? 
- Public company 
- Ministry/Government 
- Local administrations 
- Other. 
 
12. Who is the distribution network manager? 
- The owner and the manager coincide  
- Other. 
 
13. Who is responsible for tariffs definition? 
- The Regulator  
- Public company 
- Public Authorities central administration  
- Public Authorities local administration  
- Other. 
 
14. Please indicate the tariff structure set by the regulator in a synthetic way 
(i.e. by using formula) 
 
15. Which is the transmission tariff mechanism adopted? 
- Cost plus/Rate of Return 
- Price Cap 
- Revenue Cap 
- Other. 
 
16. Since when the chosen transmission tariff mechanism is applied? 
 
17. What is the regulatory lag (length of time between tariffs rate reviews)? 
 
18. Which was the previous tariff mechanism implemented?  
- Cost plus/Rate of Return 
- Price Cap 
- Revenue Cap 
- Other. 
 
19. Is the Regulator responsible for Third Party Access (TPA)? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Only consultative role 
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- Sharing competences with other bodies, please specify 
 
20. Since when the Regulator is responsible for TPA? 
 
21. What kind of means the Regulator dispose for guaranteeing TPA non-
discrimination 
and transparency? 
 
22. Can you please specify criteria provided by your legislation?  
 
Section B: Regulator competences  
 
23 Is the Regulator's competent for authorization procedures (i.e.: licensing the 
network access etc)? If yes, please type for which aspects he is competent and 
since when. 
 
24. Is the Regulator responsible of service quality regulation? If yes, please type 
for which aspects he is competent (i.e. transmission, generation etc) and since 
when?  
 
25. Is the Regulator in charge of dispute settlement (i.e.: between the authority 
and energy companies; between companies and their customers)? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Only consultative role 
- Sharing competences with other bodies, please specify 
 
26. Since when is the Regulator competent for disputes settlement? 
 
27. Is the Regulator competent for consumers' protection? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Only consultative role 
- Sharing competences with other bodies, please specify 
 
28. Since when is the Regulator in charge of consumers' protection? 
 
Section C: Energy Efficiency & Renewables  
 
29. Please indicate the institution in charge of energy efficiency 
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30. Since when it is competent for energy efficiency? 
 
31. Which are the mechanisms the body competent of energy efficiency has 
adopted or is going to adopt in the next future? 
- tender mechanisms; 
- time based pricing; 
- white certificates markets; 
- energy audits; 
- other. 
 
32. Which are the main constraints the body in charge of energy efficiency 
found or is expecting to find in implementing the above mentioned 
instruments? 
- lack of financing due to high costs 
- lack of investments due to low incentives 
- lack of private sector involvement 
- unavailability of adequate technologies at reasonable prices 
- lack of political involvement 
- lack of citizens’ involvement 
- lack of communication 
- other. 
 
33. Please type the name of the Body in charge of renewables 
 
34. Since when it is in charge of renewables? 
 
35. Is the body in charge of renewables competent in setting incentive policy? 
- Yes 
- No 
- Only consultative role 
- Sharing competences with other bodies, please specify 
 
36. Please identify the incentive mechanisms your country have defined for 
electricity production from Renewables 
- feed-in tariffs;  
- taxation measures;  
- green certificate;  
- tender mechanisms; 
- other. 
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37. Which are the objectives to be achieved by your country in terms of 
electricity produced from Renewable sources? 
 
38. Which are the main priorities your National Renewable Energy Policy is 
based on? 
- Support to investments 
- Research and Development support 
- Price definition mechanisms 
- Improved Competition among Operators 
- Other criteria. 
 
39. Please type the name of the Policy or Programme for electricity production 
from Renewables you are referring to and the year of adoption? 
 
Section D: Regulator's Relations with Stakeholders  
40. How are the relations between the Regulator, the Government and the 
Stakeholders (i.e.: energy industry; consumers) defined? 
 
- The Regulator is an advisor of the Government. Final decisions are 
taken by the Government. NO DIRECT relation between Regulator 
and Stakeholders. 
- The ministry model: The Regulator is a body of the Government and 
has NO DIRECT relation with Stakeholders.  
- The independent model: The Regulator is separate by the 
Government. The Regulator has decision power and DIRECT relation 
with Stakeholders 
- Other. 
 
41. In case of appeal against Regulator's decisions, the following are involved: 
- Courts and /or administrative tribunal 
- Government Ministry of Energy 
- Parliament 
- Other. 
 
42. Which are the formal obligations of the Regulator towards the Executive 
(the President, the Prime Minister and Ministries) Power? 
- Presentation of annual report for information only 
- None 
- Presentation of annual report for approval 
- Other. 
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43. Which are the formal obligations of the Regulator towards Legislative (i.e.: 
the Parliament, or the Assembly) Power? 
- Presentation of annual report for information only 
- None 
- Presentation of annual report for approval 
- Other. 
 
Section E: Regulator's Internal Organization 
44. Who decides the Regulator internal organisation (internal procedures, 
allocation of responsibility, tasks etc)? 
- The regulator,  
- The Executive power,  
- The Legislative power,  
- Both regulator and executive,  
- Both regulator and legislative. 
- Other. 
 
45. Who is in charge of the Regulator personnel policy (recruitment, promotion, 
salaries)? 
- The regulator,  
- The Executive power,  
- The Legislative power,  
- Both regulator and executive,  
- Both regulator and legislative. 
- Other.  
 
 
46. Choose the option that better fits with the organizational structure of the 
Regulator 
- Single Head Regulator, one President plus Regulatory staff; 
- Regulatory Council Chairman plus Council members, and Regulatory 
Staff; 
- Other. 
 
47. Who is competent for the Regulator's budget definition and approval (i.e.: 
the government, the regulator)?  
 
48. For what duration of time the budget is defined? (i.e.: annual budget; multi 
annual budget, in this case please type the number of years).  
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